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People v. Provost

COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION THREE
Jan 29, 2020
No. G056297 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 29, 2020)

Opinion

G056297

01-29-2020

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. BRIAN ANTHONY PROVOST, Defendant and Appellant.

Gene D. Vorobyov, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorney General, Margaret E. Maxwell, Kathy S. Pomerantz and Michael Wise, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.


NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. 17WF0720) OPINION Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Michael J. Cassidy, Judge. Affirmed in part and remanded with directions. Gene D. Vorobyov, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorney General, Margaret E. Maxwell, Kathy S. Pomerantz and Michael Wise, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

* * *

On March 19, 2017, police officers set up an arranged drug sale with Brian Anthony Provost. When the officers stopped Provost as he was driving to the sale location, he failed to comply with the officers' commands. Following a short altercation, the officers arrested Provost and recovered drugs, a handgun, and ammunition from his vehicle. A jury convicted Provost of numerous charges relating to the incident.

Provost waived his right to a jury trial on prior strike conviction and prior prison term allegations. Following a court trial, the trial court made true findings on both of the prior strike convictions and both of the prior prison term allegations. The court sentenced Provost to state prison for an indeterminate term of 27 years to life, plus a determinate term of six years on the prison term enhancements. It awarded Provost 377 days of presentence custody credit, but no conduct credit.

Provost raises several issues on appeal. First, he requests this court review the in camera proceedings on his motions to discover the arresting officers' personnel information under Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 (Pitchess). After independently reviewing the sealed hearing transcript and materials, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Pitchess motions.

Second, Provost contends the trial court engaged in improper factfinding when it found a prior assault conviction qualified as a strike because Provost committed the crime with a deadly weapon. In a related claim, he argues insufficient evidence supported the court's finding the prior assault was committed with a deadly weapon. We conclude there was no improper factfinding because the court properly relied on the charging document, plea-related documents, and the abstract of judgment to determine Provost entered a plea of no contest to committing assault with a deadly weapon. In addition, substantial evidence supported the trial court's finding on the prior assault conviction.

Finally, Provost contends the trial court erroneously calculated his presentence custody credits and erred in failing to award any conduct credits. The Attorney General concedes the issue, and requests we remand the matter for the sentencing court to determine Provost's presentence credits. We agree and therefore remand the matter to the trial court to determine the period of Provost's actual custody and to award the appropriate presentence credits.

I

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Underlying Offenses

On March 19, 2017, Huntington Beach police officers Bryn Fedderson and David Chandler responded to an online ad for "black powder tar eyeliner" - code for heroin. Fedderson arranged for the heroin to be delivered to a cul-de-sac in Huntington Beach. The seller informed Fedderson he would arrive in a black Camaro. As the officers drove to the arranged location, they observed a black Camaro with tinted windows failing to stop at a stop sign. The officers followed and stopped the vehicle for the traffic violation.

Fedderson and Chandler stepped out of their patrol car, approached the Camaro, and ordered Provost - who was driving the vehicle - to turn off the engine. Provost did not comply, and Chandler reached into the vehicle from the passenger side to turn off the engine. When Provost tried to pull Chandler's body into the vehicle, Fedderson punched Provost in the head and ordered Provost to let Chandler go. Provost released Chandler and reached toward the Camaro's floorboard. Fedderson ordered Provost to stop and took out his Taser. When Fedderson observed Provost holding a handgun, he yelled "Gun," and deployed the Taser, which proved ineffective.

As Fedderson and Chandler retreated behind the Camaro, they heard a single gunshot. The officers returned fire. Provost then stated he was "done," and repositioned himself in the Camaro. Fedderson called for back-up, and after more officers arrived, Provost was arrested.

From the Camaro, the officers recovered four cell phones, syringes, heroin, methamphetamine and $890 in cash. Officers also recovered a loaded .38-caliber revolver and two boxes of .38-caliber ammunition in the back passenger seat. B. Charges, Jury Verdict and Court Trial on Priors

Following the incident, Provost was charged in an information with resisting and deterring an executive officer (Pen. Code, § 69; count 1), aggravated assault on a peace officer (§ 245, subd. (c); count 2), misdemeanor battery on a peace officer (§ 243, subd. (c)(2); count 3), possession of a firearm with a prior enumerated offense (§ 29900, subd. (a)(1); count 4), being a convicted felon having a concealed firearm in a vehicle (§ 25400, subds. (a)(1)/(c)(1); count 5), possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); count 6), possession of a controlled substance with a firearm (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.1, subd. (a); count 7), sale or transportation for sale of heroin (Health & Saf. Code, § 11352, subd. (a); count 8), possession for sale of heroin (Health & Saf. Code, § 11351; count 9), sale or transportation for sale of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379, subd. (a); count 10), and possession for sale of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378; count 11). On counts 8 through 11, the information alleged that Provost was personally armed with a firearm during a Health and Safety Code violation (§ 12022, subd. (c)).

All further statutory references are to the Penal Code, unless otherwise stated.

The information also alleged Provost had suffered two prior strike convictions within the meaning of sections 667, subdivisions (d) and (e)(2)(A), and 1170.12, subdivisions (b) and (c)(2)(A), two prior serious felony convictions (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)), and had served two prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).

With the exception of count 2, on which the jury deadlocked and the trial court declared a mistrial, the jury found Provost guilty as charged. The jury found true the firearm enhancement allegation on counts 8 through 11.

Provost waived his right to a jury trial on the prior strike convictions and prior prison term allegations. Following a court trial, the trial court found the allegations to be true. It dismissed the two prior serious felony conviction enhancements, finding the instant crimes did not qualify as serious felonies. C. Sentence

The trial court denied probation and sentenced Provost to state prison for an indeterminate term of 27 years to life, plus a determinate term of six years. It awarded Provost 377 days of presentence custody credit. The court declined to award conduct credits, explaining the Department of Corrections would make that determination.

II

DISCUSSION

A. Pitchess Motions

Before trial, Provost filed Pitchess motions to discover the personnel files of Officers Fedderson and Chandler.

The trial court conducted an in camera review for evidence of "excessive use of force and anything that has to do with honesty and credibility." After its review, the court disclosed the name and address of two witnesses and a summary of an officer-involved shooting.

Provost requests this court review the in camera proceedings on the Pitchess motions. We review a trial court's decision on a Pitchess motion for an abuse of discretion. (People v. Mooc (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1216, 1228 (Mooc).) After independently reviewing the sealed transcript of the in camera proceeding on the Pitchess motions as well as the confidential personnel records, we find no abuse of discretion. (Mooc, supra, at p. 1232.) The Pitchess motions therefore provide no basis to challenge Provost's convictions. B. Prior Strike Conviction

Provost contends the trial court erred in finding a prior assault conviction constituted a strike under the Three Strikes Law.

1. Relevant Background

The information alleged Provost had suffered two prior strike convictions: a 2002 robbery conviction (§ 211) and a 2006 assault conviction (§ 4501). Section 4501 prohibits assault by a state prisoner committed by using a deadly weapon or, alternatively, by using force likely to cause great bodily injury (GBI). (4501, subds. (a) & (b).) Only the "deadly weapon" prong of the statute - subdivision (a) - is a serious felony under section 1192.7, and is thus a "strike" under the Three Strikes Law. (§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(13).)

The prosecution introduced Exhibit 3 to prove Provost's conviction for violating section 4501 qualified as a strike. Exhibit 3 included a felony complaint, the minutes from the plea hearing, a plea form, and an abstract of judgment. The complaint charged appellant and codefendant Steve Spilger with one count of violating section 4501, specifically "ASSAULT WITH WEAPON BY PRISONER." It further stated, "[A] FELONY, was committed by BRIAN PROVOST, AND STEVE SPILGER, who did willfully and unlawfully, being confined in a state prison, commit an assault by means of force likely to produce GBI with a deadly weapon upon the person of another, to wit, Michael [R.]." (Italics added.) The phrase regarding "by means of force likely to produce GBI" was added by handwritten insertion, and the victim's name was added by handwritten interlineation, replacing "CALIFORNIA TRAINING FACILITY."

The abstract of judgment stated that Provost was convicted of violating section 4501, "Assault W/Deadly Weapon By Non-Life Prisoner." The minutes recorded that the charge to which Provost pleaded no contest was "PC4501 [Assault W/Deadly Weapon By Non-Life Prisoner]." Finally, the plea form stated that Provost pleaded no contest to violating section 4501.

At the court trial on the priors, the prosecutor argued the handwritten insertion of the GBI allegation to the felony complaint was "an indication of the other way that a [section] 4501 [violation] can be proven." The prosecutor agreed with the trial court's observation that the handwritten insertion "qualified the GBI with a deadly weapon," and argued that pleading to the "conjunctive allegation" meant admitting that a deadly weapon was used in committing the crime. She noted there were two defendants on the complaint, but "when it was [Provost] just himself," the abstract of judgment and the minutes stated "'assault with a deadly weapon.'" The prosecutor argued the case was "on all fours with [People v.] Delgado [(2008) 43 Cal.4th 1059 (Delgado)]" because there was "clarity of not only the minutes, but the abstract of judgment showing that it was an assault with a deadly weapon."

Defense counsel argued the evidence in Exhibit 3 was ambiguous, asserting that if Provost had pleaded to assault with a deadly weapon then there was "no reason [to] insert 'by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury.'" Counsel further argued the record showed Provost did not plead to the strike version of section 4501 because no five-year prior (§ 667, subd. (a)) was "alleged, admitted or sentenced to," nor did the plea form show Provost admitted a five-year prior or was sentenced to a five-year prior.

The trial court found beyond a reasonable doubt that Provost was convicted of violating section 4501 by committing assault with a deadly weapon.

2. The Trial Court's True Finding Provost Suffered a Strike Conviction Did Not Violate His Sixth Amendment Rights

Provost contends the trial court's finding that he committed the strike version of section 4501 constituted improper factfinding in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial under People v. Gallardo (2017) 4 Cal.5th 120 (Gallardo). As an initial matter, we conclude Provost forfeited this claim because Provost did not timely object to the court's factual determination on Sixth Amendment grounds. As Provost acknowledges, at the time of the priors trial, Gallardo had been decided. Provost therefore could have, but did not, raise an objection under Gallardo. Nevertheless, we opt to address Provost's claim on the merits, if for no other reason than to forestall a habeas petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to raise the issue. (See People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161, fn. 6; People v. Lewis (1990) 50 Cal.3d 262, 282.)

In Gallardo, supra, the California Supreme Court drew on the reasoning of Descamps v. United States (2013) 570 U.S. 254 (Descamps) and Mathis v. United States (2016) ___ U.S. ___, (Mathis), to conclude that the Sixth Amendment of the federal constitution precludes a trial court from "determin[ing] the 'nature or basis' of the prior conviction based on its independent conclusions about what facts or conduct 'realistically' supported the conviction." (Gallardo, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 136.) Instead, "[t]he court's role is . . . limited to identifying those facts that were established by virtue of the conviction itself—that is, facts the jury was necessarily required to find to render a guilty verdict, or that the defendant admitted as the factual basis for a guilty plea." (Ibid.)

Descamps and Mathis involved the interpretation of a federal criminal statute. In those cases, the United States Supreme Court provided guidance on how a sentencing court could determine whether a prior conviction was a violent felony under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). (See Descamps, supra, 570 U.S. at pp. 257-258; Mathis, supra, ___ U.S. ___, [136 S.Ct at pp. 2247-2248].)

The Gallardo court addressed whether a prior conviction for assault in violation of section 245 constituted a strike under the Three Strikes law. (Gallardo, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 125.) Like section 4501, section 245 may be violated when the assault is committed either with a deadly weapon or by means of force likely to cause GBI. Only the deadly weapon prong of section 245 constitutes a strike under the Three Strikes law. (Ibid.) In Gallardo, the criminal information alleged the defendant had "a 2005 conviction for assault with a deadly weapon or with force likely to produce great bodily injury." (Ibid.) During the court trial on the priors, the trial court relied solely on the preliminary hearing transcript from the prior proceeding to determine the section 245 conviction qualified as a strike. (Id. at p. 126.) The Gallardo court held that by relying solely on "the preliminary hearing transcript to determine the 'nature or basis' of defendant's prior conviction, the sentencing court engaged in an impermissible inquiry to determine '"what the defendant and state judge must have understood as the factual basis of the prior plea."'" (Gallardo, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 137.)

The Gallardo court reaffirmed that trial courts may review materials such as "charging documents, jury instructions, and any agreed-to factual basis for a guilty plea" to determine the "'nature or basis'" of the prior conviction. (Gallardo, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 131, citing Shepard v. United States (2005) 544 U.S. 13, 22-23, 26.) However, "'indictments and jury instructions'" "differ from the preliminary hearing transcript here in a meaningful way. An indictment or jury instructions might help identify what facts a jury necessarily found in the prior proceeding. [Citation.] But defendant's preliminary hearing transcript can reveal no such thing." (Gallardo, supra, at p. 137, citing Deschamps, supra, 570 U.S. at p. 257.) The Supreme Court remanded the matter to "permit the trial court to make the relevant determinations about what facts defendant admitted in entering her plea." (Gallardo, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 138.)

Here, the trial court reviewed the felony complaint, the minutes of the plea hearing, the plea form, and the abstract of judgment to determine the nature or basis of the prior section 4501 conviction. The trial court did not consider the preliminary hearing transcript to make its determination. Thus, it did not commit the same error as the trial court in Gallardo.

Relying on People v. Hudson (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 196 (Hudson), Provost argues the trial court engaged in impermissible factfinding when it considered the abstract of judgment and minutes to determine he had pleaded no contest to the strike prong of section 4501. In Hudson, supra, the defendant was charged with a section 245 assault. "In the first amended complaint, dated August 1, 1990, it stated the assault charge was 'a violation of Section 245(a)(1) . . . , in that said defendant(s) did then and there assault [victim], and by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury.' . . . [¶] An information was thereafter filed on August 24, 1990. The second count of the information again omitted language charging section 245(a)(1) based on assault with a deadly weapon. However, handwritten notes on the information added the following language to the charge: 'defendants did then and there assault [victim] with a deadly weapon, to wit: a pipe, and by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury.' (Italics added.) . . . Hudson pled nolo contendere on February 27, 1991, to 'section 245(a)(1) . . . as charged in Count 2 of the Information.' However, the document does not specify the theory, if any, upon which Hudson pled guilty to section 245(a)(1)." (Hudson, supra, 28 Cal.App.5th at p. 202.)

"At the bifurcated trial, the prosecution presented two forms, the abstract of judgment and fingerprint card, which describe the crime committed under section 245(a)(1) as assault with a deadly weapon." (Hudson, supra, 28 Cal.App.5th at pp. 202-203.) "On both forms, the space for describing the nature of the crime is small. On the abstract of judgment form, the name of the crime was abbreviated to 'Assault w/deadly weapon' and the fingerprint card stated 'Ct2 PC245(a) ADW.'" (Id. at p. 203, fn. 3.) "The court was also provided the transcript of the preliminary hearing, during which the victim described Hudson beating him with a metal pipe." (Id. at p. 203.) Based on the documents submitted, the trial court determined the defendant pleaded no contest to the strike prong of section 245. (Ibid.)

The appellate court reversed the trial court's true finding on the prior strike conviction allegation, declaring "[t]his case is indistinguishable from Gallardo." (Hudson, supra, 28 Cal.App.5th at p. 208.) After expressing concerns over the validity of the handwritten insertions to the information, the court concluded that "assuming the handwritten notes alleging assault with a deadly weapon were incorporated therein," the trial court could not find the defendant had pleaded to the strike prong of section 245 because "the record is silent as to whether Hudson pled to assault based on the use of a deadly weapon, causing great bodily injury, or both." (Id. at p. 208.)

The Hudson court then concluded the trial "court's reliance on the preliminary hearing transcript was impermissible, and violated Hudson's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial." (Hudson, supra, 28 Cal.App.5th at p. 209.) It also found the Sixth Amendment violation was not harmless despite the abstract of judgment stating the defendant was convicted of "'Assault w/deadly weapon.'" (Id. at pp. 209-210.) The court stated "the abstract of judgment alone does not reveal whether the court's conclusion that the offense was for assault with a deadly weapon evidenced from the elements of the prior offense as stated in the charging documents, plea agreement or colloquy. Instead, the abstract may reflect the court's own interpretation and factfinding of the available evidence." (Id. at p. 210.)

Assuming the case was properly decided, Hudson does not assist Provost. First, the handwritten insertion to the charging document here does not raise the same concerns as the "handwritten" notation to the information in Hudson. In Hudson, the information initially did not charge the defendant with assault with a deadly weapon, but did so later when the court clerk amended the information. In contrast, the felony complaint originally charged Provost with assault with a deadly weapon before being amended to charge Provost with committing assault by means of force likely to produce GBI with a deadly weapon. In addition, the operative information in Hudson charged the defendant with assault with a deadly weapon and by means of force likely to produce GBI, but the operative complaint here charged Provost with "assault by means of force likely to produce GBI with a deadly weapon." Thus, here, Provost's no contest plea to the assault charge constitutes an admission he used a deadly weapon when committing the assault.

The reasoning of Hudson is suspect on several grounds. First, the defendant had pleaded no contest to "'Count 2 of the Information'" "'as charged.'" (Hudson, supra, 28 Cal.App.5th at p. 202.) The operative information at the time of the plea charged the defendant with committing assault with a deadly weapon and committing assault by means of force likely to produce GBI. It was thus reasonable for the trial court to determine the defendant had pleaded no contest to both theories of liability. Because the trial court based its determination on permissible documents (the charging document and the plea), there was no Sixth Amendment violation under Gallardo or Descamps. The questionable validity of the amendments to the operative information may raise issues about the sufficiency of the evidence to support the finding, but it does not raise Sixth Amendment concerns.
Similarly, the trial court's reliance on the description of the offense in the abstract of judgment does not raise Sixth Amendment concerns. Hudson expressed concern the description in the abstract of judgment reflected the prior judge's independent factfinding. But Descamps drew a distinction between the judge in the prior proceeding and the sentencing judge in the present proceeding. The Sixth Amendment violation at issue in Descamps related to a later sentencing court making a disputed factual determination "'about what the defendant and state judge must have understood as the factual basis of the prior plea.'" (Descamps, supra, 570 U.S. at p. 269, italics added.) In contrast, the description of the offense in the abstract of judgment presumptively reflects the contemporaneous understanding of the judge who accepted the plea. (Delgado, supra, 43 Cal.4th at pp. 1070-1071 ["Defendant raises no basis for a conclusion that a contemporaneous, officially prepared abstract of judgment that clearly describes the nature of the prior conviction should not, in the absence of rebuttal evidence, be presumed reliable and accurate."].) Additionally it is unclear whether the description in the abstract of judgment constitutes a finding of fact, rather than merely a recording of events. Finally, to permit a later court to examine the validity of the description in an abstract of judgment is contrary to Descamps's concern that a later court not make independent factual determinations on the record evidence.

Second, the trial court here did not rely on a preliminary hearing transcript to determine Provost had committed assault with a deadly weapon.

Finally, in Hudson, the abstract of judgment - stating the defendant had committed "'Assault w/deadly weapon'" - was inconsistent with the operative information, which charged the defendant with both assault with a deadly weapon and assault by means of force likely to produce GBI. No such inconsistency appears here because, as noted above, the operative information charged Provost with "assault by means of force likely to produce GBI with a deadly weapon" and thus he admitted to having committed the assault with a deadly weapon. Moreover, the trial court did not rely solely on the abstract of judgment to determine Provost committed assault with a deadly weapon. In sum, there was no Sixth Amendment violation.

3. Substantial Evidence Supported the Trial Court's True Finding on the Strike Conviction

Provost contends insufficient evidence supported the trial court's finding he pleaded no contest to the strike prong of section 4501. We review the record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it is supported by substantial evidence. (Delgado, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1067.) In Delgado, the Supreme Court concluded that an abstract of judgment describing a violation of § 245, subdivision (a)(1) as "'Asslt w DWpn'" was sufficient to permit a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant's conviction fell under the strike prong of section 245. (Delgado, supra, 43 Cal.4th at pp. 1069-1070.) The Delgado court distinguished People v. Rodriguez (1998) 17 Cal.4th 253 (Rodriguez), explaining the abstract of judgment in Rodriguez referred to the other specific, discrete, and disjunctive form of section 245(a)(1), involving force likely to produce GBI. (Rodriguez, supra, 17 Cal.4th at pp. 261-262 [abstract of judgment describing violation of § 245, subd. (a)(1) as "'ASLT GBI/DLY WPN'" proved nothing more than least adjudicated elements of charged offense and therefore was insufficient to prove a serious felony conviction].) Here, the abstract of judgment stated Provost pleaded no contest to violating section 4501, "'Assault W/Deadly Weapon By Non-Life Prisoner,'" with no reference to the use of force likely to produce GBI. Consequently, the abstract of judgment provides sufficient evidence to support the trial court's true finding on the prior strike conviction.

People v. Learnard (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 1117 (Learnard) does not assist Provost. There, the appellate court found insufficient evidence to support a strike finding because the trial court "simply disregarded references in both the information and the abstract of judgment to assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury. The court did the same with respect to the conduct described at the preliminary hearing." (Learnard, supra, 4 Cal.App.5th at p. 1123.) Here, the abstract of judgment did not refer to assault by means of force likely to produce GBI and as stated above, the felony complaint identified the means of force likely to produce GBI as a deadly weapon.

Finally, the lack of a section 667, subdivision (a) allegation in the felony complaint does not assist Provost. Although at the time of Provost's sentencing on the prior conviction, the court was required to impose a section 667, subdivision (a) enhancement, if alleged, the prosecutor was not required to charge the section 667, subdivision (a) allegation. (See People v. Nguyen (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 260, 267 & fn. 1 [failure to allege a prior serious conviction under section 667, subdivision (a), "a discretionary charging decision"].) In sum, substantial evidence supported the trial court's finding Provost's prior section 4501 conviction qualified as a strike. C. Presentence Credits

As noted, the trial court awarded Provost 377 days of custody credit and no conduct credit. Provost contends he is entitled to 378 days of custody credit and 378 days of conduct credit. The Attorney General concedes the trial court erred in not awarding conduct credits, and argues the record does not show the days Provost was in actual custody. The Attorney General notes Provost was arrested on March 19, 2017, and sentenced on April 13, 2018, a period of 391 days. We remand the matter to the trial court to determine the period Provost was in actual custody and to award the appropriate custody and conduct credits under sections 2900.5, subdivision (a), and 4019.

III

DISPOSITION

The convictions are affirmed. The matter is remanded to the trial court to confirm the period of Provost's actual custody and award presentence credits as appropriate.

ARONSON, ACTING P. J. WE CONCUR: IKOLA, J. THOMPSON, J.


Summaries of

People v. Provost

COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION THREE
Jan 29, 2020
No. G056297 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 29, 2020)
Case details for

People v. Provost

Case Details

Full title:THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. BRIAN ANTHONY PROVOST, Defendant…

Court:COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION THREE

Date published: Jan 29, 2020

Citations

No. G056297 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 29, 2020)