The defendant's contention that the Supreme Court erred in denying his motion to withdraw his plea since it was not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made survives the valid waiver of his right to appeal (see People v. Lofton, 115 A.D.3d 989, 989, 982 N.Y.S.2d 587 ; People v. Persaud, 109 A.D.3d 626, 626, 970 N.Y.S.2d 324 ; People v. Morrow, 48 A.D.3d 704, 705, 852 N.Y.S.2d 327 ; see also People v. Callahan, 80 N.Y.2d 273, 280, 590 N.Y.S.2d 46, 604 N.E.2d 108 ). However, contrary to the defendant's contention, the record demonstrates that the defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently pleaded guilty and, under the circumstances, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying his pro se motion to withdraw his plea (see People v. Griffith, 78 A.D.3d 1194, 1195, 913 N.Y.S.2d 264 ; People v. Gully, 17 A.D.3d 382, 382, 792 N.Y.S.2d 199 ; People v. Telfair, 299 A.D.2d 429, 429, 749 N.Y.S.2d 436 ; People v. Potter, 294 A.D.2d 603, 604, 742 N.Y.S.2d 584 ).
Here, the record supports the Supreme Court's determination that the defendant's plea was entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently ( see People v Fiumefreddo, 82 NY2d at 543; People v Harris, 74 AD3d at 839). The defendant's unsubstantiated and conclusory assertions of innocence, coercion, and ineffective assistance of counsel were contradicted by the record and, therefore, were insufficient to warrant withdrawal or a hearing ( see People v Griffith, 78 AD3d at 1195; People v Wiedmer, 71 AD3d at 1067; People v Potter, 294 AD2d 603, 604; People v D'Orio, 210 AD2d 424, 425; People v Grady, 110 AD2d 780, 780-781). "[T]he defendant's waiver of his right to appeal precludes review of his contention that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel, except to the extent that the alleged ineffective assistance affected the voluntariness of his plea" ( People v Gedin, 46 AD3d at 701; see People v Aguayo, 73 AD3d 938, 939; People v Taubenkraut, 48 AD3d 598).
Instead, it is sufficient if the court affords the defendant an opportunity to present his arguments with respect to withdrawal ( see People v Tinsley, 35 NY2d 926; People v Fiumefreddo, 82 NY2d at 543). Unsubstantiated and conclusory assertions of innocence and coercion that are contradicted by the record are insufficient to warrant withdrawal or a hearing ( see People v Wiedmer, 71 AD3d 1067; People v Potter, 294 AD2d 603; People v D'Orio, 210 AD2d 424; People v Grady, 110 AD2d 780). Here, the defendant's contention on appeal that his plea was not knowingly, voluntarily, or intelligently made because his prior attorney failed to inform him or misinformed him of the deportation consequences of his plea of guilty is principally based on matter debtors the record and, thus, cannot be reviewed on direct appeal ( see People v Wiedmer, 71 AD3d 1067; People v Alexander, 62 AD3d 719, 720; People v Drago, 50 AD3d 920; People v DeLuca, 45 AD3d 777).
The County Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the defendant's pro se motion to vacate his plea of guilty, without a hearing. The defendant's conclusory allegations that he was innocent and that he was coerced by the codefendant and the codefendant's family were belied by the plea proceedings and were insufficient to warrant vacatur of the plea ( see People v. Frederick, 45 NY2d 520; People v. Potter, 294 AD2d 603, 604; People v. Dunbar, 260 AD2d 644; People v. Barnett, 258 AD2d 526).
As the defendant's bare assertion of innocence is contradicted by the plea minutes, his motion to vacate the judgment on this ground is denied. People v. Molloy, 28 A.D.3d 681 (2d Dept.), lv. denied, 7 N.Y.3d 792 (2006); People v. Solis, 302 A.D.2d 542 (2d Dept.), lv. denied, 99 N.Y.2d 658 (2003); People v. Potter, 294 A.D.2d 603 (2d Dept.), lv. denied, 98 N.Y.2d 771 (2002).The Defendant's Claim That he was Deprived of his Right to Testify Before the Grand Jury.