However, it has been well recognized that judicial notice may be taken of the fact that property has some value, although the courts have been reluctant to take notice of any specific value. ( People v. Kurtz, 37 Ill.2d 103; People v. Price, 81 Ill. App.2d 111; People v. Kelly, 66 Ill. App.2d 204.) We see no valid reason why notice may not be taken in a case such as this that the property has a value of over $150. Courts do not operate in a vacuum; they are presumed to be no more ignorant than the public generally, and will take judicial notice of that which everyone knows to be true.

However, it has been well recognized that judicial notice may be taken of the fact that property has some value, although the courts have been reluctant to take notice of any specific value. ( People v. Kurtz, 37 Ill.2d 103, 224 N.E.2d 817 ; People v. Price, 81 Ill.App.2d 111, 225 N.E.2d 453 ; People v. Kelly, 66 Ill.App.2d 204, 214 N.E.2d 290.) We see no valid reason why notice may not be taken in a case such as this that the property has a value of over $150. Courts do not operate in a vacuum; they are presumed to be no more ignorant than the public generally, and will take judicial notice of that which everyone knows to be true.

However, having decided to answer the officer, defendant took the risk that the inference permissible from this half-truth, viz., that he intended to permanently deprive the car's owner of it, could be used against him in a court of law. Cf. People v. Price (1967), 81 Ill. App.2d 111, 225 N.E.2d 453 (intent to permanently deprive automobile's owner thereof was proved where defendant, when arrested, claimed he was owner of car, produced a sales contract containing owner's name and claimed he had borrowed the car from him but, at trial, denied any knowledge of the car and where car was found many miles from where the owner had parked it four days before). Moreover, we find unavailing the facts or nonfacts upon which defendant relies in support of a finding of mere joyriding.

However, it has been well recognized that judicial notice may be taken of the fact that property has some value, although the courts have been reluctant to take notice of any specific value. ( People v. Kurtz, 37 Ill.2d 103, 224 N.E.2d 817; People v. Price, 81 Ill. App.2d 111, 225 N.E.2d 453; People v. Kelly, 66 Ill. App.2d 204, 214 N.E.2d 290.) We see no valid reason why notice may not be taken in a case such as this that the property has a value of over $150. Courts do not operate in a vacuum; they are presumed to be no more ignorant than the public generally, and will take judicial notice of that which everyone knows to be true.

The question of intent is one to be determined by the trier of fact from an examination of the facts and circumstances introduced in evidence. People v. Price, 81 Ill. App.2d 111, 225 N.E.2d 453. In the instant case the trial judge was presented with conflicting versions as to how the defendant came into the possession of the missing vehicle.

Ill. Rev Stats, c 38, § 16-1 (1965). All that is now required to support the charge of theft is that the indictment show that a thing of value was stolen, Ill. Rev Stats, c 38, § 15-1 (1965); People v. Price, 81 Ill. App.2d 111, 225 N.E.2d 453; People v. Kelly, 66 Ill. App.2d 204, 214 N.E.2d 290. In Price the indictment charged that the value exceeded $100, but no evidence was offered to prove value.