05; People v Thomas, supra; People v Scotto, supra). In any event, we find that the court's charge, when read as a whole, properly conveyed to the jury that a reasonable doubt is to be distinguished from a doubt based on a whim, sympathy, or some other vague reason (see, People v Jones, 27 N.Y.2d 222, 227; People v Malloy, 55 N.Y.2d 296, cert denied 459 U.S. 847; People v Phelps, 168 A.D.2d 693; People v Kuey, 155 A.D.2d 481). We find that the sentence imposed was not excessive (People v Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80). Mangano, P.J., Miller, O'Brien and Santucci, JJ., concur.
The defendant maintains that the court's charge with regard to identification and reasonable doubt contained prejudicial errors. However, we find that, as a whole, the charge correctly conveyed the elements to be weighed when assessing the accuracy and veracity of identification testimony (see, People v. Whalen, 59 N.Y.2d 273; People v. Beard, 157 A.D.2d 788, 789; People v Sorrentino, 138 A.D.2d 760; People v. Robertson, 128 A.D.2d 815, 816; People v. Daniels, 88 A.D.2d 392, 400-401), as well as the correct standard for proof beyond a reasonable doubt, thus permitting the jury to apply the correct rules in arriving at its verdict (see, 1 CJI[NY] 6.20; People v. Phelps, 168 A.D.2d 693; see also, People v. Malloy, 55 N.Y.2d 296, 300, cert denied 459 U.S. 847; People v. Jones, 27 N.Y.2d 222, 227; People v. Kuey, 155 A.D.2d 481, 482). We further find that the sentence imposed was not excessive (see, People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80).