Before questioning began at the Gift Avenue facility, D.W.S. was again advised of his Miranda rights. Specifically, he was told that he had a right to remain silent, that he had a right to the presence of counsel and that counsel would be appointed if he could not afford one. He was not specifically admonished that he had a right to cut off questioning at any time. The trial court correctly ruled that such an admonition was not necessary to comply with Miranda. See Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 86 S.Ct. 1602, and People v. Pleasant (1980), 88 Ill. App.3d 984, 411 N.E.2d 132. By admission of the defense counsel at the suppression hearing, it is uncontested that D.W.S. knowingly waived his rights when he responded that he understood his rights and that he wanted to speak without an attorney.
( Cf. People v. Thompson (1982), 107 Ill. App.3d 285, 437 N.E.2d 916; People v. Faison (1979), 78 Ill. App.3d 911, 397 N.E.2d 1233; People v. Nestrick (1977), 45 Ill. App.3d 519, 359 N.E.2d 503.) Questioning resumed approximately 1 1/4 hours later, a period of time which is significant under Mosley, and sufficient to convey to defendant that his assertion of silence would be honored by the authorities. (See People v. Ferguson (1981), 102 Ill. App.3d 702, 429 N.E.2d 1321 (one hour); People v. Pleasant (1980), 88 Ill. App.3d 984, 411 N.E.2d 132 (1 1/2 hours); Michigan v. Mosley (1975), 423 U.S. 96, 46 L.Ed.2d 313, 96 S.Ct. 321 (two hours).) Although defendant was questioned by a different officer than the one who conducted the previous interrogation, knowledge of the prior interview is imputed to the officer involved in the second interview.
• 2 In determining whether a defendant's right to remain silent was scrupulously honored, a number of factors must be examined. Two of the most crucial are whether there was a significant period of time, during which there was a complete cessation of questioning, between the defendant's exercise of his right to remain silent and the reinterrogation, and whether the reinterrogation was preceded by a fresh set of Miranda warnings. ( People v. Pleasant (1980), 88 Ill. App.3d 984, 988, 411 N.E.2d 132, 135.) Additional factors to be considered are whether a different officer conducted the second questioning, whether a completely different subject matter was involved in the second questioning, and whether there is something in the record which would justify or explain the defendant's reconsideration of his decision to remain silent.
(See People v. Young (1983), 115 Ill. App.3d 455, 461, 450 N.E.2d 947; cf. People v. Thompson (1982), 107 Ill. App.3d 285, 437 N.E.2d 916; People v. Faison (1979), 78 Ill. App.3d 911, 397 N.E.2d 1233.) Interrogation resumed approximately 90 minutes later, a period of time "significant under Mosley, and sufficient to convey to defendant that his assertion of silence would be honored by the authorities." ( People v. Young (1983), 115 Ill. App.3d 455, 450 N.E.2d 947 (1 1/4 hours); People v. Ferguson (1981), 102 Ill. App.3d 702, 429 N.E.2d 1321 (one hour); People v. Pleasant (1980), 88 Ill. App.3d 984, 411 N.E.2d 132 (1 1/2 hours); Michigan v. Mosley (1975), 423 U.S. 96, 46 L.Ed.2d 313, 96 S.Ct. 321 (two hours).) As in Young, the defendant was questioned by a different officer about the same crime during each interrogation. Although knowledge of a prior interrogation is imputed to the second interrogating officer ( People v. White (1975), 61 Ill.2d 288, 335 N.E.2d 457; People v. Connell (1980), 91 Ill. App.3d 326, 332, 414 N.E.2d 796; but see Michigan v. Mosley (1975), 423 U.S. 96, 46 L.Ed.2d 313, 96 S.Ct. 321), neither this nor the fact that the same subject matter was addressed, necessarily renders the second interrogation unlawful.
Where fresh or new Miranda warnings are required as a prerequisite to reinterrogation, the defendant's assurance that he recalls his rights from previous admonition may suffice. See, People v. Young, 115 Ill. App.3d 455, 71 Ill.Dec. 259, 450 N.E.2d 947 (1983); People v. Pleasant, 88 Ill. App.3d 984, 44 Ill.Dec. 226, 411 N.E.2d 132 (1980); and Biddy v. Diamond, 516 F.2d 118 (5th Cir. 1975). In Young, a rape suspect was advised of his rights at 5:00 p.m., and questioned briefly before invoking his right to remain silent.
This court has had several recent occasions in which to discuss the requirement under Michigan v. Mosley (1975), 423 U.S. 96, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313, that a defendant's right to remain silent be honored by the police. ( People v. Savory (1980), 82 Ill. App.3d 767, 403 N.E.2d 118; People v. Robinson (1980), 87 Ill. App.3d 621, 410 N.E.2d 121; People v. Pleasant (1980), 88 Ill. App.3d 984, 411 N.E.2d 132.) The approach utilized in these cases indicates that a determination of the issue must be made based upon all the facts concerning the defendant's custody, his exercise of his right to remain silent, and his subsequent decision to speak to the police.
4 (1973) (although defendant objected to certain remarks during closing argument which were intended to call attention to the defendant's failure to testify, other portions of the argument commenting on his failure to testify were waived by the failure to make a timely objection); People v. Nuccio, 54 Ill.2d 39, 49, 294 N.E.2d 276, 281-82 (1973) (fact that defendant objected to one of a number of improper comments by prosecutor during closing argument did not preserve for appeal the other statements to which no objections were raised); People v. Hampton, 44 Ill.2d 41, 46, 253 N.E.2d 385, 387 (1969) (one objection to five statements during closing argument insufficient to preserve the other four statements for review); People v. Sinclair, 27 Ill.2d 505, 509, 190 N.E.2d 298, 300 (1963) (defendant's objection to one statement during closing argument did not preserve other remarks to which no objections were made for review). The Appellate Court of Illinois has been in general accord. See People v. Pleasant, 88 Ill.App.3d 984, 991, 44 Ill.Dec. 226, 231, 411 N.E.2d 132, 137 (3d Dist. 1980) (fact that defendant objected to two of four allegedly prejudicial remarks during closing argument did not preserve for review the two statements to which no objections were made); People v. McCoy, 35 Ill.App.3d 326, 330, 341 N.E.2d 422, 424-25 (5th Dist. 1976) (failure to object to four allegedly improper comments during closing argument waived error on appeal even though objection was made to a fifth improper statement); People v. Bleimehl, 9 Ill. App.3d 273, 279, 292 N.E.2d 60, 64 (1st Dist. 1972) (although defendant objected to one of three allegedly improper comments during closing argument and the objection was sustained, any impropriety in the other two comments was waived by the failure to object in the trial court). Applying the law articulated by these cases, the fact that petitioner objected to two statements during closing argument would not be sufficient to preserve the remaining seven statement for review on appeal.
Kajari testified that defendant asked "to think" at 4:40 p.m. Defendant was then left alone until Kajari, Cummings, and Lavin went to speak with him at 7:20 p.m. This 2-hour and 40-minute interval between questioning was significant. (See People v. Reyes, 181 Ill. App.3d at 256 (55-minute interval held significant); People v. Young (1983), 115 Ill. App.3d 455, 450 N.E.2d 947 (75-minute interval held significant); People v. Ferguson (1981), 102 Ill. App.3d 702, 429 N.E.2d 1321, cert. denied (1982), 459 U.S. 872, 74 L.Ed.2d 133, 103 S.Ct. 159 (50-minute interval held significant); People v. Pleasant (1980), 88 Ill. App.3d 984, 411 N.E.2d 132 (90-minute interval held significant).) Defendant, from that point in time, never stated that he wished to remain silent although he was told that he had that right. Like the situation in People v. Foster, the transcript of defendant's statement reveals that defendant waived his Miranda rights, including his right to remain silent, initialled, and signed the statement.
People v. Fleming (1981), 103 Ill. App.3d 194, 431 N.E.2d 16. We do not believe that it may be said, as a matter of law, that the 55-minute interval between the questioning by the Indiana police and questioning by the Chicago police was an insignificant period of time. (The following cases have found the lapse of time to be significant: People v. Ferguson (1981), 102 Ill. App.3d 702, 429 N.E.2d 1321 (50 minutes); People v. Young (1983), 115 Ill. App.3d 455, 450 N.E.2d 947 (75 minutes); People v. Pleasant (1980), 88 Ill. App.3d 984, 411 N.E.2d 132 (90 minutes).) The requestioning was preceded by Miranda warnings, and although the two Indiana troopers were present during the second interrogation, they did not ask any questions. The fact that different personnel conducted the requestioning supports the determination that the defendant's rights were scrupulously honored.
( People v. Carlson (1980), 79 Ill.2d 564, 404 N.E.2d 233.) In other instances cited, defendant failed to object, thus waiving the issue of these remarks on appeal. People v. Grayson (1980), 89 Ill. App.3d 766, 411 N.E.2d 1177; People v. Pleasant (1980), 88 Ill. App.3d 984, 411 N.E.2d 132. • 14 While a prosecutor is allowed wide latitude in closing arguments (People v. Roberts), there were instances of improper remarks which we cannot condone.