Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. CC812553
RUSHING, P.J.
I. Statement of the Case
Under a negotiated settlement, defendant Joel Pintor pleaded no contest to assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury, a felony, with the understanding that he would be placed on probation and could seek to have the conviction deemed a misdemeanor. (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1).) At sentencing, the court placed him on probation and imposed certain conditions, including that he submit to warrantless searches and not possess deadly or dangerous weapons.
All further unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.
On appeal from the judgment (see § 1237, subd. (b)), defendant claims the court abused its discretion in imposing the search condition and prohibiting possession of deadly or dangerous weapons.
We will affirm the judgment.
II. Background
The record contains no information about the circumstances of the offense. It reveals only that defendant along with two codefendants entered identical pleas to the offense at the same hearing. The victim suffered “facial fractures and lacerations [,] [c]uts and bruises on his arms and back, with two lacerations on his head — one requiring three staples and the other two staples to hold that shut.” Defendant was ordered to pay at least $23,894.62 in restitution to the victim. And defendant was required to complete an anger management program.
III. Discussion
Defendant contends the court abused its discretion in imposing the search condition and prohibiting possession of deadly or dangerous weapons. He claims that because there is no evidence that the offense involved the use of a deadly or dangerous weapon, it was arbitrary and unreasonable to impose both conditions. We disagree.
General Principles
A trial court has broad discretion to impose such reasonable probation conditions “as it may determine are fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done... and generally and specifically for the reformation and rehabilitation of the probationer....” (§ 1203.1, subd. (j); People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1120-1121.) “A condition of probation will not be held invalid unless it ‘(1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality....’ [Citation.] Conversely, a condition of probation which requires or forbids conduct which is not itself criminal is valid if that conduct is reasonably related to the crime of which the defendant was convicted or to future criminality.” (People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 486, fn. omitted, superseded on other grounds as stated in People v. Wheeler (1992) 4 Cal.4th 284, 290-292; People v. Welch (1993) 5 Cal.4th 228, 233-234.) “Stated positively... a valid condition of probation must (1) be related to the crime of which the defendant was convicted, or (2) relate to conduct that is criminal, or (3) require or forbid conduct that is reasonably related to future criminality.” (People v. Bauer (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 937, 942.)
The propriety of a probation condition is reviewed under a “highly deferential standard.” (People v. Balestra (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 57, 63.) “ ‘The burden is on the party attacking the sentence to clearly show that the sentencing decision was irrational or arbitrary. [Citation.] In the absence of such a showing, the trial court is presumed to have acted to achieve legitimate sentencing objectives, and its discretionary determination to impose a particular sentence will not be set aside on review.’ [Citation.] Concomitantly, ‘[a] decision will not be reversed merely because reasonable people might disagree. “An appellate tribunal is neither authorized nor warranted in substituting its judgment for the judgment of the trial judge.” [Citations.]’ ” (People v. Superior Court (Alvarez) (1997) 14 Cal.4th 968, 977-978; People v. Carbajal, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 1121.)
The Search Condition
In People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, the court noted that “probation is a privilege and not a right, and that adult probationers, in preference to incarceration, validly may consent to limitations upon their constitutional rights.” (Id. at p. 384.)
The court further explained that “[g]enerally speaking, conditions of probation ‘are meant to assure that the probation serves as a period of genuine rehabilitation and that the community is not harmed by the probationer's being at large. [Citation.] These same goals require and justify the exercise of supervision to assure that the restrictions are in fact observed.’ [Citation.] For example, probation conditions authorizing searches ‘aid in deterring further offenses... and in monitoring compliance with the terms of probation. [Citations.] By allowing close supervision of probationers, probation search conditions serve to promote rehabilitation and reduce recidivism while helping to protect the community from potential harm by probationers.’ [Citation.] A condition of probation that enables a probation officer to supervise his or her charges effectively is, therefore, ‘reasonably related to future criminality.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Olguin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 380; People v. Mason (1971) 5 Cal.3d 759, 763-764, disapproved on an unrelated point in People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 486, fn. 1 [purpose of unexpected searches is to ascertain whether probationer is complying with conditions]); People v. Kern (1968) 264 Cal.App.2d 962, 965; People v. Adams (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 705, 712; cf. People v. Reyes (1998) 19 Cal.4th 743, 752 [same concerning parolees].)
As an example of a valid search condition, the Olguin court cited People v. Balestra, supra, 76 Cal.App.4th 57. In Balestra, the court upheld warrantless search and drug and alcohol testing conditions regardless of the particulars of the underlying offense. The court explained that “a warrantless search condition is intended to ensure that the subject thereof is obeying the fundamental condition of all grants of probation, that is, the usual requirement (as here) that a probationer ‘obey all laws.’ Thus, warrantless search conditions serve a valid rehabilitative purpose, and because such a search condition is necessarily justified by its rehabilitative purpose, it is of no moment whether the underlying offense is reasonably related to theft, narcotics, or firearms[.]” (Id. at p. 67, italics added; accord, People v. Brewer (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1298, 1311 [quoting Balestra]; People v. Bianco (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 748, 752 [quoting Brewer].)
Here, in accordance with defendant’s general obligation to obey the law, the court noted that as a condition of probation, defendant, as a person convicted of a felony, was barred from owning, possessing, or having within his custody any firearms or ammunition. (See §§ 12021, 12316, subd. (b)(1) [prohibition possession by felons].) Defendant implicitly concedes that this condition was properly imposed even though his offense did not involve a weapon, let alone a firearm. Clearly, the search condition ensures defendant’s compliance with both the law and prohibition against possessing firearms and, therefore, is reasonably related to preventing future criminality and serves the purposes of rehabilitation and reformation. Accordingly, it is valid regardless of whether the underlying offense involved a firearm, weapon, or contraband.
Defendant did not object to this condition and thus forfeited any claim that it was unreasonable. (People v. Welch, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 237.)
Defendant cites In re Martinez (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 577 for the proposition that in order to find a probation condition reasonably related to future criminality, “there must be a ‘factual nexus’ between the crime, defendant’s manifested propensities, and the probation condition.” (Id. at p. 583.) Martinez predates the authorities cited above. Moreover, we question the continued validity of any such “nexus” requirement because it is inconsistent with the prevailing view of the California Supreme Court and appellate courts, under which search conditions that ensure the probationer’s compliance with all laws and probation conditions are valid regardless of whether there is a factual nexus between the condition and the underlying offense.
In any event, Martinez is distinguishable. There, a group of 50 people were jeering and throwing beer cans and bottles as two police officers who were attempting to impound a vehicle. At one point, the defendant threw a bottle at a patrol car. It broke and spewed beer on one officer. The defendant pleaded guilty to misdemeanor battery on a peace officer and granted probation. As a condition of probation, the court prohibited defendant from possessing deadly or dangerous weapons and required that he submit to warrantless searches. The defendant did not challenge the weapons prohibition but claimed the search condition was unreasonable. (In re Martinez, supra, 86 Cal.App.3d at p. 579.)
In invalidating the search condition, the court carefully limited its holding to the facts, which it called “unique.” (In re Martinez, supra, 86 Cal.App.3d at p. 582.) In particular, the defendant was convicted of a misdemeanor, not a felony, and the offense did not involve a concealed weapon, which, according to the court would justify a search condition. The court further noted that “[d]efendant is described by the probation officer as having received an honorable discharge from the Marine Corps, married with three children and regularly employed. His prior criminal record consists of one arrest which did not result in conviction. The probation officer further describes defendant's involvement in the present offense as ‘an isolated situation.’ ” (Ibid.)
Here, defendant was charged with and pleaded no contest to a felony involving a violent physical attack that severely injured the victim. Defendant was properly barred from possessing firearms. And he was required to attend an anger management program. These circumstances contrast with the “unique” facts in Martinez.
In sum, defendant has failed to show that the search condition is not reasonably related to ensuring compliance with probations conditions and preventing future criminality—e.g., possession of firearms—or that its imposition was irrational or arbitrary or otherwise an abuse of discretion.
The Prohibition on Possession of Deadly or Dangerous Weapons
Defendant committed an assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury that did cause considerable and costly injury to the victim. Given the offense, the court could infer that defendant had violent impulses that rendered him potentially dangerous to others. Indeed, the court ordered that defendant complete an anger management program. Under the circumstances, the court could reason that if defendant were allowed to possess deadly or dangerous weapons, he would pose an even greater potential threat of danger to others. Thus, the court reasonably could find that banning possession of deadly and dangerous weapons was reasonably related to future criminality because it had a tendency to prevent any possible future assaultive conduct from becoming aggravated by the use of such weapons. Moreover, given the ban on possession of firearms, the court could have considered it unreasonable, if not absurd, not to also ban possession of other types of deadly and dangerous weapons.
IV. Disposition
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: PREMO, J., ELIA, J.