[Petitioner's] confessions were not taken at a time when his arraignment was imminent, and there was no unnecessary delay in the arraignment. The judicial process had not begun, and further investigation, consisting of interrogation of [petitioner] on the more serious charges, was warranted (see People v. Brisman, 268 A.D.2d 279, lv denied, 95 N.Y.2d 793; People v. Hotchkiss, 260 A.D.2d 411, lv denied, 93 N.Y.2d 1003; People v. Quartieri, 171 A.D.2d 889, lv denied, 78 N.Y.2d 1079). Moreover, the total delay from arrest to arraignment was not unusual (see People ex rel. Maxian v. Brown, 77 N.Y.2d 422).
The defendant's contention that the Supreme Court improperly directed a joint trial of the proceedings under Indictment Nos. 143/06 and 144/06 is unpreserved for appellate review ( see People v. Gomezgil, 135 A.D.2d 561, 562, 521 N.Y.S.2d 781), since the specific argument that the defendant now makes on appeal was not made in the Supreme Court ( cf. People v. Ormejuste, 117 A.D.3d 756, 985 N.Y.S.2d 139; People v. Jones, 224 A.D.2d 334, 335, 638 N.Y.S.2d 63). In any event, any error in joining the two matters for trial was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt and the lack of any prejudice to the defendant resulting from the joinder of the two matters for trial ( see People v. Serrano, 74 A.D.3d 1104, 1107, 904 N.Y.S.2d 711; People v. Singson, 40 A.D.3d 1015, 1016, 837 N.Y.S.2d 687; People v. Quartieri, 171 A.D.2d 889, 892, 567 N.Y.S.2d 815). The defendant's remaining contention is without merit.
People v Ormejuste, 117 AD3d 756; People v Jones, 224 AD2d 334, 335). In any event, any error in joining the two matters for trial was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt and the lack of any prejudice to the defendant resulting from the joinder of the two matters for trial (see People v Serrano, 74 AD3d 1104, 1107; People v Singson, 40 AD3d 1015, 1016; People v Quartieri, 171 AD2d 889, 892). The defendant's remaining contention is without merit.
The proof in support of the arson-related counts would have been material and admissible as evidence-in-chief upon a trial of the drug charge, as the proof related to the reasons for the defendant's arrest (see CPL 200.20[b]; People v. Bongarzone, 69 N.Y.2d 892, 895; People v. Nolan, 277 A.D.2d 400). Moreover, the defendant made various statements at the time of his arrest on the drug charge which would have been material and admissible as evidence-in-chief upon a trial of the arson-related counts (see People v. Nolan, supra; People v. Quartieri, 171 A.D.2d 889). SANTUCCI, J.P., O'BRIEN, GOLDSTEIN and COZIER, JJ., concur.
We decline to exercise our power to review those contentions as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice ( see CPL 470.15 [a]). Finally, we conclude that defendant received meaningful representation ( see People v. Baldi, 54 N.Y.2d 137, 147) and that any error in the court's denial of defendant's motion to sever the counts with respect to the two incidents is harmless ( see People v. Quartieri, 171 A.D.2d 889, 892, lv denied 78 N.Y.2d 1079; People v. Ferringer, 120 A.D.2d 101, 111; see also People v. Crimmins, 36 N.Y.2d 230, 241-242).
Contrary to the defendant's contention, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in consolidating the indictments involved in this case (see, CPL 200.20[b]; People v. Bongarzone, 69 N.Y.2d 892; People v. Mota, A.D.2d [2d Dept., Oct. 29, 2001]; People v. Quartieri, 171 A.D.2d 889). The defendant's remaining contentions are without merit.
Contrary to the defendant's contention, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in consolidating the indictments involved in this case (see, CPL 200.20[b]; People v. Bongarzone, 69 N.Y.2d 892; People v. Quartieri, 171 A.D.2d 889). The record demonstrates that the defendant was not deprived of his right to be present during a material stage of the proceedings (see, People v. Sanchez, 213 A.D.2d 566; People v. Bozella, 205 A.D.2d 790).
The defendant's contention that the delay in his arraignment was for the sole purpose of depriving him of his right to counsel is without merit. An unnecessary delay in arraignment, without more, does not cause the accused's right to counsel to attach automatically (see, People v. Hopkins, 58 N.Y.2d 1079, 1081; People v. White, 259 A.D.2d 508; People v. Marinelli, 238 A.D.2d 525, 526; People v. Beckham, 174 A.D.2d 748, 749; People v. Quartieri, 171 A.D.2d 889, 891; People v. Mosley, 135 A.D.2d 662, 663-664). Where, as here, the police were investigating the defendant's possible involvement in two unrelated crimes, and where the delay was in part occasioned by the defendant's assistance in helping the police locate his accomplices, the delay in arraignment was warranted (see, People v. White, supra; People v. Marinelli, supra; People v. Beckham, supra; People v. Quartieri, supra; People v. Borazzo, 137 A.D.2d 96).
The defendant's waiver of his right to a prompt arraignment was voluntary (see, People v. Ortlieb, 84 N.Y.2d 989; People v. Baker, 208 A.D.2d 758). In any event, under the circumstances of this case, the delay in arraignment was warranted (see, People v. Hopkins, 58 N.Y.2d 1079; People v. Faison, 265 A.D.2d 422; People v. Marshall, 244 A.D.2d 508; People v. Marinelli, 238 A.D.2d 52 5; People v. Quartieri, 171 A.D.2d 889). The defendant's sentence is not excessive (see, People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80).
Defendant's confessions were not taken at a time when his arraignment was imminent, and there was no unnecessary delay in the arraignment. The judicial process had not begun, and further investigation, consisting of interrogation of defendant on the more serious charges, was warranted (see, People v. Brisman, 268 A.D.2d 279, lv denied 95 N.Y.2d 793; People v. Hotchkiss, 260 A.D.2d 241, lv denied 93 N.Y.2d 1001; People v. Quartieri, 171 A.D.2d 889, lv denied 78 N.Y.2d 1079). Moreover, the total delay from arrest to arraignment was not unusual (see, People ex rel. Maxian v. Brown, 77 N.Y.2d 422).