Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Tulare County. Paul A. Vortmann, Judge. Super. Ct. No. VCF216179
Richard Jay Moller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Carlos A. Martinez and Wanda Hill Rouzan, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
Before Cornell, Acting P.J., Hill, J. and Kane, J.
After the trial court denied appellant’s motion to suppress (Pen. Code, § 1538.5), he pled no contest to count 1 of the information, transportation of heroin (Health & Saf. Code, § 11352, subd. (a)), and admitted the special allegation he had been convicted of a prior drug offense (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.2, subd. (a)). The court sentenced appellant to the midterm of four years and struck the special allegation. Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal based on the denial of his suppression motion.
The remaining counts in the information were dismissed.
FACTS
On January 25, 2009, while on routine patrol, a Visalia police officer noticed appellant driving on the wrong side of the road and then making an illegal U-turn. During the traffic stop, the officer contacted dispatch and was advised that appellant’s driver’s license had been suspended. The officer placed appellant under arrest for driving on a suspended license. Under these circumstances, it was Visalia Police Department policy to have the vehicle impounded and towed. Prior to towing, department procedures called for the officer to conduct an inventory search of the entire vehicle in order to safeguard the contents of the vehicle, to protect against false claims related to any contents and to ensure officer safety. When the officer searched the trunk of the car, he saw the corner of a plastic bag exposed from under the trunk lining on the passenger side of the trunk. He lifted the trunk lining to investigate and found heroin inside the bag.
DISCUSSION
Standard of Review
The trial court’s factual findings must be upheld by the appellate court if they are supported by substantial evidence. (People v. Lawler (1973) 9 Cal.3d 156, 160.) Applying the facts as found by the trier of fact against the constitutional standard of reasonableness requires the appellate court to exercise its independent judgment. (People v. Leyba (1981) 29 Cal.3d 591, 597.)
Inventory Searches
The police may constitutionally engage in an inventory search of property lawfully seized in order to ensure that it poses no danger, to secure valuable items and to protect against false claims of loss or damage. (Whren v. United States (1996) 517 U.S. 806, 811 & fn. 1.) However, an inventory search must not be used as a pretext for a general rummaging in order to discover incriminating evidence. (Florida v. Wells (1990) 495 U.S. 1, 4.) An inventory search that follows standardized procedures and is not conducted in bad faith is lawful. (Colorado v. Bertine (1987) 479 U.S. 367, 372.) California case law adheres to the same principles. (People v. Williams (1999) 20 Cal.4th 119.)
The Motion To Suppress Was Properly Denied
In his motion to suppress, appellant argued that the officer’s search under the lining of the trunk exceeded the scope of an inventory search. Appellant presents the issue as follows: Did Officer Ferreira’s search of appellant’s car for contraband constitute a legitimate inventory search or was it a ruse for a general rummaging? Appellant asserts that when the officer saw a plastic bag partially exposed under the lining of the trunk and seized it, simply because he thought there might be something in the bag, he engaged in a general rummaging for contraband, not a legitimate inventory search. Appellant also contends that there was an inconsistency between the officer’s written report that the contraband was under the trunk lining and his testimony that a portion of the bag was exposed from the lining. The lower court specifically determined that there was no inconsistency. This finding pertained to the credibility of the officer. This court finds there was substantial evidence to support that factual conclusion. (People v. Lawler, supra, 9 Cal.3d at p. 160.)
The evidence was uncontradicted that the Visalia Police Department had a policy of conducting full searches, including the trunks, of impounded vehicles. Since it was lawful to conduct such an inventory, and because the officer saw a portion of the plastic bag when he opened the trunk, there was nothing unreasonable (or unlawful) about his lifting the liner to see what the plastic bag contained. There is no evidence in the record indicating that this search was a ruse for general rummaging. (Florida v. Wells, supra, 495 U.S. at p. 4.) Whether the plastic bag was partially exposed in the trunk, glove compartment, floorboard or seat cushion, once detected, it was not unreasonable for the officer to investigate further to determine what the bag contained. Indeed, the officer could be criticized for not examining the bag to ascertain its contents. If, for example, the bag contained cash, the officer’s failure to account for it in the inventory could be the basis for a claim against the department if the cash went missing. If the bag contained a loaded weapon, it would pose a danger. These examples explain why case law authorizes inventory searches of impounded vehicles. The motion to suppress was properly denied.
A different analysis might arise if the bag had not been exposed until after the officer removed the liner, but that question is not presented in this case.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.