Opinion
G039061
10-29-2008
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DANIEL KENDEL PIKE, Defendant and Appellant.
Stephen S. Buckley, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Quisteen Shum, Angela M. Borzachillo and Scott C. Taylor, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Not to be Published
Daniel Kendel Pike appeals a judgment extending his commitment as a mentally disordered offender (MDO). He contends there is insufficient evidence he presents a substantial physical danger to others, and he was denied his right to a speedy trial. We reject these contentions and affirm the judgment.
FACTS
Pike suffers from paranoid schizophrenia, a mental illness characterized by delusions, persecutory beliefs and erratic behavior. He was a successful home builder in the 1980s, but in 1992 his mental health began to deteriorate following a difficult divorce. He ended up moving in with his parents, and over time he came to believe their house was being poisoned with carbon monoxide. Thinking the house needed additional ventilation, he ravaged it with a sledgehammer, causing about $40,000 in damage. He spent the next month in a mental health facility, but despite his doctors recommendation, he refused to continue his medication upon leaving the facility, in 1996.
In 1999, Pike was arrested and had his van impounded for sleeping in public. When he went to retrieve his van from the tow yard, he absconded with the vehicle without paying the storage fee. In the process, he nearly ran over one of the yard workers, and when a second worker tried to block his way, he chased him away with a knife. He then led police on a 100-mile chase to his parents house in Calabasas. Even then, Pike didnt surrender; the police had to use bean bag pellets and physical restraints to take him into custody.
The episode resulted in Pike being convicted of robbery, assault with a deadly weapon, evading the police and resisting arrest. He was sentenced to three years in prison, but about halfway through the term, he began to believe the prison water was being contaminated by a secret religious group. He also expressed his belief the guards were killing inmates and serving them up as food in the prison cafeteria. Given these delusions, Pike was transferred to Atascadero State Hospital as an MDO.
That was in 2001. While at Atascadero, Pike resisted treatment and continued to have delusions. For instance, he believed there was a judge in Orange County who secretly conspired with the mob to "kill Hebrews." He also believed he had been unjustly convicted in his own case. Rather than taking responsibility for his actions, Pike insisted he had acted in self-defense because the tow yard workers and police were trying to harm him.
While Pike never acted violently at Atascadero, his doctors attributed this largely to the fact he was in a controlled environment; they did not take it as a sign he was not mentally ill or dangerous. To the contrary, because Pike displayed absolutely no insight into his mental illness, they deemed him to be a substantial danger to society. Given Pikes persistent delusions and profound lack of insight, his doctors petitioned for his continued confinement, and his commitment at Atascadero was extended annually, starting in 2002.
In 2004, Pike set his sights on gaining placement in an outpatient conditional release program. To that end, he started taking his medication voluntarily and acknowledged he was prone to delusional thinking. Although there were still concerns about his mental stability, the court granted his request for conditional release and he was placed in a residential living facility.
While there, Pike behaved well, followed his treatment plan and even took some college courses. Things were going so well that about 20 months into the program, Pikes medical team began to contemplate his release into the community. However, on January 17, 2007, he suffered a major setback. He reported there were dead bodies in the basement of his living facility and staff members were having sex with the bodies. He also said the manager of the facility was among the dead bodies and the managers body had been taken over by another person. Based on these beliefs, Pike was placed in a hospital for treatment. However, he refused to consent to an increase or change in his medication.
In the wake of this incident, county officials petitioned to 1) revoke Pikes outpatient status, and 2) extend his hospital commitment, which was due to expire on April 15, 2007. On February 23, the court held a revocation hearing, at which the chief psychologist of the conditional release program testified. Stacey Berardino said she tried to interview Pike about his most recent delusions, but he was reluctant to talk about them. However, he did say he wanted to make a movie about the dead bodies in his living facility and call it "Nigger in a Woodpile." This was worrisome to Berardino because the manager of the facility is African-American.
Berardino was also concerned because Pike admitted to her that he had lied in his quest to be placed on outpatient status in the first place. Although Pike had told his doctors he no longer believed the events in his delusions were real, he actually believed that they were. Based on her assessment of Pike, Berardino opined he was a danger to society and in need of medication for stabilization. The court agreed. It revoked Pikes outpatient status, ordered him to remain in the hospital for further treatment and set his trial on the Peoples petition to extend his commitment for February 26, 2007.
On that day, the defense requested a continuance, which the court granted. The trial was then trailed to April 9, just six days before Pikes commitment was scheduled to expire. However, on the 9th, the defense requested another continuance, and the trial was moved back again. After that, it was trailed several more times, until May 24, when again it was continued at the behest of the defense. Defense counsel then stipulated to another continuance on May 30, and the trial did not get underway until July 11, 2007. At that time, the defense moved for a dismissal based on the delay in bringing the matter to trial. However, the court denied Pikes speedy trial motion for lack of prejudice. In so doing, the court noted the defense had been in favor of the previous continuances.
At the trial, Berardino testified that Pikes history of delusions and erratic behavior were indicative of his schizophrenia and that he could not be trusted to control his actions in the future. While acknowledging there have been times when Pike has voluntarily taken his medication and acted appropriately, Berardino was concerned he has generally denied his condition, refused to medicate and shown an utter lack of insight into his problems. Berardino was particularly concerned about Pikes inability to understand the events in his delusions are not real. She said this is a problem because schizophrenics have a tendency to act in an erratic or violent manner when they are experiencing a delusion that they perceive to be real. It is their inability to understand and manage their delusions that "makes them a higher risk for dangerousness," she explained.
For his part, Pike testified he no longer has any delusions. While admitting he has some problems, he insisted that they were primarily physical, not mental, and that they were currently in remission. The jury did not believe him. It found Pike is an MDO in that: 1) He suffers from a severe mental disorder; 2) the disorder is not in remission or cannot be kept in remission without treatment; and 3) because of this, he represents a substantial danger of physical harm to others. Thereupon, the court extended Pikes commitment to the state mental hospital for a period of one year.
I
Pike admits he has a severe mental disorder that is not in remission and cannot be kept in remission without treatment. However, he contends there is insufficient evidence to support the jurys finding he represents a substantial danger to the physical well-being of others. We disagree.
"In considering the sufficiency of the evidence to support MDO findings, an appellate court must determine whether, on the whole record, a rational trier of fact could have found that defendant [was] an MDO beyond a reasonable doubt, considering all the evidence in the light which is most favorable to the People, and drawing all inferences the trier could reasonably have made to support the finding. [Citation.] `"`Although we must ensure the evidence is reasonable, credible, and of solid value, nonetheless it is the exclusive province of the trial judge or jury to determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts on which that determination depends. [Citation.] Thus, if the [finding] is supported by substantial evidence, we must accord due deference to the trier of fact and not substitute our evaluation of a witnesss credibility for that of the fact finder. . . . [Citation.]" [Citations.]" (People v. Clark (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1072, 1082-1083.)
Pike argues the jurys finding of dangerousness is not supported by substantial evidence because the prosecution failed to show he has committed a single violent act since his convictions in 1999. However, the statutory scheme does not call for such a showing. To the contrary, it explicitly provides that "`substantial danger of physical harm does not require proof of a recent overt act." (Pen. Code, § 2962, subd. (f), italics added.) Nor does it require a finding of recent dangerousness. (In re Qawi (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1, 24.) Rather, all the substantial-danger-of-physical-harm element seems to require is "a prediction of future dangerousness by mental health professionals." (Ibid., italics added.)
Here, that requirement was supplied through the testimony of chief psychologist Berardino, who was intimately familiar with Pikes mental history. Throughout her reports and testimony, she consistently opined that Pike is a substantial danger to others because he lacks insight into his mental disorder. According to Berardino, this lack of insight prevents Pike from being able to recognize when he is experiencing a delusion. And because of that, there is a very real danger he will get caught up in a delusion and act violently, as he did when he destroyed his parents home in 1996 and when he committed his criminal acts in 1999. Berardino believed Pikes recent delusions about dead people were particularly troubling because they involved the manager of the very board and care facility he was living at. It was the delusions connection to Pikes current living circumstances that made it so worrisome to Berardino.
Berardino was also justifiably concerned about Pikes historical disinclination to take his medication. Because he is under the impression he is not mentally ill, Pike has eschewed the notion of self-medication, and this, in turn, has increased his propensity for delusions and erratic behavior. As Berardino explained, a person cannot very likely stave off an episode of psychotic behavior if he or she is unable to recognize and treat the symptoms that precede it.
Given Pikes history of mental illness, and his attitude toward it, it is not dispositive that he has refrained from violence during his time in the mental health system. As Pikes doctors have noted, that system is relatively controlled compared to life on the outside, and if Pike were released into the community, he would be exposed to new sources of pressure and stress that could very well exacerbate his condition. Based on all the evidence that was provided, the jury could reasonably conclude that, if released from custody, Pike would represent a substantial danger of physical harm to others. We therefore reject his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.
II
Pike also claims the court erred in denying his motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial. Again, we disagree.
Recognizing that MDO proceedings are civil in nature, Pike bases his claim not on the Sixth Amendments speedy trial guarantee, but on statutory law and the constitutional right to due process. (See generally People v. Williams (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1577, 1590 ["MDO commitment proceedings are civil in nature and therefore defendants presented with possible commitment do not enjoy the constitutional rights accorded criminal defendants"].)
By statute, a hearing on a petition to extend an MDOs commitment should be held at least 30 days prior to his or her scheduled release date. (See Pen. Code, § 2972, subd. (a).) However, that time requirement does not apply if the MDO waives time or good cause is shown. (Ibid.) And while due process protects against undue delay in bringing a case to trial, no constitutional violation will be found where the record indicates the defendant did not in fact want a speedy trial. (See Barker v. Wingo (1972) 407 U.S. 514, 536.) Courts are not required to "dismiss[ ] serious prosecutions because a defendant who has claimed good cause for and stipulated to a long series of delays later claims the trial court and prosecution denied him a speedy trial by granting the delays he sought." (Gottlieb v. Superior Court (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 804, 810.)
Pike is just such a defendant. His trial was originally scheduled for February 26, 2007, six weeks before his scheduled release date of April 15. However, he sought and obtained continuances on February 26 and April 12, which pushed the trial date beyond his scheduled date of release. Then again, on May 24, he sought and obtained a third continuance. And a week later, on May 30, he stipulated to yet another continuance. At no time prior to the July 11 trial did Pike voice any concern about the pace at which his case was proceeding.
Under these circumstances, Pike has clearly waived his right to a speedy trial. (See People v. McDermott (2002) 28 Cal.4th 946, 987 [rejecting defendants speedy trial claim where the record showed she repeatedly requested and obtained continuances].) No statutory and constitutional violation has been shown. (Compare Zachary v. Superior Court (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 1026 [due process violation found where the prosecution did not file its petition to extend defendants commitment as an MDO until his most recent commitment had already expired].)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR:
SILLS, P. J.
IKOLA, J.