One of the recorded phone calls between two of the codefendants concerned the location of a certain firearm, and one of the codefendants was instructed to retrieve it. The People's evidence further demonstrated that Azoro was found outside the subject building a short time later with a recently-inflicted gunshot wound. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, and giving it the benefit of every reasonable inference to be drawn therefrom (see People v Ramos, 19 NY3d 133, 136), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant solicited, requested, commanded, importuned, or intentionally aided the individual who engaged in conduct which constituted the offense of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (see Penal Law § 20.00; People v Ekwegbalu, 131 AD3d 982, 983; People v Pressley, 115 AD3d 991, 992; People v Johnson, 94 AD3d 1408, 1409; People v Santiago, 199 AD2d 290). The People were not required to conclusively establish the identity of the individual who actually possessed the weapon (see People v Clark, 23 AD3d 673, 674-675), and their failure to do so did not render the evidence legally insufficient to establish the defendant's guilt under an acting-in-concert theory (see People v Hirschfeld, 282 AD2d 337, 338; People v Taylor, 74 AD2d 177, 179).

One of the recorded phone calls between two of the codefendants concerned the location of a certain firearm, and one of the codefendants was instructed to retrieve it. The People's evidence further demonstrated that Azoro was found outside the subject building a short time later with a recently-inflicted gunshot wound. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, and giving it the benefit of every reasonable inference to be drawn therefrom (see People v. Ramos, 19 N.Y.3d 133, 136, 946 N.Y.S.2d 83, 969 N.E.2d 199 ), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant solicited, requested, commanded, importuned, or intentionally aided the individual who engaged in conduct which constituted the offense of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (see Penal Law § 20.00 ; People v. Ekwegbalu, 131 A.D.3d 982, 983, 15 N.Y.S.3d 847 ; People v. Pressley, 115 A.D.3d 991, 992, 982 N.Y.S.2d 394 ; People v. Johnson, 94 A.D.3d 1408, 1409, 942 N.Y.S.2d 302 ; People v. Santiago, 199 A.D.2d 290, 605 N.Y.S.2d 702 ). The People were not required to conclusively establish the identity of the individual who actually possessed the weapon (see People v. Clark, 23 A.D.3d 673, 674–675, 804 N.Y.S.2d 426 ), and their failure to do so did not render the evidence legally insufficient to establish the defendant's guilt under an acting-in-concert theory (see People v. Hirschfeld, 282 A.D.2d 337, 338, 726 N.Y.S.2d 3 ; People v. Taylor, 74 A.D.2d 177, 179, 427 N.Y.S.2d 439 ).

The defendant's contention that the Supreme Court failed to comply with the procedure for handling jury notes set forth by the Court of Appeals in People v. O'Rama, 78 N.Y.2d 270, 277–278, 574 N.Y.S.2d 159, 579 N.E.2d 189 is unpreserved for appellate review. The alleged failure to comply with the O'Rama procedure did not constitute a mode of proceedings error which would obviate the preservation requirement because it is evident from the record that the Supreme Court fulfilled its core responsibilities under CPL 310.30 by providing defense counsel with meaningful notice of the content of the jury's notes (see People v. Nealon, 26 N.Y.3d 152, 2015 N.Y. Slip Op 07781; People v. Ramirez, 15 NY3d 824, 826, 909 N.Y.S.2d 1, 935 N.E.2d 791; People v. Kadarko, 14 N.Y.3d 426, 429–430, 902 N.Y.S.2d 828, 928 N.E.2d 1025; People v. Heron, 130 A.D.3d 754, 756, 13 N.Y.S.3d 243; People v. Pressley, 115 A.D.3d 991, 992, 982 N.Y.S.2d 394).Contrary to the defendant's contention raised in his pro se supplemental brief, the Supreme Court did not err in denying his trial motion to reopen the suppression hearing.

The defendant's contention that the Supreme Court failed to comply with the procedure for handling jury notes set forth by the Court of Appeals in People v. O'Rama, 78 N.Y.2d 270, 277–278, 574 N.Y.S.2d 159, 579 N.E.2d 189 is unpreserved for appellate review. The alleged failure to comply with the O'Rama procedure did not constitute a mode of proceedings error which would obviate the preservation requirement because it is evident from the record that the Supreme Court fulfilled its core responsibilities under CPL 310.30 by providing defense counsel with meaningful notice of the content of the jury's notes (see People v. Nealon, 26 N.Y.3d 152, 2015 N.Y. Slip Op 07781 ; People v. Ramirez, 15 NY3d 824, 826, 909 N.Y.S.2d 1, 935 N.E.2d 791 ; People v. Kadarko, 14 N.Y.3d 426, 429–430, 902 N.Y.S.2d 828, 928 N.E.2d 1025 ; People v. Heron, 130 A.D.3d 754, 756, 13 N.Y.S.3d 243 ; People v. Pressley, 115 A.D.3d 991, 992, 982 N.Y.S.2d 394 ).Contrary to the defendant's contention raised in his pro se supplemental brief, the Supreme Court did not err in denying his trial motion to reopen the suppression hearing.

The defendant also failed to preserve for appellate review his contention that the Supreme Court failed to comply with the procedure delineated in People v. O'Rama, 78 N.Y.2d 270, 574 N.Y.S.2d 159, 579 N.E.2d 189, in its handling of two notes by which the jury asked to see certain photographs and videotapes that were in evidence, and requested a clarification of the definition of intent. The alleged failure to comply with the O'Rama procedure did not constitute a mode of proceedings error which would obviate the preservation requirement because it is evident from the record that the Supreme Court complied with its core responsibilities under CPL 310.30 by giving counsel meaningful notice of the content of the jury's notes, and providing a meaningful response to the jury (see People v. Alcide, 21 N.Y.3d 687, 694, 976 N.Y.S.2d 432, 998 N.E.2d 1056 ; People v. Cherry, 127 A.D.3d 879, 888–881, 5 N.Y.S.3d 527 ; People v. Pressley, 115 A.D.3d 991, 992, 982 N.Y.S.2d 394 ; People v. Woodrow, 89 A.D.3d 1158, 1160, 932 N.Y.S.2d 236 ). In any event, the defendant's contention that the Supreme Court failed to comply with the O'Rama procedure is without merit (see People v. Evans, 127 A.D.3d 780, 782, 6 N.Y.S.3d 555 ; People v. Nunez, 120 A.D.3d 714, 717, 991 N.Y.S.2d 121 ).

The defendant also failed to preserve for appellate review his contention that the Supreme Court failed to comply with the procedure delineated in People v O'Rama (78 NY2d 270), in its handling of two notes by which the jury asked to see certain photographs and videotapes that were in evidence, and requested a clarification of the definition of intent. The alleged failure to comply with the O'Rama procedure did not constitute a mode of proceedings error which would obviate the preservation requirement because it is evident from the record that the Supreme Court complied with its core responsibilities under CPL 310.30 by giving counsel meaningful notice of the content of the jury's notes, and providing a meaningful response to the jury (see People v Alcide, 21 NY3d 687, 694; People v Cherry, 127 AD3d 879, 88-881; People v Pressley, 115 AD3d 991, 992; People v Woodrow, 89 AD3d 1158, 1160). In any event, the defendant's contention that the Supreme Court failed to comply with the O'Rama procedure is without merit (see People v Evans, 127 AD3d 780, 782; People v Nunez, 120 AD3d 714, 717).