People v. Pirozzi

21 Citing cases

  1. Andrews v. State

    930 A.2d 846 (Del. 2007)   Cited 3 times
    In Andrews, the State argued that § 621 only required the intent to utter the words, and did not require the intent to threaten the victim.

    ANN. tit. 17, § 1151 (8)(B) (2006)).See In re M.S., 10 Cal.4th 698, 42 Cal. Rptr.2d 355, 89,6 P.2d 1365, 1377 (1995); State v. Stalder, 630 So.2d 1072, 1076-77 (Fla. 1994); Matter of Welfare of S.M.J., 556 N.W.2d 4, 7 (Minn.Ct.App. 1996); People v. Pirozzi, 237 A.D.2d 628, 656 N.Y.S.2d 42, 44 (1997); State v. Plowman, 314 Or. 157, 838 P.2d 558, 561 (1992); Commonwealth v. Ferino, 433 Pa.Super. 306, 640 A.2d 934, 938 (1994); Martinez v. State, 980 S.W.2d 662, 667 (Tex.Ct.App. 1998). Florida and New York have used a slightly different approach; ( See Stalder, 630 So.2d at 1076 "[t]he statute requires that it is the commission of the crime that must evidence the prejudice; the fact that racial prejudice may be exhibited during the commission of the crime is itself insufficient . . . A bias-motivated crime for purposes of this statute is any crime wherein the perpetrator intentionally selects the victim because of the victim's 'race, color, ethnicity, religion, or national origin.'"

  2. People v. Winston

    No. 2022-02080 (N.Y. App. Div. Mar. 24, 2022)

    The hate crime charges require a showing that a defendant "intentionally select[ed]" a victim "in whole or in substantial part because of a belief" about that person's religious practice (Penal Law § 485.05[1][a]). The charge of aggravated harassment in the second degree, however, requires a showing that a defendant committed that crime "because of a belief or perception" regarding the victim's religious practice (Penal Law § 240.30[3]), and "[a]ny [religious practice-related] epithets are circumstantial evidence that a defendant's actions were motivated by [religious practice] prejudice" (People v Pirozzi, 237 A.D.2d 628, 630 [2d Dept 1997] [internal quotation marks omitted], lv denied 90 N.Y.2d 909 [1997]). Although the jury evidently found that defendant did not single Bari out because of his faith when it acquitted him of the two hate crime charges, the jury also heard Bari consistently testify that defendant engaged in harassing verbal behavior against him because of his religion.

  3. People v. Winston

    205 A.D.3d 32 (N.Y. App. Div. 2022)   Cited 3 times

    The hate crime charges require a showing that a defendant "intentionally select[ed]" a victim "in whole or in substantial part because of a belief" about that person's religious practice ( Penal Law § 485.05[1][a] ). The charge of aggravated harassment in the second degree, however, requires a showing that a defendant committed that crime "because of a belief or perception" regarding the victim's religious practice ( Penal Law § 240.30[3] ), and "[a]ny [religious practice-related] epithets are circumstantial evidence that a defendant's actions were motivated by [religious practice] prejudice" ( People v. Pirozzi , 237 A.D.2d 628, 630, 656 N.Y.S.2d 42 [2d Dept. 1997] [internal quotation marks omitted], lv denied 90 N.Y.2d 909, 663 N.Y.S.2d 521, 686 N.E.2d 233 [1997] ). Although the jury evidently found that defendant did not single Bari out because of his faith when it acquitted him of the two hate crime charges, the jury also heard Bari consistently testify that defendant engaged in harassing verbal behavior against him because of his religion.

  4. People v. Izzo

    2017 N.Y. Slip Op. 51514 (N.Y. App. Term 2017)   Cited 3 times

    Lastly, to the extent defendant argues that the verdict convicting him of harassment in the second degree is repugnant to his acquittal on the charges of attempted assault in the third degree and menacing in the third degree, this argument is unpreserved for our review, as defendant failed to move pursuant to CPL 330.30 to set aside or modify the verdict (see CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Alfaro, 66 NY2d 985, 987 [1985]). In any event, the fact that defendant was found not guilty of attempted assault in the third degree and menacing in the third degree does not warrant a reversal of his conviction of harassment in the second degree (see People v Bowen, 53 Misc 3d 149[A], 2016 NY Slip Op 51657[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2016]; People v Kramer, 50 Misc 3d 27, 32 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2015]; People v Crandon, 15 Misc 3d 130[A], 2007 NY Slip Op 50659[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]; see generally People v Pirozzi, 237 AD2d 628, 631 [1997]). Accordingly, the judgment of conviction is affirmed.

  5. People v. Bowen

    2016 N.Y. Slip Op. 51657 (N.Y. App. Term 2016)   Cited 5 times

    In the case at bar, the evidence that defendant punched the complainant and caused a laceration to her lip and a scratch on her arm established the elements of harassment in the second degree, as defendant possessed "the requisite intent to harass, annoy or alarm' [her] when [he] struck [her] or otherwise subjected [her] to physical contact" (People v. Crandon, 15 Misc.3d 130[A], 2007 N.Y. Slip Op 50659[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007], quoting Penal Law § 240.26[1] ). Furthermore, contrary to defendant's assertion, the fact that he was found not guilty of attempted assault in the third degree and menacing in the third degree, but guilty of harassment in the second degree, does not warrant the reversal of his conviction of the latter charge (see People v. Bartkow, 96 N.Y.2d at 772 ; People v. Pirozzi, 237 A.D.2d 628, 631 [1997] ; People v. Kramer, 50 Misc.3d at 32 ; People v. Crandon, 15 Misc.3d 130[A], 2007 N.Y. Slip Op 50659[U] ). The People presented legally sufficient evidence disproving defendant's justification defense.

  6. People v. Phoenix

    136 A.D.3d 637 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016)

    In fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.155; People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 348–349, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1), we nevertheless accord great deference to the jury's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor (see People v. Mateo, 2 N.Y.3d 383, 410, 779 N.Y.S.2d 399, 811 N.E.2d 1053; People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672). Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the jury's verdict of guilt as to murder in the second degree as a hate crime was not against the weight of the evidence (see Penal Law § 485.051[b]; People v. Romero, 7 N.Y.3d 633, 643, 826 N.Y.S.2d 163, 859 N.E.2d 902; People v. Ortiz, 48 A.D.3d 1112, 851 N.Y.S.2d 784; People v. Marino, 35 A.D.3d 292, 826 N.Y.S.2d 68; People v. Pirozzi, 237 A.D.2d 628, 656 N.Y.S.2d 42), and the jury's verdict of guilt as to attempted assault in the first degree as a hate crime was not against the weight of the evidence (see Penal Law § 20.00; People v. Scott, 25 N.Y.3d 1107, 14 N.Y.S.3d 308, 35 N.E.3d 476; People v. Romero, 7 N.Y.3d at 643, 826 N.Y.S.2d 163, 859 N.E.2d 902; People v. Witherspoon, 300 A.D.2d 605, 753 N.Y.S.2d 88; People v. Santana, 191 A.D.2d 174, 594 N.Y.S.2d 189). Contrary to the defendant's contention, the sentence imposed on the conviction of attempted assault in the first degree as a hate crime was not excessive (see People v. Delgado, 80 N.Y.2d 780, 587 N.Y.S.2d 271, 599 N.E.2d 675).

  7. People v. Phoenix

    2016 N.Y. Slip Op. 657 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016)

    In fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15[5]; People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 348-349), we nevertheless accord great deference to the jury's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor (see People v Mateo, 2 NY3d 383, 410; People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495). Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the jury's verdict of guilt as to murder in the second degree as a hate crime was not against the weight of the evidence (see Penal Law § 485.05[1][b]; People v Romero, 7 NY3d 633, 643; People v Ortiz, 48 AD3d 1112; People v Marino, 35 AD3d 292; People v Pirozzi, 237 AD2d 628), and the jury's verdict of guilt as to attempted assault in the first degree as a hate crime was not against the weight of the evidence (see Penal Law § 20.00; People v Scott, 25 NY3d 1107; People v Romero, 7 NY3d at 643; People v Witherspoon, 300 AD2d 605; People v Santana, 191 AD2d 174).

  8. People v. Youmans

    950 N.Y.S.2d 493 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012)

    Following the submission of papers to the Justice Court by both parties, the court again granted defendant's motion to set aside the jury verdict. The Justice Court erred in granting defendant's motion to set aside the jury verdict upon what amounted to the court's own independent weighing of the evidence and factual review (People v. Goodfriend, 64 N.Y.2d 695, 697 [1984];People v. Carter, 63 N.Y.2d 530 [1984];People v. Pirozzi, 237 A.D.2d 628 [1997];seeCPL 330.30[1] ). The court predicated its decision on a weighing of the evidence regarding the operation, or lack of operation, by defendant of the vehicle as an essential element of the offense (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192[2], [3] ).

  9. In re Ahmed A.

    82 A.D.3d 1090 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011)   Cited 1 times

    That statute provides, in relevant part, that "[a] person is guilty of aggravated harassment in the second degree when, with intent to harass, annoy, threaten or alarm another person, he or she . . . [s]trikes, shoves, kicks, or otherwise subjects another person to physical contact, or attempts or threatens to do the same because of a belief or perception regarding such person's race, color, national origin, ancestry, gender, religion, religious practice, age, disability or sexual orientation, regardless of whether the belief or perception is correct" (Penal Law § 240.30). Here, the evidence was sufficient to establish that the appellant repeatedly struck the complainant, and that this attack was "motivated by bias or prejudice" ( Matter of Shane EE., 48 AD3d 946, 947; see People v Russell, 13 AD3d 267, 268; People v Pirozzi, 237 AD2d 628, 630-631; see also People v Minucci, 68 AD3d 1017, 1017; Matter of Aaron McC, 66 AD3d 684, 685; Matter of Kedne L., 45 AD3d 843, 844; People v Marino, 35 AD3d 292, 293).

  10. In re Shane

    48 A.D.3d 946 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008)   Cited 10 times

    The evidence plainly showed that respondent at least intended to annoy or alarm the victim with his repeated name-calling and threats of physical harm ( see Matter of Kyle L., 268 AD2d 836, 837-838 [2000]). The racial and gender-based character of those names was circumstantial evidence sufficient to show that his actions were motivated by bias or prejudice ( see People v Marino, 35 AD3d 292, 293; People v Russell, 13 AD3d 267, 268, lv denied 4 NY3d 856; People v Pirozzi, 237 AD2d 628, 630 [1997], lv denied 90 NY2d 909). No physical contact occurred, but respondent's statements, "I've got a gun with your name on it" and "we shoot niggers like you in the woods," constituted threats of harmful physical contact. Although the victim testified that she did not fear that respondent would actually shoot her, no particular feelings on the part of the victim are required ( compare Penal Law § 240.30 with Penal Law § 120.14).