Opinion
Appeal No. 3-15-0690
12-15-2017
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TROY L. PLEMMONS, Defendant-Appellant.
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). Appeal from the Circuit Court of the 14th Judicial Circuit, Whiteside County, Illinois, Circuit No. 14-CF-275 Honorable Stanley B. Steines, Judge, Presiding. JUSTICE LYTTON delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice Carter concurred in the judgment.
Justice Holdridge dissented.
ORDER
¶ 1 Held: The State did not provide any independent evidence corroborating defendant's admission that he had been driving the vehicle. ¶ 2 Defendant, Troy L. Plemmons, appeals his convictions for aggravated driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI), driving while license suspended, and failure to report an accident, arguing that his convictions should be reversed under the corpus delicti rule as the State failed to provide evidence to corroborate his admission that he had been driving the vehicle. We reverse.
¶ 3 FACTS
¶ 4 Defendant was charged with aggravated DUI (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(2) (West 2014)), driving while license suspended (625 ILCS 5/6-303(a) (West 2014)), and failure to report an accident (625 ILCS 5/11-404(a) (West 2014)). A jury trial was held. Sara Rokey testified that she was a patrol officer for the Rock Falls police department and was dispatched to an accident at 12:30 a.m. on June 26, 2014. She was told by dispatch that "a vehicle had run off the road and hit some property." En route to the location of the accident, Rokey pulled behind a red Lincoln Navigator. She did not see who was driving the Navigator. She turned her vehicle around to see if she could find the vehicle that had been in the accident. Rokey was then flagged down by a man who told her that the Navigator she had been following was the vehicle that had been in the accident. She turned her vehicle around and located the Navigator. ¶ 5 Rokey estimated the time from when she originally saw the Navigator to when she located it again to be about a minute. She located the Navigator at a residence. Rokey noted the Navigator had damage to the front bumper, windshield, back hatch, back bumper, one of the taillights, and was missing a front license plate. She saw a man exiting the passenger side of the Navigator. "He started walking away from [Rokey] headed towards the next house to the west. [She] asked him to stop numerous times just to come talk to [her], [she] needed to identify him, told him to stop. He eventually stopped and sat on a porch step of the next residence." While approaching the porch, the man, later identified as Dustin Funderberg, called defendant's name once or twice. Funderberg told Rokey the Navigator was his, which was confirmed upon a check of the registration. After Funderberg had called defendant's name, defendant walked out of the residence and onto the porch where Funderberg was sitting. The record does not establish whose residence it was. ¶ 6 Rokey noticed that defendant was having a hard time standing. She helped him sit on the steps so he did not fall over. She also noticed that it was hard to understand defendant as he was slurring his speech and mumbling. Rokey observed that it looked like he had urinated on himself. Above defendant's right eye appeared to be "a cut and a bump or a welt." Funderberg had "a cut on his lip and some blood and some blood on one of his hands or knuckles." Funderberg's mannerisms were similar to defendant; he had a hard time standing, was slurring his speech, and appeared not to understand what Rokey was saying. Based on this and the odor of an alcoholic beverage emanating from both, Rokey determined that defendant and Funderberg were intoxicated. ¶ 7 Rokey stated that she asked defendant if he had been driving, and he did not answer her. Rokey ran defendant's information and discovered that he had a suspended driver's license. Rokey asked defendant if he knew his license was suspended, and he responded, "Yes, and I was driving." She then informed defendant that he was under arrest. She patted defendant down after arresting him and did not recall finding the keys to the Navigator. ¶ 8 Kristian Montanez testified that he was a deputy patrolman for Whiteside County. He was also dispatched to the accident. It took him 10 to 12 minutes to arrive. When he arrived at the scene of the accident he noticed that the Navigator had damaged a trailer, boat, fence, and another vehicle. He located the Navigator's license plate at the scene. He then went to Rokey's location at the residence. Montanez inspected the Navigator. He noticed blood on the inside of the windshield, on the "[d]river's side kind of in the center." The record does not include a photograph of the blood on the windshield. ¶ 9 Rokey had already placed defendant under arrest when Montanez arrived. Montanez also noticed that defendant was intoxicated. He told defendant he would like to conduct field sobriety tests, and defendant refused. While processing defendant at the police station, Montanez heard defendant say "he had fucked up and *** was sorry." However, defendant was still very intoxicated, and Montanez stated that defendant could have said, "I'm fucked up." Then Montanez said that he heard defendant actually say, "I fucked up, it's time to pay the piper." Defendant also said that "he didn't want Mr. Funderberg to be in any more trouble." Funderberg had a prior DUI. Montanez then asked defendant why he helped Funderberg, but defendant did not answer. Defendant told Montanez that they had come from a bar. He admitted that he was intoxicated, and would not take an Intoxilyzer test. Defendant then told Montanez that he had not been driving. Montanez searched defendant and did not find the keys to the Navigator. ¶ 10 Defendant moved for a directed verdict, arguing that the State failed to prove the corpus delicti. The court denied the motion, noting that Funderberg was exiting the passenger side of the Navigator moments after Rokey had originally seen the Navigator on the road. The court further noted that Funderberg had been calling defendant's name. Defendant did not present any witnesses. The jury found defendant guilty of all three charges. Defendant filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied. He was sentenced to three years' imprisonment on the DUI conviction with one year MSR, and concurrent 90-day jail terms on the other two convictions.
In its petition for rehearing, the State says, "At trial, Officer Rokey testified that she observed Funderberg exit the passenger side of the vehicle, '...calling for somebody by the name of Troy.' " This is incorrect. The record only establishes that Rokey heard Funderberg call for defendant at some point between exiting the vehicle and sitting on the porch. Regardless, Rokey's testimony does not establish that defendant was driving the vehicle, but only establishes that defendant exited the house when he was called. --------
¶ 11 ANALYSIS
¶ 12 On appeal, defendant argues that the only evidence that he was driving the vehicle came from his own statements, and therefore, defendant concludes that he was not proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and, "his convictions under the motor vehicle code must be reversed under the corpus delicti rule." Because the State did not present any independent evidence corroborating defendant's admission, we find that the State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant had been driving the vehicle. ¶ 13 In People v. Sargent, 239 Ill. 2d 166, 183 (2010), the Illinois Supreme Court stated:
"Under the law of Illinois, proof of an offense requires proof of two distinct propositions or facts beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) that a crime occurred, i.e., the corpus delicti; and (2) that the crime was committed by the person charged. [Citations.] In many cases *** a defendant's confession may be integral to proving the corpus delicti. It is well established, however, that proof of the corpus delicti may not rest exclusively on a defendant's extrajudicial confession, admission, or other statement. [Citation.] Where a defendant's confession is part of the proof of the corpus delicti, the prosecution must also adduce corroborating evidence independent of the defendant's own statement. [Citation.] If a confession is not corroborated in this way, a conviction based on the confession cannot be sustained."This corroboration requirement stems from the mistrust of confessions. People v. Furby, 138 Ill. 2d 434, 447 (1990). "To avoid running afoul of the corpus delicti rule, the independent evidence need only tend to show the commission of a crime. It need not be so strong that it alone proves the commission of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt." (Emphasis in original.) People v. Lara, 2012 IL 112370, ¶ 18. The independent evidence must do more than merely suggest an offense occurred. People v. Lambert, 104 Ill. 2d 375, 380-81 (1984)). "Due to the fact-intensive nature of the inquiry, *** the question of whether certain independent evidence is sufficient to establish specific charged offenses must be decided on a case-by-case basis." Lara, 2012 IL 112370, ¶ 26. ¶ 14 Defendant was convicted of aggravated DUI, driving while license suspended, and failing to report an accident. The key element in each of these offenses is that defendant was driving or in actual, physical control of the vehicle. See 625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(2), 6-303(a), 11-404(a) (West 2014). The dissent points out that defendant was intoxicated and had his license suspended. However, neither of these facts is illegal unless defendant was actually driving the vehicle. "Although the observation of the defendant in the act of driving is not an indispensable prerequisite for a conviction, the act must be established by other credible and substantial evidence, either direct or circumstantial." People v. Foster, 138 Ill. App. 3d 44, 46 (1985). If this element is not proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the convictions must be reversed. People v. Burkholder, 47 Ill. App. 3d 334, 335 (1977). Defendant does not challenge the evidence presented regarding any other elements of the charged offenses. ¶ 15 In Foster, a police officer was called to a one vehicle accident. Foster, 138 Ill. App. 3d at 45. When he arrived, the defendant was sitting in the passenger seat and another man was in the driver's seat. Id. The defendant told the officer twice that he had been the one driving the vehicle, though he later told the officer he was not the driver. Id. at 45-46. The defendant was convicted, but appealed, arguing that there was no evidence, besides his admission, that he was the driver of the vehicle. Id. at 46. On appeal, this court found that there was no independent evidence to establish that the defendant was the driver. Id. In doing so, the court noted that the defendant was in the passenger side of the vehicle and that no evidence was presented regarding the ownership of the vehicle. Id. at 46-47. ¶ 16 In contrast to Foster, there are a series of cases in which the appellate court found that there was sufficient independent evidence other than the admission to establish that the defendant was the driver in a DUI case. In People v. Lurz, 379 Ill. App. 3d 958, 972 (2008), the defendant was found one-half mile from where his truck ran out of gas, and he was in possession of the keys to the truck when he was found. The defendant in People v. Call, 176 Ill. App. 3d 571, 577 (1988), was the owner of the vehicle that had been driven into the ditch. Though no one was found near the vehicle and the defendant was found two miles from where the vehicle was, a witness saw someone matching the defendant's description speed past him in the vehicle moments before it went into the ditch. Id. The court in People v. Rhoden, 253 Ill. App. 3d 805, 812 (1993), noted that the defendant was the owner of the vehicle, was standing next to the vehicle after the accident, another man was pinned under the passenger side of the vehicle, and defendant "took pains to keep the car in good condition, making it unlikely for him to have entrusted the car to" his intoxicated passenger. ¶ 17 Here, Rokey saw Funderberg exit the passenger side of the vehicle when she arrived at the vehicle's location. Defendant was not anywhere near the vehicle, but instead walked out of a residence after Funderberg repeatedly called out his name. Defendant did not have the keys to the vehicle, nor was he the owner of the vehicle. Instead, Funderberg was the owner of the vehicle. Though the facts of this case are different than Foster, Lurz, Call, and Rhoden, we find it most similar to Foster. In Foster, the defendant was found in the passenger seat of the vehicle, another man was in the driver's seat, and there was no other evidence regarding the circumstances of the accident. Defendant in this case was not found near the vehicle, while Funderberg was found in the vehicle. Moreover, the courts in Lurz, Call, and Rhoden, specifically noted that the defendant was the owner of the vehicle, the defendant possessed the keys, and/or there was some other evidence tying the defendant to the driving of the vehicle, such as a witness, none of which is present here. See Lurz, 379 Ill. App. 3d at 972; Call, 176 Ill. App. 3d at 577; Rhoden, 253 Ill. App. 3d at 812. Even when viewing the evidence presented in the light most favorable to the State (Lurz, 379 Ill. App. 3d at 968), we find the State did not provide independent evidence to corroborate defendant's admission that he had been driving the vehicle. Therefore, defendant was not proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of aggravated DUI, driving while license suspended, and failing to report an accident. ¶ 18 In coming to this conclusion, we reject the State's contention that the location of the blood on the windshield would be consistent with the cut above defendant's eye if defendant had been driving the vehicle. The record does not contain any evidence that the cut above defendant's eye was bleeding. In fact, the only blood mentioned was on Funderberg's hand and mouth. Moreover, the record does not contain any other evidence showing that the placement of the blood on the windshield would have been in the same place as defendant's eye would have been. Montanez only testified that he found blood on the windshield on the "[d]river's side kind of in the center." No photograph of the windshield was entered into evidence. ¶ 19 Finally, we would be remiss if we did not note two assertions the State makes in its petition for rehearing. First, the State claims that we "ignored the testimony of Deputy Montanez," asserting that Montanez's testimony states that defendant admitted "he was in the vehicle with Funderberg immediately prior to the accident." This is an exaggeration of the facts. We acknowledged above (supra ¶ 9) that defendant told Montanez they had come from a bar. We reiterate that defendant's admissions are not enough to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant had been driving the vehicle. Moreover, defendant specifically told Montanez that he had not been driving the vehicle. ¶ 20 Second, the State disagrees with our rejection of its argument that the blood on the windshield came from the cut above defendant's eye, stating that it is not up to this court to "search out a series of potential explanations compatible with innocence." Specifically, the State says that it was the province of the jury to determine whether defendant's cut was bleeding and that the jury could have determined that defendant's cut was the source of the blood. However, the jury was not instructed to determine whether the cut above defendant's eye was bleeding or not. We have not "search[ed] out a series of potential explanations," but have found that based on the evidence as presented to us in the record on appeal, the State did not meet their burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was driving, which is what the jury was instructed to determine. The State may believe that "[a] cut, by its nature, is an open wound," but nothing in the record establishes that defendant's cut was or had been bleeding. ¶ 21 Simply put, other than defendant's admission, there was no evidence that defendant drove the vehicle. In fact, there was no evidence regarding who was driving the vehicle at all. The vehicle could have been driven by Funderberg, defendant, or some unidentified third party. Thus, even when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was the driver.
¶ 22 CONCLUSION
¶ 23 The judgment of the circuit court of Whiteside County is reversed. ¶ 24 Reversed. ¶ 25 JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE, dissenting. ¶ 26 I respectfully dissent. In Lara, our supreme court explicitly held, in relevant part:
"[T]he corpus delicti rule requires only that the corroborating evidence correspond with the circumstances recited in the confession and tend to connect the defendant with the crime. The independent evidence need not precisely align with the details of the confession on each element of the charged offense, or indeed to any particular element of the charged offense." Lara, 2012 IL 112370, ¶ 51.¶ 27 In accordance with our supreme court's holding in Lara, I would find that the State sufficiently adduced such evidence. The defendant admitted to the police that his license was suspended, he drove the vehicle, and he was intoxicated. The independent evidence showed that (1) the defendant was injured, had difficulty standing, slurred his speech, urinated himself, and was inside of the residence when Rokey arrived; (2) Funderberg was the owner of the vehicle, injured, intoxicated, and seen exiting the passenger side of the vehicle one minute after Rokey saw the vehicle in motion; (3) the vehicle was damaged and its parts were recovered from the scene; (4) the vehicle was seen leaving the area of the scene; and (5) the defendant's license was suspended. ¶ 28 The independent evidence need only tend to show the commission of a crime and it need not be so strong that it alone proves the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. ¶ 18. Accordingly, I would find that the State's independent evidence sufficiently corroborated all of the circumstances of the defendant's confession, which tended to show the commission of a crime and connected him to it. Thus, because I would find no violation of the corpus delicti rule, I would affirm the defendant's convictions for aggravated DUI, driving while license suspended, and failing to report an accident.