Opinion
C042940.
11-7-2003
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. MONTERIO PINCKNEY, Defendant and Appellant.
Defendant Monterio Pinckney appeals from his convictions for first degree murder, first degree burglary, and attempted murder. His sole contention on appeal is that the trial courts failure to give a complete answer to the jurys question, whether "specific intent and/or mental state means `conscious of his actions" constituted reversible error. We disagree and affirm.
RELEVANT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On May 30, 2001, defendant accused his wife, Monique, of being unfaithful, hit her repeatedly, and threatened to kill her. Later that day, the pair went to the home Rosie C., a friend of Moniques mothers, where the argument about Moniques fidelity began again, and again defendant beat Monique.
On June 1, Monique went to sleep at Rosies home when she was awakened by the sound of her mother screaming and gunshots. After she heard the gunshots, Monique hid in the closet. Defendant ran through the house yelling for Monique to come out, argued with Moniques mother, and threatened to shoot her if she did not tell him where Monique was. Monique stayed hidden until police arrived, then she saw her mother on the living room floor. Moniques mother died from a single gunshot wound to the chest. Multiple bullets and spent casings were found in Rosies home.
Before surrendering to police, defendant left messages on Moniques answering machine telling her he was still looking for her and threatening to kill her. Upon searching the home, officers found a note from defendant which apologized for killing Moniques mother and stated, "[i]t should have been [Monique]."
Defendant claimed he began using methamphetamine and rock cocaine following the May 30 fight, up until he returned to Rosies house on June 1. He also claimed he accidentally shot Moniques mother when she grabbed the gun and tried to get it away from him.
The jury was fully and completely instructed, including instruction on the elements of first degree murder (CALJIC Nos. 8.10 and 8.20), the elements of attempted murder (CALJIC Nos. 8.66 and 8.67), the elements of burglary (CALJIC No. 14.50), and the requirement that there be a concurrence of act and intent (CALJIC Nos. 3.31 and 3.31.5). During deliberations, the jury sent a note to the court which stated, "We are interpreting that specific intent and/or mental state means, `conscious of his actions. Is that correct?"
The court read to counsel its proposed response to the jury: "The term `conscious of his actions is not a legal term that is set forth in the jury instructions of this case. [¶] SPECIFIC INTENT [¶] When the definition of a crime consists of only the description of a particular act, without reference to intent to do a further act or achieve a further consequence, we ask whether the defendant intended to do the proscribed act. This intention is deemed to be general criminal intent. When the definition of the crime refers to the defendants intent to do some further act or achieve some additional consequence, the crime is deemed to be of specific intent. [¶] The specific intent required for the crimes it applies to is set forth in the definition of the crimes. [¶] MENTAL STATE [¶] Mental state is really self-defining. It means what is going on in a persons mind. This forms their state of mind. [¶] The mental state required for the crimes it applies to is set forth in the definitions of the crimes."
Defense counsel agreed that "the term conscious of his actions . . . is not a term thats contained anywhere in the jury instructions . . . [and] . . . is not a term that is applicable based on my understanding of the law in this case." He also agreed that the proposed answer was a correct statement of the law. He requested, however, that the court simply indicate to the jury that "conscious of his actions is not a term applicable to this case" "and just tell the jury the definitions for mental state and specific intent has [sic] already been provided to them elsewhere in the instructions and leave it at that."
After listening to argument from counsel, the court indicated it believed "the jury is under the misapprehension that mental state equates to consciousness of his actions, and I have told them that that is not the legal term that they should be using." The court also said, "as a trial judge it is my duty to answer questions. I think the question does encompass an inquiry on the part of the jury as to what specific intent and mental state mean because theyre wanting to know this is what we think it means. Is this right? And Im telling them no, thats not right. This is what specific intent is and this is what mental state is. [¶] . . . I think it is my duty as a judge to try to help them as much as I can within the call of their question, and I believe that the response does do that." Based on this reasoning, the court sent the proposed response to the jury room.
The jury returned to deliberations and returned a verdict of guilty of first degree murder, attempted murder, first degree burglary and found true the allegations that defendant personally discharged a firearm that resulted in death and personally used a firearm. Defendant was sentenced to 25 years to life for murder, plus 25 years to life for use of a firearm. In addition, a consecutive life sentence with the possibility of parole was imposed for the attempted murder, plus 10 years for the use of a firearm in the attempted murder. The sentence for the burglary was stayed pursuant to Penal Code section 654.
DISCUSSION
Defendant contends "the courts failure to give a complete answer to the jurys question on act and intent deprived [defendant] of his fifth, sixth and fourteenth amendment rights to due process and a fair trial." Defendant specifically contends the courts response did not go far enough because "[t]he question implied the jury was confused not only about what mental state was required for each crime, but the impact of the combination of act and intent." Therefore, defendant contends the court had a duty "to refer the jurors not only to the instructions on the elements of the crimes, . . . but also to CALJIC Nos. 3.30, 3.31, and 3.31.5 requiring a union or joint operation of act and intent." We disagree with defendants characterization of the nature of the jurys stated confusion.
Penal Code section 1138 imposes upon the trial court a duty to help the jury understand the legal principles applicable to the case. (People v. Beardslee (1991) 53 Cal.3d 68, 97.) However, if "the original instructions are themselves full and complete, the court has discretion under section 1138 to determine what additional explanations are sufficient to satisfy the jurys request for information." (Ibid.) There is no contention in this case that the original instructions were not themselves full and complete. Accordingly, we must determine whether the trial court properly exercised its discretion in determining its response to the jury.
To properly exercise its discretion, "a court must do more than figuratively throw up its hands and tell the jury it cannot help. It must at least consider how it can best aid the jury. It should decide as to each jury question whether further explanation is desirable, or whether it should merely reiterate the instructions already given." (People v. Beardslee, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 97.)
The court fully satisfied its duty in this respect. The court discussed the jurys question with counsel and considered counsels arguments. The court also detailed its reasons for giving the particular response, acknowledging its duty to answer the jurys questions, and its understanding of the jurys question. The trial court reasonably concluded the jury was confused about the meaning of specific intent and mental state. The courts "explanation [of the law] was clear and correct." (People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 985.) The courts response advised the jury their understanding was incorrect, clarified the law with a correct statement of what specific intent and mental state mean, and advised the jury to return to the previously provided instructions for the specific intent required for each offense. The trial court properly exercised its discretion on this issue.
Furthermore, defendants complaint that the jury should have been reinstructed as to the requirement of a concurrence between defendants acts and his intent is not well taken. The jury was fully and completely instructed, including instructions on the requirement of a concurrence between acts and intent. The question asked by the jury did not raise this issue. Had the jury been confused about the concurrence requirement, the record in this case indicates they would have asked a further question. This jury had previously asked for additional copies of the jury instructions, asked for a read back of the prosecutors closing arguments, and then asked its question about specific intent. "This particular jury demonstrated that it was not too shy to ask questions, suggesting that it would have asked another if it felt the judges response unsatisfactory." (Weeks v. Angelone (2000) 528 U.S. 225, 235-236 [145 L.Ed.2d 727, 738-739].)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: SCOTLAND, P.J. and HULL, J.