Opinion
E050700 Super.Ct.No. INF10000249
10-06-2011
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ANGEL RAMOS PIMENTEL, Defendant and Appellant.
David Andreasen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Gil Gonzalez, Randall D. Einhorn, and Scott C. Taylor, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
OPINION
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. John G. Evans and Anthony R. Villalobos, Judges. Affirmed.
Judge Evans denied the initial motion to suppress. Judge Villalobos denied the renewed motion to suppress at the plea hearing and took the plea.
David Andreasen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Gil Gonzalez, Randall D. Einhorn, and Scott C. Taylor, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant and appellant Angel Ramos Pimentel pled guilty to selling, transporting, or furnishing methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379, subd. (a)); in return, the remaining allegations were dismissed, and defendant was placed on probation for a period of three years. Defendant's sole contention on appeal is that the trial court erred in denying his suppression motion (Pen. Code, § 1538.5). We reject this contention and affirm the judgment.
I
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The factual background is taken from the suppression hearing.
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On December 30, 2009, about 7:30 p.m., as about eight uniformed Palm Springs police officers were serving a narcotics search warrant at a residence on Navajo Circle in Palm Springs, they encountered defendant sitting in a truck. The truck was legally parked along the curb on the street, adjacent to the residence and directly next to the driveway. The officers had not observed defendant at the residence prior to that date.
While other officers proceeded to the residence, Officer Kyle Stjerne and Officer Andre approached defendant because defendant appeared to be "somehow related to the residence [they] were going to serve the search warrant on." Officer Stjerne explained that he "felt that that was a safety risk that this person needed to be contacted and detained while the service of the search warrant was being conducted." The officer further elaborated that such a detention was standard policy for officer safety reasons, "because [defendant] was in such close proximity to the house itself, . . . [and] appeared to be doing something in relation to the residence when [they] were going to serve the search warrant . . . ." The officer believed that "for officer safety reasons it was prudent to detain the subject in the vehicle until service had been conducted safely."
Once Officer Stjerne encountered defendant, he asked defendant to step out of the truck. Defendant spoke very little English, so Officer Stjerne asked Officer Andre, who spoke fluent Spanish, to translate for him. Officer Stjerne asked defendant to place his hands on top of his head; defendant complied. The officer then conducted a patdown search for weapons and then told defendant to sit down on the curb. Defendant again complied. Officer Stjerne asked defendant whether he had any drugs or weapons in the truck. Officer Stjerne used the Spanish words for "drugs" and "firearm" while pointing to the passenger compartment of the truck. Defendant replied that there were drugs in the truck but no weapons.
The officers then asked defendant permission to search his truck. Defendant consented to the search of his vehicle. Upon searching the vehicle, Officer Stjerne found several small clear plastic baggies containing a white crystalline substance and others that contained a white powdery substance.
Following argument from counsel, and after the trial court reread the relevant case law and testimony, the court denied the suppression motion. It found that defendant was legally detained, based on the officers' reasonable belief that "they needed to protect their own safety in executing the search warrant . . . ." The court further concluded that during the reasonable detention, "the officers were reasonable in asking whether or not the defendant was armed and/or had drugs," and once defendant stated that he had drugs, the officers had probable cause to search the vehicle.
II
DISCUSSION
Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his suppression motion when he was unlawfully detained. Specifically, he claims that because he was not on the premises where the officers were serving a narcotics search warrant, he was not a resident of the residence, and he did nothing to arouse suspicion of the officers while sitting in his parked vehicle near the residence, the officer's actions constituted an unreasonable search and seizure. We disagree.
"The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits seizures of persons, including brief investigative stops, when they are 'unreasonable.' [Citations.] Our state Constitution has a similar provision. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 13.) A seizure occurs whenever a police officer 'by means of physical force or show of authority' restrains the liberty of a person to walk away. [Citation.]" (People v. Souza (1994) 9 Cal.4th 224, 229.)
"[A] police officer's seizure of a person need not in all cases be justified by probable cause to arrest for a crime. [Citation.]" (People v. Souza, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 230.) "[T]he temporary detention of a person for the purpose of investigating possible criminal activity may, because it is less intrusive than an arrest, be based on 'some objective manifestation' that criminal activity is afoot and that the person to be stopped is engaged in that activity. [Citations.]" (Ibid.)
The standard an appellate court employs in its review of a denial of a motion to suppress evidence is well settled. In evaluating a challenge to the trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, we defer to its factual findings, whether express or implied, if they are supported by substantial evidence. (People v. Sardinas (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 488, 493.) We then exercise our independent judgment to decide what legal principles are relevant, independently apply them to the facts, and determine as a matter of law whether there has been an unreasonable search and/or seizure. (People v. Glaser (1995) 11 Cal.4th 354, 362 (Glaser).)
The trial court's express factual findings are supported by substantial evidence and are essentially undisputed. There is no dispute that the officers went to the subject residence to serve a narcotics search warrant; as they were executing the warrant, they observed defendant sitting in his parked vehicle directly adjacent to the residence and next to the driveway. The People do not dispute that the officers conducted a detention of defendant but argue that the detention was justified. We agree with the People.
In Glaser the issue was whether police officers could lawfully detain an individual who was about to open the gate to the backyard of a private residence on a dark, stormy evening at the same time the officers had arrived to execute a search warrant at the home. (Glaser, supra, 11 Cal.4th at pp. 359-360.) Our Supreme Court identified two separate governmental interests, namely safety and learning the identity of a person entering upon the premises being searched, in determining the reasonableness of the detention. (Id. at pp. 359-360, 367-368.)
"The police interest in protecting against violence during the search of a home for narcotics has been widely recognized. 'In the narcotic business, "firearms are as much 'tools of the trade' as are most commonly recognized articles of narcotics paraphernalia."' [Citation.] The danger is potentially at its greatest when, as here, the premises to be searched are a private home, rather than a place of public accommodation as in Ybarra. '[B]ecause of the private nature of the surroundings and the recognized propensity of persons "engaged in selling narcotics [to] frequently carry firearms to protect themselves from would-be robbers," [citation] the likelihood that the occupants [of a residence] are armed or have ready accessibility to hidden weapons is conspicuously greater than in cases where, as in Ybarra, the public freely enters premises where legal business is transacted.' [Citation.] As the United States Supreme Court observed in Maryland v. Buie (1990) 494 U.S. 325 [108 L.Ed.2d 276, 110 S.Ct. 1093], involving the legality of a protective sweep during an in-home arrest, the dangers are particularly acute when an officer seeks to serve a warrant in a suspect's house. The officer is 'at the disadvantage of being on his adversary's "turf." An ambush in a confined setting of unknown configuration is more to be feared than it is in open, more familiar surroundings.' [Citation.]" (Glaser, supra, 11 Cal.4th at pp. 367-368, fn. omitted.)
"The government interest in determining the identity of a person entering premises being searched is related to, though broader than, the officers' need for security. The risk posed by residents or familiars of the household, who may be involved in the criminal activities therein, is obviously greater than that posed by mere visitors who happen unwittingly on the scene. In addition, determining the identity and connection to the premises of a person who is already present on the search site, or who enters during the search, allows officers to ascertain whether the other interests identified in [Michigan v.] Summers [(1981) 452 U.S. 702] warrant detention of the person during the search. The 'legitimate law enforcement interest in preventing flight in the event that incriminating evidence is found' [citation], for example, is present only if there is reason to suspect the person of involvement in criminal activities on the premises. Similarly, only those with ownership, control or knowledge of the premises will be able to assist in the 'orderly completion of the search.' [Citation.] Searching officers therefore have a legitimate interest in determining the identity and connection of a person present at or entering a search site." (Glaser, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 368, italics added.)
"When, in the course of initiating a search under [a] warrant of a private residence for illegal drugs or related items, police officers encounter on the premises a person whose identity and connection to the premises are unknown and cannot immediately be determined without detaining the person, the officers may constitutionally detain him or her for the period of time required and in the manner necessary to make those determinations and to protect the safety of all present during the detention. If the person is determined to be an occupant of the home to be searched, he or she may be detained, pursuant to Summers, for the duration of the search. [Citation.] If the person is determined not to be an occupant, further detention is proper only if justified by other specific, articulable facts connecting him or her to the criminal activity suspected to be occurring on the premises or establishing a danger to the officers if the person is released." (Glaser, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 374.)
Defendant argues the trial court's ruling "represents an unprecedented expansion of Summers' narrow exception allowing suspicionless detention of an occupant of a premises being searched pursuant to a warrant." He further claims that Glaser is distinguishable because he was not on the premises when the officers arrived, but on a public street, where he was patted down for weapons, thereby increasing the intrusiveness. He also asserts that none of the other factors considered in Glaser are present here: He appeared to have no connection to the residence or familiarity to the premises, and it was not a dark and stormy night. Defendant claims he was more akin to a complete stranger who should have been asked to identify himself and then sent on his way, as was the defendant in People v. Gallant (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 200 (Gallant)[Fourth Dist., Div. Two].
In Gallant, police officers executed a search warrant at the residence of Joyce Gardner, who lived with her mother. There were no male subjects mentioned in the warrant. Several baggies of methamphetamine were found at the residence, and Gardner and her mother were arrested. About 30 to 40 minutes after Gardner arrived at the residence, the defendant drove up and parked his truck and boat at the curb in front. He walked to the front of the house and knocked on the door. (Gallant, supra, 225 Cal.App.3d at p. 203.) One of the officers answered the knock by drawing his gun and opening the door. Before the defendant said anything, the officer identified himself, explained that they were searching the residence, advised the defendant that he would be detained, and ordered him to step inside. Immediately upon entering, the defendant was told to put his hands on top of his head, and an officer searched him. Another officer began questioning the defendant, who identified himself and said that he was there to see Gardner. The officer asked the defendant if he would consent to a search of his person and vehicle for controlled substances. The defendant gave his consent, and $3,000 was found on his person. Methamphetamine and other controlled substances were found in the defendant's vehicle and boat. (Id. at p. 204.)
This court held that the initial detention was unlawful because there were no facts at all connecting the defendant to the premises or to the criminal activity they suspected was being conducted at the premises but was instead based on a hunch and a policy of detaining anyone who came to the residence during a search. (Gallant, supra, 225 Cal.App.3d at pp. 207-208, 210-211.) "From the fact that drugs in a saleable quantity have been found in a house, police may reasonably assume that some people come to that house to either deliver or buy drugs. However, a police officer may not reasonably conclude from that same fact that everyone approaching that house is involved in the drug trade. In the absence of evidence of their particular involvement in the illegal activity, friends, family, and the Fuller Brush man should be free to knock on the door without being ordered inside at gunpoint and frisked." (Id. at p. 208.)
We first note that one case has questioned Gallant's continued viability in light of Glaser. (People v. Samples (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1197, 1206.) In any event, Gallant is factually distinguishable from the present case. In this case, defendant did not merely show up by chance and fortuitously knock on the front door while police officers were searching the residence. Rather, he was sitting in his vehicle in the dark, directly adjacent to the residence and next to the driveway, when the officers arrived at the residence to execute the search warrant. This was sufficient information for the officers to reasonably suspect a connection between defendant and the residence that allowed them to briefly detain defendant to investigate his identity and purpose for being there.
Unlike in Gallant, the circumstances here presented an officer safety risk, since defendant was present near the residence as the officers were arriving to execute the search warrant. Moreover, here, by contrast, defendant was not confronted by a gun-wielding officer who told him he was being detained after the officers had already found the methamphetamine that was the subject of the search warrant. Rather, the officers here believed defendant was a safety risk and needed to be detained as they executed the narcotics search warrant, because defendant was in close proximity to the residence and "somehow related" to the residence. Unlike defendant in the present case, Gallant neither posed a potential interference with the execution of the warrant nor jeopardized the safety of the officers executing the warrant. The search team did not alter its path of approach to the residence in a manner that brought it into contact with defendant. Instead, the uniformed officers, who were originally supposed to go along with the other officers in executing the search warrant, were essentially reassigned to detain defendant because he posed a security risk to the entry team.
Defendant's reliance on People v. Sandoval (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 205 to support his contention is misplaced. In that case, the police found the defendant smoking a cigarette while sitting on the steps of a residence in which a probationer was to be searched because of reports of drug dealing in the residence. Although the officers testified they had no reason to suspect the defendant was armed or involved in any type of criminal activity, he was handcuffed and eventually searched. (Id. at p. 208-209, 212.) In this case, the officers detained defendant because he presented a security risk to the entry team. Unlike the detention here, the search that took place in Sandoval was conducted on the steps of the house after a search team had cleared the home of any possible threat. (Id. at pp. 208-209.) Sandoval is therefore distinguishable from the case before us.
Given the totality of the circumstances known to the officers, safety considerations warranted a further detention and patdown search of defendant for weapons. (See e.g., People v. Thurman (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 817, 823-824; People v. Huerta (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 744, 750; People v. Limon (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 524, 534-535; People v. Samples, supra, 48 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1210-1211.)
Once defendant admitted he had drugs in his truck, the officers were justified in further detaining defendant and had probable cause to search the truck. (See California v. Acevedo (1991) 500 U.S. 565, 580 [111 S.Ct. 1982, 114 L.Ed.2d 619.) Moreover, defendant consented to the search of his vehicle, and since the detention was lawful, defendant's consent was valid.
In view of the foregoing, the trial court did not err in denying defendant's suppression motion.
III
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
RICHLI
J.
We concur:
RAMIREZ
P.J.
CODRINGTON
J.