Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. JV34742
Premo, J.
The juvenile court found P.V. (minor) to be a person described by Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 (wardship for violation of law) in that he had committed robbery for the benefit of a criminal street gang. On appeal, minor contends that no substantial evidence supports the robbery finding. We disagree and affirm the judgment.
SCOPE OF REVIEW
In determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support a finding in a juvenile court proceeding, the reviewing court is bound by the same principles as to sufficiency and the substantiality of the evidence govern the review of criminal convictions generally. (In re Roderick P. (1972) 7 Cal.3d 801, 809.) These principles include the following: “It is the prosecution’s burden in a criminal case to prove every element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Cuevas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 252, 260.) The appellate court, to determine whether the prosecution has introduced sufficient evidence to meet this burden, must determine “ ‘whether from the evidence, including all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, there is any substantial evidence of the existence of each element of the offense charged.’ ” (People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 139, fn. 13.) In making this determination, “[the appellate court] must examine the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence--evidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid value--such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] The appellate court presumes in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.” (People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1053.) “Although it is the duty of the [trier of fact] to acquit a defendant if it finds that circumstantial evidence is susceptible of two interpretations, one of which suggests guilt and the other innocence [citations], it is the [trier of fact], not the appellate court which must be convinced of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. ‘ “If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also be reasonably reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant a reversal of the judgment.” ’ ” (People v. Bean (1988) 46 Cal.3d 919, 932-933.)
BACKGROUND
David Castro worked at Mike’s Pizza and grocery store in San Jose. He kept personal cans for recycling and four tire rims in a locked storage shed located in an alley on the side of the store’s building. One morning on his way to the storage shed, he saw Marcos Lomeli, minor, and B.P. standing together at the entrance to the alley. He recognized Lomeli as a regular customer, shook hands with Lomeli, and said “hi” to the group. He then continued to the storage area and began collecting his cans. Lomeli approached Castro with a kitchen knife in his hand and gestured the knife toward Castro. He accused Castro of smoking, not wanting his friends, and talking too much. When he saw Castro’s tire rims, he said that he was going to take them. He cautioned Castro against telling anyone and made Castro understand that “something would happen to [him] in a bad way.” He called out to minor and B.P.--who were standing about 45 feet away--and told them to pick up the tire rims. Minor and B.P. arrived within 10 seconds, passed by Castro, picked up the rims, and walked away with them. Still holding the knife but in a lowered position, Lomeli told Castro that “it’s a donation for the barrio.”
Minor told the police that (1) he did not know Lomeli but knew Lomeli was a member of SSP (a sub-group of the Sureno criminal street gang), (2) he saw that Lomeli had a concealed kitchen knife when they were standing in front of Mike’s Pizza before Lomeli approached Castro, (3) he did not hear the conversation between Lomeli and Castro, and (4) he did not see the knife when he picked up the tire rims.
San Jose Police Officer Ian Cooley testified that Lomeli, minor, and B.P. had Sureno and SSP tattoos and had previously admitted being SSP members to the police, opined that the three were SSP members, and opined that taking the rims was for the benefit of SSP.
DISCUSSION
Minor accepts that Lomeli robbed Castro. He urges, however, that no evidence supports that he robbed Castro or aided and abetted Lomeli. He relies principally on his own police statements that he did not hear Lomeli announce an intent to steal the tire rims or see a knife when he took the rims at Lomeli’s direction. He reasons that the evidence shows no more than a “volitional act of taking the rims.” He concludes that no evidence shows an intent to steal--or that he even knew the rims belonged to Castro--or that he knew of Lomeli’s intent to steal. Minor’s analysis is erroneous.
It is undisputed in this case that a robbery was committed. Robbery is “the felonious taking of personal property in the possession of another, from his person or immediate presence, and against his will, accomplished by means of force or fear.” (Pen. Code, § 211.) “[A] person aids and abets the commission of a crime when he or she, acting with (1) knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator; and (2) the intent or purpose of committing, encouraging, or facilitating the commission of the offense, (3) by act or advice aids, promotes, encourages or instigates, the commission of the crime.” (People v. Beeman (1984) 35 Cal.3d 547, 561.) An aider and abettor may be criminally liable not only for his own criminal acts, but also for criminal acts by other perpetrators that were natural and probable consequences. (People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 567; People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 106-107; People v. Brigham (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 1039, 1045.)
“Among the factors which may be considered in making the determination of aiding and abetting are: presence at the scene of the crime, companionship, and conduct before and after the offense.” (In re Lynette G. (1976) 54 Cal.App.3d 1087, 1094; accord, People v. Campbell (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 402, 409; see also In re Jose T. (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 1455, 1460 (Jose T.) [“Neither mere presence at the scene of a crime, nor the failure to take steps to prevent a crime, is alone sufficient to establish that a person is an aider and abettor. Such evidence may, however, be considered together with other evidence in determining that a person is an aider and abettor.”].)
Under the evidence presented in the whole record, and in light of our limited scope of review, the juvenile court’s findings must be sustained. (See Jose T., supra, 230 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1460-1461.)
Minor was present at the scene of the crime with two companions who were fellow gang members. He knew that one companion carried a knife. He knew that the companion who was carrying the knife approached Castro at the storage shed. He facilitated the offense by obeying the knife carrier’s command to approach the shed and take out the tire rims. He left the scene with the fruits of the offense and his other gang-member companion who had obeyed the same command.
Virtually all of the probative factors relative to aiding and abetting are present: presence at the scene of the crime, companionship, and conduct before and after the offense. Moreover, minor’s knowledge of Lomeli’s purpose may also be inferred from their membership in the SSP gang whose identity provided a preface and rationale for the robbery. The juvenile court could reasonably find that minor and Lomeli were working together.
DISPOSITION
The judgment of wardship is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: Rushing, P.J., Elia, J.