Opinion
C097890
04-29-2024
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DARNELL EUGENE PRUITT, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
(Super. Ct. No. 10F06215)
MAURO, Acting P. J.
Following a recommendation from the Secretary of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR), the trial court recalled the sentence of defendant Darnell Eugene Pruitt and resentenced him, striking two of defendant's four prior serious felony conviction enhancements, thereby reducing defendant's sentence from 30 years to 20 years.
Defendant now contends the trial court was required to dismiss three of the four enhancements because multiple enhancements had been alleged in his case. Finding no error or abuse of discretion, we will affirm the judgment.
BACKGROUND
While traveling in a taxi, defendant demanded money from the driver and then drove off with the taxi. Defendant pleaded no contest to carjacking. (Pen. Code, § 215.)He also admitted a prior strike conviction (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subd. (a)) and four prior serious felony convictions (§ 667, subd. (a)). The trial court sentenced him to a stipulated 30-year prison term consisting of the middle term of five years for the carjacking, doubled for the prior strike, plus five years for each of the four prior serious felony conviction enhancements.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
In January 2021, the Secretary of CDCR sent a letter to the trial court explaining that the COVID-19 pandemic had created a need to decrease the prison population in a manner consistent with health and safety, so as to increase physical distancing in prisons and reduce the spread of the virus. Because a COVID-19 risk score identified defendant as someone at particularly high risk of serious complications from COVID, the Secretary recommended that the trial court recall defendant's sentence and resentence him under former section 1170, subdivision (d)(1). The Secretary's letter explained that defendant had served beyond the base term of his sentence, his sentence included enhancements that had been mandatory but were now discretionary, defendant had been infraction free for over three years, and defendant had participated in rehabilitative programs.
While defendant's prior appeal was pending, Assembly Bill No. 1540 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 719, §§ 1-7) became effective on January 1, 2022, moving the recall and resentencing provisions of former section 1170 subdivision (d)(1) to former section 1170.03. Subsequently, Assembly Bill No. 200 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 9) became effective on June 30, 2022, renumbering former section 1170.03 to new section 1172.1.
The trial court issued a written order declining to resentence defendant. This court reversed the trial court's order and remanded the matter, concluding that recent changes in the law warranted the trial court's reconsideration of resentencing.
On remand, the trial court said defendant received the benefit of his plea agreement because he avoided a third strike sentence and his record was problematic. The trial court detailed defendant's history of 22 convictions over a 25-year period. But it also described defendant's "relatively extensive" efforts toward rehabilitation since being incarcerated. And it noted that although defendant had been disciplined for fighting while incarcerated, he had been discipline free for over three years.
The trial court concluded it was a balance of what defendant had done as a member of society versus what he had done while incarcerated. It said the carjacking was serious but there should be recognition of the progress defendant had made. The trial court recalled and resentenced defendant, striking two of the four prior serious felony enhancements, reducing defendant's sentence from 30 years to 20 years.
DISCUSSION
Defendant contends that because multiple enhancements had been alleged in his case, and the trial court did not make a finding that dismissal would endanger the public, the trial court was required to dismiss all but one enhancement. (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(B).) We disagree.
A
When CDCR makes a resentencing request, there is a presumption favoring recall and resentencing unless the trial court finds that the defendant currently poses an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, meaning that the defendant will commit a new violent felony offense within the meaning of section 667, subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iv). (§§ 667, subd. (d)(2), 1170.18, subd. (c).) In resentencing under the statute, the trial court shall apply any changes in law that reduce defendant's sentence and may reduce defendant's sentence in the interest of justice. (§ 1172.1, subds. (a)(2), (a)(3)(A).) In exercising its discretion, the trial court shall consider various postconviction factors. (§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(5).)
Senate Bill No. 81 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.), which became effective before defendant's sentencing hearing, "amended section 1385 to specify factors that the trial court must consider when deciding whether to strike enhancements from a defendant's sentence in the interest of justice. (Stats. 2021, ch. 721, § 1.)" (People v. Sek (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 657, 674.) As amended, section 1385, subdivision (c)(1) states: "Notwithstanding any other law, the court shall dismiss an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to do so, except if dismissal of that enhancement is prohibited by any initiative statute." Section 1385 calls for the trial court to conduct a balancing based on all the circumstances of a case. (People v. Brown (2023) 14 Cal.5th 530, 548-549; People v. Ortiz (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1087, 1096-1097 (Ortiz), review granted Apr. 12, 2023, S278894.)
Section 1385, subdivision (c)(2) lists nine mitigating circumstances and states in relevant part: "In exercising its discretion under this subdivision, the court shall consider and afford great weight to evidence offered by the defendant to prove that any of the mitigating circumstances in paragraphs (A) to (I) are present. Proof of the presence of one or more of these circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety." If the court finds that dismissal of an enhancement would endanger public safety, it need not consider the listed mitigating circumstances. (People v. Mendoza (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 287, 296 (Mendoza).)
Section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(B) further provides that when multiple enhancements are alleged in a single case, "all enhancements beyond a single enhancement shall be dismissed."
B
Section 1385, subdivision (c)(1) grants a trial court discretion to determine whether dismissal of an enhancement is in the furtherance of justice. Subdivision (c)(2) discusses the types of mitigating circumstances a trial court should consider in exercising its discretion, adding that proof of such circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing an enhancement. (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2).) Those phrases do not eliminate a trial court's discretion, and we do not interpret the phrase "shall be dismissed" in section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(B) in isolation. (People v. Mazur (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 438, 444-445 (Mazur), review granted Feb. 14, 2024, S283229.) "Construed as a whole, the statute makes clear that all the mitigating circumstances listed in subdivision (c)(2) merely guide the court's discretion in determining whether a dismissal is in furtherance of justice." (Ibid.)
Although section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(B) permits a trial court to dismiss all but one enhancement in its exercise of discretion when multiple enhancements are alleged in a single case, the subdivision does not require such dismissal and does not deprive the trial court of its discretion to decline such dismissal.
Defendant points to People v. Walker (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 386, 397-398, review granted March 22, 2023, S278309, for the proposition that a trial court must presume that dismissal of an enhancement is in furtherance of justice, and that dismissal is required, unless the trial court finds that a shorter sentence would endanger public safety. (Id. at p. 398.) Other courts, however, have decided the question differently. (People v. Lipscomb (2022) 87 Cal.App.5th 9, 15-21; Ortiz, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 1098, rev. granted; People v. Anderson (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 233, 239-241, review granted Apr. 19, 2023, S278786; see Mendoza, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 297; People v. Cota (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 318, 335-336; Mazur, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at pp. 444-447, rev. granted.) We agree with the cases holding that section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(B) does not eliminate trial court discretion. (See also People v. Ponder (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 1042, 1052, review granted Jan. 10, 2024, S282925, citing Ortiz, at p. 1098.)
Here, in resentencing defendant, the trial court considered and balanced the evidence of defendant's progress toward rehabilitation with the seriousness of his commitment offense and his significant criminal history. It exercised its discretion based on the totality of the circumstances and chose to dismiss two of the four enhancements in furtherance of justice, reducing defendant's sentence by 10 years. We find no error or abuse of discretion.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: BOULWARE EURIE, J. MESIWALA, J.