The trial judge rejected the State's arguments. He reasoned the operative time was not when defendant was released from prison, but rather when he was convicted of the offense for which the State seeks revocation of his probation. Based on his reliance on People v. Powell (1980), 89 Ill. App.3d 801, 412 N.E.2d 47, the trial judge denied the State's petition to revoke. The trial judge reasoned the 10-month delay between defendant's conviction and the filing of the probation revocation petition was similar to the 15-month delay between the conviction and the State's filing of the petition to revoke defendant's probation in Powell.

Accordingly, defendants serving a probationary term are guaranteed due process protections. ( People v. Tillman (1992), 237 Ill. App.3d 971, 973, 605 N.E.2d 736, 738; People v. Powell (1980), 89 Ill. App.3d 801, 802, 412 N.E.2d 47, 48.) This protection is more limited than the protection afforded a defendant during the litigation stage of his prosecution.

In White, 273 Ill. App.3d at 643-44, the appellate court found that an unexcused four-year delay between the filing of a petition for probation revocation and commencement of proceedings on the petition violated the defendant's right to due process and required dismissal of the charges. See also People v. Powell, 89 Ill. App.3d 801, 412 N.E.2d 47 (1980) (15-month delay); People v. Crawford, 85 Ill. App.3d 366, 406 N.E.2d 861 (1980) (17-month delay). Here, neither the prosecutor nor the trial court has offered any excuse for the delay of more than 72 months between the judgment finding Turner not guilty by reason of insanity and the commitment hearing.

Delay in seeking revocation of a probationer's parole until the disposition of other pending charges against probationer is permissible where the probationer is not prejudiced by the delay. See People v. Powell, 89 Ill. App.3d 801, 45 Ill. Dec. 11, 412 N.E.2d 47 (1980). However, "[c]onviction of a subsequent offense is not a prerequisite for revocation of probation."