Opinion
2014-04-23
The PEOPLE, etc., respondent, v. James PILEGGI, appellant.
Green & Willstatter, White Plains, N.Y. (Theodore S. Green of counsel), for appellant. Janet DiFiore, District Attorney, White Plains, N.Y. (Jennifer Spencer, Steven A. Bender, and Richard Longworth Hecht of counsel), for respondent.
Green & Willstatter, White Plains, N.Y. (Theodore S. Green of counsel), for appellant. Janet DiFiore, District Attorney, White Plains, N.Y. (Jennifer Spencer, Steven A. Bender, and Richard Longworth Hecht of counsel), for respondent.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Zambelli, J.), rendered January 17, 2012, convicting him of manslaughter in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in making its Sandoval ruling ( see People v. Sandoval, 34 N.Y.2d 371, 357 N.Y.S.2d 849, 314 N.E.2d 413), which permitted inquiry into the defendant's prior use of illegal steroids, and his injection of a fellow police officer with illegal steroids in 2008. This prior conduct was relevant to the defendant's credibility because it demonstrated his willingness to further his self-interest at the expense of society ( see id. at 377, 357 N.Y.S.2d 849, 314 N.E.2d 413;People v. Celleri, 29 A.D.3d 707, 709, 814 N.Y.S.2d 270;People v. Blackman, 13 A.D.3d 640, 641–642, 789 N.Y.S.2d 57;People v. Floyd, 143 A.D.2d 143, 531 N.Y.S.2d 599).
The defendant's contention that the evidence was legally insufficient to establish that he acted recklessly in causing the death of the victim is unpreserved for appellate review ( see CPL 470.05[2]; People v. Gray, 86 N.Y.2d 10, 629 N.Y.S.2d 173, 652 N.E.2d 919;People v. Huddleston, 101 A.D.3d 901, 954 N.Y.S.2d 914). In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution ( see People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 467 N.Y.S.2d 349, 454 N.E.2d 932), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt of manslaughter in the second degree beyond a reasonable doubt ( see Penal Law § 15.05[3]; People v. Licitra, 47 N.Y.2d 554, 419 N.Y.S.2d 461, 393 N.E.2d 456;People v. Johnson, 205 A.D.2d 707, 708, 613 N.Y.S.2d 429). Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence ( see CPL 470.15[5] ).
The defendant's contention that the prosecution elicited improper opinion testimony on the issue of recklessness which invaded the province of the jury is also unpreserved for appellate review ( see People v. Minter, 106 A.D.3d 934, 964 N.Y.S.2d 660) and, in any event, without merit ( see People v. Kozlowski, 11 N.Y.3d 223, 240, 869 N.Y.S.2d 848, 898 N.E.2d 891;People v. Minter, 106 A.D.3d at 934–935, 964 N.Y.S.2d 660).
Under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the defendant's request to strike the testimony of a police detective who admitted that he spoke to the prosecutor during a break in his testimony ( see People v. Branch, 83 N.Y.2d 663, 667, 612 N.Y.S.2d 365, 634 N.E.2d 966;People v. Neil, 289 A.D.2d 611, 614–615, 733 N.Y.S.2d 528;People v. Thanh Giap, 273 A.D.2d 54, 55, 709 N.Y.S.2d 62;cf. People v. Robinson, 190 A.D.2d 697, 593 N.Y.S.2d 279).
Contrary to the defendant's contention, the supplemental charge that the Supreme Court gave in response to the jury's request for a definition of the “conscious disregard” component of recklessness was proper ( see People v. Lewie, 17 N.Y.3d 348, 362–363, 929 N.Y.S.2d 522, 953 N.E.2d 760).
The defendant's remaining contentions are without merit. RIVERA, J.P., LEVENTHAL, HINDS–RADIX and MALTESE, JJ., concur.