Opinion
659 KA 11-01818
06-12-2015
The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Michael E. PRINDLE, Defendant–Appellant.
Timothy P. Donaher, Public Defender, Rochester (James A. Hobbs of Counsel), for Defendant–Appellant. Sandra Doorley, District Attorney, Rochester (Geoffrey Kaeuper of Counsel), for Respondent.
Timothy P. Donaher, Public Defender, Rochester (James A. Hobbs of Counsel), for Defendant–Appellant.Sandra Doorley, District Attorney, Rochester (Geoffrey Kaeuper of Counsel), for Respondent.
PRESENT: SMITH, J.P., CENTRA, PERADOTTO, SCONIERS, AND WHALEN, JJ.
Opinion
MEMORANDUM:Defendant appeals from a resentence imposed by Supreme Court upon remittal from the Court of Appeals, which modified the judgment by reducing his conviction of murder in the second degree (Penal Law § 125.25 [2] ) to manslaughter in the second degree (§ 125.15[1] ) (People v. Prindle, 16 N.Y.3d 768, 769, 919 N.Y.S.2d 491, 944 N.E.2d 1130 ). Upon remittal, the court adjudicated defendant a persistent felony offender and resentenced him to an indeterminate term of imprisonment of 15 years to life.
Defendant initially contends that New York's persistent felony offender statute is unconstitutional in light of the rule in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435. We reject that contention. It is well settled that the persistent felony offender statute is constitutional (see People v. Battles, 16 N.Y.3d 54, 59, 917 N.Y.S.2d 601, 942 N.E.2d 1026, cert. denied ––– U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 123, 181 L.Ed.2d 46 ; People v. Quinones, 12 N.Y.3d 116, 122–131, 879 N.Y.S.2d 1, 906 N.E.2d 1033, cert. denied 558 U.S. 821, 130 S.Ct. 104, 175 L.Ed.2d 31 ). Contrary to defendant's further contention, his resentencing does not violate the rule in Alleyne v. United States, ––– U.S. ––––, 133 S.Ct. 2151, 186 L.Ed.2d 314, inasmuch as the factors that made him eligible for enhanced sentencing were prior convictions that were based on proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and thus those factors were not “based on [the court's] finding by a preponderance of the evidence” (Alleyne, ––– U.S. at ––––, 133 S.Ct. at 2163 ).
Contrary to defendant's further contention, “[i]t is settled law that the sentencing of a defendant as a persistent felony offender ... does not implicate the protections embodied in the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the Federal and State Constitutions” (People v. Pelkey, 294 A.D.2d 669, 670, 742 N.Y.S.2d 693, lv. denied 98 N.Y.2d 771, 752 N.Y.S.2d 11, 781 N.E.2d 923 ; see People v. Sailor, 65 N.Y.2d 224, 226–227, 491 N.Y.S.2d 112, 480 N.E.2d 701, cert. denied 474 U.S. 982, 106 S.Ct. 387, 88 L.Ed.2d 340 ; see also Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 728–729, 118 S.Ct. 2246, 141 L.Ed.2d 615 ).
Finally, we reject defendant's contentions that he was improperly adjudicated a persistent felon, and that the sentence is unduly harsh and severe. We conclude that defendant's “history and character ... and the nature and circumstances of his criminal conduct indicate that extended incarceration and life-time supervision will best serve the public interest” (Penal Law § 70.10[2] ; see People v. Bastian, 83 A.D.3d 1468, 1470, 919 N.Y.S.2d 724, lv. denied 17 N.Y.3d 813, 929 N.Y.S.2d 801, 954 N.E.2d 92 ; People v. Perry, 19 A.D.3d 619, 619, 800 N.Y.S.2d 25, lv. denied 5 N.Y.3d 809, 803 N.Y.S.2d 38, 836 N.E.2d 1161, reconsideration denied 5 N.Y.3d 855, 806 N.Y.S.2d 175, 840 N.E.2d 144 ).
It is hereby ORDERED that the resentence so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.