Moreover, as this court noted in the co-defendant Polanco's case, the officer had the presence of mind to persuade the perpetrators that he was simply a buyer and not a police officer and further, to attempt to retrieve his gun after purchasing the drugs and before leaving the apartment. (People v Polanco, 179 A.D.2d 531 [decided herewith].) By failing to timely object to the court's oral response to a verbal inquiry from jurors, the defendant waived any appellate challenge.
Appeal from the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the First Judicial Department, Ira Beal, J. Irving Anolik, New York City, for appellant. Robert M. Morgenthau, District Attorney of New York County, New York City (Gregory H. Mansfield of counsel), for respondent. On review of submissions pursuant to section 500.4 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals (22 N.Y.CRR 500.4), order affirmed for the reasons stated in the memorandum of the Appellate Division ( 179 A.D.2d 531). Concur: Acting Chief Judge SIMONS and Judges KAYE, TITONE, HANCOCK, JR., and BELLACOSA. Taking no part: Judge SMITH.
Ordered that the judgments are affirmed. The photographic identification of the defendant was made by two trained, undercover police officers who, approximately two hours earlier, observed him during their face-to-face drug purchase transactions. Under these circumstances, the hearing court properly concluded that the single-photo identification was merely confirmatory ( see, People v. Montgomery, 88 N.Y.2d 926; People v. Dixon, 85 N.Y.2d 218; People v. Lane, 185 A.D.2d 282; People v. Polanco, 179 A.D.2d 531). Accordingly, the court did not err in summarily denying that branch of the defendant's omnibus motion which was to suppress the officers' identification testimony. In view of our determination with respect to the defendant's conviction under Indictment No. 94-181, there is no basis for vacatur of his plea under Indictment NO. 94-270 ( cf., People v Clark, 45 N.Y.2d 432).
The court properly found that the officer's identification of defendant at the prearranged meeting place a short time after the "buy-bust" occurred was merely confirmatory and, therefore, not subject to CPL 710.30 requirements (see, People v Rodriguez, 79 N.Y.2d 445, 449; People v Wharton, 74 N.Y.2d 921, 922-923; People v Reed, 197 A.D.2d 866, lv denied 82 N.Y.2d 901; People v Guzman, 197 A.D.2d 705, lv denied 82 N.Y.2d 896). Thus, no Wade hearing was required (see, People v Wharton, supra; People v Polanco, 179 A.D.2d 531, 532-533, affd 80 N.Y.2d 1012). We agree with defendant that the People's failure to disclose the tape recording in a more timely manner was improper.
ppression hearing in order to discharge their burden of coming forward with evidence to establish probable cause" (People v Brown, 184 A.D.2d 647, citing People v Petralia, 62 N.Y.2d 47, 51, cert denied 469 U.S. 852; see also, People v Haynie, 181 A.D.2d 695). Moreover, the description transmitted to the arresting officer, coupled with the defendant's proximity to the crime scene and his appearance, which closely matched the description of the individual who had just sold narcotics to the undercover officer, constituted "`facts and circumstances which, when viewed together'", would lead a reasonable person having the same expertise as the arresting officer to conclude that the defendant had perpetrated the drug sale (People v Landry, 187 A.D.2d 732; People v Acevedo, 181 A.D.2d 596; People v Javier, 175 A.D.2d 182; People v Harrington, 163 A.D.2d 327). The defendant's further contention that the Supreme Court erred in denying his application for a Wade hearing is without merit (see, People v Polanco, 179 A.D.2d 531, 532, affd 80 N.Y.2d 1012; People v Wharton, 74 N.Y.2d 921, 922; see also, People v Roberts, 169 A.D.2d 284, 289, affd 79 N.Y.2d 964; People vJohnson, 178 A.D.2d 659; People v Jackson, 171 A.D.2d 756). Lawrence, J.P., Eiber, O'Brien and Ritter, JJ., concur.