Opinion
July 31, 1989
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Kings County (Garry, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant was identified in a lineup by two brothers who witnessed a robbery at the bakery where they were employed. The defendant contends that the People failed to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt because the brothers were unable to make an in-court identification. However, a detective who was present during the lineups testified that the defendant was the person identified by the brothers. Such identification testimony is permissible under CPL 60.25 and constitutes evidence-in-chief (see, People v Lagana, 36 N.Y.2d 71, cert denied 424 U.S. 942; People v Nival, 33 N.Y.2d 391, cert denied and appeal dismissed 417 U.S. 903; People v Parris, 109 A.D.2d 853; People v Dure, 102 A.D.2d 873). Accordingly, we find that the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see, People v Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620), was legally sufficient to support the verdict finding the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant's contention that the testimony of the detective exceeded the permissible bounds of CPL 60.25 is not preserved for appellate review and, in any event, is without merit.
Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we find that the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence (CPL 470.15). Resolution of issues of credibility, as well as the weight to be accorded to the identification testimony and to the testimony of the defendant's alibi witnesses, are primarily questions to be determined by the jury and its determination should not be set aside unless clearly unsupported by the record (see, People v Nieves, 143 A.D.2d 229, lv denied 72 N.Y.2d 1048; People v Gaines, 142 A.D.2d 685). Bracken, J.P., Brown, Lawrence and Kooper, JJ., concur.