Opinion
A149776
06-18-2018
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JAMES DEAN PIERCE, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Solano County Super. Ct. No. VCR221116)
A few minutes after a residential burglary was reported, defendant James Dean Pierce was apprehended in the burglary getaway vehicle; property from the victim's house was found in his pocket. A jury found him guilty of first degree burglary. Pierce contends there was insufficient evidence that he was involved in the burglary. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On the afternoon of June 23, 2014, Shannon Ingersoll stopped at a 7-Eleven in Vallejo. She left the engine of her black Suburban running while she quickly went into the store. When she came out a few minutes later, her vehicle was gone. The Suburban was later recovered by the police, and Ingersoll retrieved it about two hours after it had been stolen.
The Suburban had been damaged in the intervening hours. The ignition "was messed up," the "door side panel was off," and there were things in the vehicle that did not belong to Ingersoll.
Around 5:15 p.m. that day, Peter Corelis arrived at his house in Vallejo. His wife and their children had arrived at home in her car only moments before. Corelis went to his wife's car to help unlatch their child from a car seat, while his wife walked to the house. He noticed a black Suburban (later identified as Ingersoll's stolen vehicle) across the street parked in the wrong direction on the one way street. The engine was running and the windows were down, but the vehicle was unoccupied. Then, as Corelis walked toward his house with his child, his wife came running out of the house screaming that there were people in the house. Corelis saw three or four men running from the house. One man was carrying Corelis's desktop computer, another had a PlayStation console, another had a large glass bowl. The men ran to the black Suburban. Corelis thought at least one of the men was African-American and at least one was Latino. He also noticed that one of the men was wearing an article of clothing on the lower half of his body that was neon orange or pink. Corelis called 911.
At 5:22 p.m., Vallejo Police Officer Jim Melville received a report of a burglary in progress with a blue or black Suburban involved. Around 5:30 p.m., Melville saw a black Suburban turn west onto Tennessee Street. He activated his emergency lights. The Suburban accelerated and tried to evade Melville. He followed the vehicle north and through a gas station. He turned on his siren and followed the Suburban eastbound down an alley. Melville observed the front passenger of the Suburban throw a book of checks out the window. (The checks, later recovered, belonged to Corelis's wife.) The Suburban turned south onto Sutter Street and ran a stop sign as it turned west on Tennessee Street. It came to a stop on Tennessee, and all the occupants put their hands out the window.
There were three men in the black Suburban. The driver was Jovany Portades, the front passenger was Santiago Portades, and defendant Pierce was in the rear seat on the passenger side. Pierce, who is Black, was wearing neon orange shoes. In the Suburban, officers found property taken from Corelis's house including a PlayStation 3, a laptop computer, a large glass bowl, a Timbuk2 bag and other tote bags, and currency from the Dominican Republic. Melville took the three men into custody. He searched Pierce and found currency from the Dominican Republic in his pants pocket. Pierce later told Melville the money was international, and he could have gotten it from anywhere.
Corelis visited the Dominican Republic in 2011 and returned home with Dominican pesos, which he kept in his house.
Within about 30 minutes of reporting the burglary, Corelis was taken by the police to a gas station on Tennessee Street, where Corelis saw the black Suburban used in the burglary and retrieved his stolen property. Officers also showed Corelis two men, Jovany Portades and Pierce. Corelis recognized Jovany as the driver of the Suburban, but was unable to identify Pierce.
Not all Corelis's stolen property was found; he never recovered his desktop computer, a pair of shoes, a watch, and an external hard drive.
DISCUSSION
Pierce contends no substantial evidence supports his conviction of the burglary of Corelis's house. "To assess the evidence's sufficiency, we review the whole record to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime . . . beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] The record must disclose substantial evidence to support the verdict—i.e., evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] In applying this test, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the jury could reasonably have deduced from the evidence. [Citation.] 'Conflicts and even testimony [that] is subject to justifiable suspicion do not justify the reversal of a judgment, for it is the exclusive province of the trial judge or jury to determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts upon which a determination depends. [Citation.] We resolve neither credibility issues nor evidentiary conflicts; we look for substantial evidence. [Citation.]' [Citation.] A reversal for insufficient evidence 'is unwarranted unless it appears "that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support" ' the jury's verdict." (People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357 (Zamudio).)
"The same standard governs in cases where the prosecution relies primarily on circumstantial evidence. [Citation.] We 'must accept logical inferences that the jury might have drawn from the circumstantial evidence. [Citation.]' [Citation.] 'Although it is the jury's duty to acquit a defendant if it finds the circumstantial evidence susceptible of two reasonable interpretations, one of which suggests guilt and the other innocence, it is the jury, not the appellate court that must be convinced of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.]' [Citation.] Where the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact's findings, a reviewing court's conclusion the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant the judgment's reversal." (Zamudio, supra, 43 Cal.4th at pp. 357-358.)
For the crimes of burglary and robbery, our high court has "recognized that '[p]ossession of recently stolen property is so incriminating that to warrant conviction there need only be, in addition to possession, slight corroboration in the form of statements or conduct of the defendant tending to show his guilt.' " (People v. Grimes (2016) 1 Cal.5th 698, 731 [burglary and robbery] (Grimes), quoting People v. McFarland (1962) 58 Cal.2d 748, 754 [burglary]; see CALCRIM No. 376.)
Here, the evidence showed Pierce possessed recently stolen property—he was found with Corelis's Dominican currency in his pants pocket a few minutes after Corelis observed burglars running out of his house with his property. In corroboration, evidence showed Pierce was apprehended in the backseat of the getaway vehicle, a stolen Suburban, which contained items Corelis had seen the burglars carry out of his house and take to the Suburban. When Officer Melville activated his emergency lights, the driver of the Suburban attempted to evade the officer, and the front passenger disposed of some of the property stolen from Corelis's house by throwing it out the window. Corelis identified the driver of the Suburban as the man he had seen run out of his house to the driver's side of the getaway vehicle and drive away. Finally, Corelis's description of one of the other burglars was consistent with Pierce—he is Black, and when he was detained, he was wearing neon orange shoes. And all of this happened close in time to, and a short distance from, the burglary. This was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find Pierce guilty of burglary.
For his contrary position, Pierce relies on People v. Sanford (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 84 (Sanford). In that case, witnesses saw six people wearing masks get out of a Dodge Magnum and enter a jewelry store while the driver stayed in the car. One of the masked suspects had a handgun, and others had hammers, which they used to smash display cases. They grabbed jewelry and put it in large gym bags. A witness inside the jewelry store thought the six suspects were African-American. Another witness, Victoria D., saw the driver of the Magnum, whose face was not covered. Victoria D. described the driver as African-American and heavy set. Other evidence (a video recording) suggested that four of the six masked suspects got into a different car after the robbery. (Id. at pp. 86-89.) About 10 minutes after the robbery, an officer saw a Magnum matching the description of the suspect vehicle and pulled it over. The driver of the Magnum did not attempt to evade the officer. The Magnum had three occupants, including the defendant Sanford, who sat in the back seat. The eyewitnesses, including Victoria D., were taken to where the Magnum was stopped, but the witnesses could not identify any of the occupants of the Magnum as the robbers. Victoria D. did not recognize any of the three occupants, none of whom was the man she saw in the Magnum's driver's seat at the scene of the robbery. No jewelry, masks, weapons, or hammers were found in the Magnum. (Id. at pp. 89-91.) On this evidence, Sanford was convicted of second degree robbery, but the Court of Appeal concluded, "[u]nder [the] unusual circumstances" of the case, there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction. (Id. at p. 85-86.)
The Court of Appeal explained, "The only two pieces of evidence indicating that Sanford might have been one of the men at the robbery scene were the fact that he was in the Magnum when it was pulled over and the testimony of the witnesses that the participants in the robbery at the jewelry store were African-American men wearing dark-colored jeans and shoes. In our view, being in a getaway car shortly after a crime and having some of the same general characteristics as the perpetrators will likely be substantial evidence of identity in cases where it is reasonable to infer that the occupants of the getaway car were unchanged. But it is not substantial evidence in cases, such as this one, where it is not reasonable to make such an inference." (Sanford, supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at p. 92.) In Sanford, the "uncontroverted evidence undermine[d] the reasonableness of inferring that the three people who were in the Magnum when it left the robbery scene were the same three who were found in it. This evidence included unchallenged testimony indicating that, at the very least, the driver changed. . . . The absence of jewelry, weapons, and disguises in the Magnum further suggest[ed] that the car stopped for some reason between the scene and the freeway." (Id. at p. 94.)
The facts of Sanford are easily distinguishable from this case. First and foremost, the defendant in Sanford was not found in possession of recently stolen property, so the principle that possession of recently stolen property is so incriminating that there need only be, in addition to possession, slight corroboration to warrant conviction (Grimes, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 731) did not apply to him. But in this case, Pierce was found with Corelis's stolen property in his pocket, so the rule of "slight corroboration" did apply. Second, in Sanford, it was not reasonable to infer the occupants of the getaway car were unchanged because evidence suggested the driver had changed from the time of the robbery to the time the Magnum was pulled over by the police. Here, in contrast, Corelis positively identified the driver of the Suburban at the time it was pulled over as the same person he had seen run out of his house and drive away with his property. In addition, the front seat passenger threw stolen property out the window while the driver tried to evade the police, conduct suggestive of guilt, and Pierce wore an article of neon clothing as described by Corelis. With this evidence, a jury could reasonably infer the occupants of the getaway car were unchanged.
Pierce argues the fact that he was found with Dominican currency should carry little weight because some of the items taken from Corelis's house were not found in the Suburban. This argument fails because it does not take into account the rule of "slight corroboration" when a person is found with recently stolen property. (Grimes, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 731.) And the fact that not all Corelis's property was recovered does not render it unreasonable to infer the occupants of the getaway vehicle were unchanged under the circumstances of this case. Sanford recognized that the absence of jewelry, weapons, and masks, suggested the getaway car stopped for some reason between the jewelry store and the freeway where the getaway car was spotted by the police. (Sanford, supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at p. 94.) This evidence, in turn, was relevant to bolster Victoria D.'s eyewitness testimony suggesting the getaway car must have stopped so that the getaway driver, at least, could be replaced by a new driver. Sanford concluded it would not be reasonable for a jury to find "based on the evidence presented that the Magnum got on the freeway without first making a stop during which the composition of the car's occupants changed to at least some extent." (Ibid.) But here there is no additional evidence suggesting the composition of the Suburban's occupants changed, and to the contrary, the evidence suggests the three occupants remained the same from the time the getaway vehicle left Corelis's house to the time it was stopped by the police.
First, the driver tried to evade the police and was positively identified by the victim. Second, the front passenger threw stolen property out the window, conduct indicative of guilt. Third, the backseat passenger, Pierce, had stolen property in his pocket, and his appearance was consistent with the victim's description of one of the suspects. --------
Pierce also claims the fact he was wearing neon shoes should be "unpersuasive" because Corelis did not immediately report that one of the burglars wore neon and only remembered that a burglar was wearing a neon article of clothing after he saw Pierce at the gas station. Corelis, however, explained at trial that seeing the neon shoes jogged his memory that he had seen neon on one of the suspects. The jury was free to believe Corelis's explanation, and it is not our role to deem his testimony unpersuasive. (See Zamudio, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 357.)
Finally, Pierce argues that, because Corelis failed to identify two of the three passengers of the Suburban, the fact that he identified the driver does not distinguish this case from Sanford. But Sanford did not hold that a defendant can never be found guilty unless an eyewitness places the defendant at the scene of the crime. Rather, the court observed, "being in a getaway car shortly after a crime and having some of the same general characteristics as the perpetrators will likely be substantial evidence of identity in cases where it is reasonable to infer that the occupants of the getaway car were unchanged." (Sanford, supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at p. 92.) It was not reasonable to infer the occupants were unchanged in Sanford because the evidence showed the driver of the getaway car had changed from the time of the robbery to the time the getaway car was pulled over. In this case, however, the driver of the getaway vehicle remained the same. Pierce's reliance on Sanford is misplaced.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
/s/_________
Miller, J. We concur: /s/_________
Kline, P.J. /s/_________
Richman, J.