Opinion
2012-12-27
The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Victor PETERSON, Defendant–Appellant.
Richard M. Greenberg, Office of the Appellate Defender, New York (Risa Gerson of counsel), for appellant. Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., District Attorney, New York (Yuval Simchi–Levi of counsel), for respondent.
Richard M. Greenberg, Office of the Appellate Defender, New York (Risa Gerson of counsel), for appellant. Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., District Attorney, New York (Yuval Simchi–Levi of counsel), for respondent.
FRIEDMAN, J.P., ACOSTA, RENWICK, RICHTER, ROMÁN, JJ.
Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Daniel P. Conviser, J.), rendered September 28, 2010, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree, and sentencing him, as a second felony drug offender, to a term of three years, unanimously affirmed.
The record, taken as a whole ( see People v. Providence, 2 N.Y.3d 579, 583, 780 N.Y.S.2d 552, 813 N.E.2d 632 [2004] ), demonstrates that defendant made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel. The court conducted a thorough inquiry, in which it fully warned defendant of the risks of self-representation ( see e.g. People v. Peterson, 273 A.D.2d 88, 89, 709 N.Y.S.2d 540 [2000] [same defendant] ). Defendant's lack of legal knowledge and difficulties in representing himself were not grounds for denying or revoking pro se status ( see People v. Ryan, 82 N.Y.2d 497, 507, 605 N.Y.S.2d 235, 626 N.E.2d 51 [1993] ). “Ineptitude, inherent in almost any case of self-representation, is a constitutionally protected prerogative” ( People v. Schoolfield, 196 A.D.2d 111, 117, 608 N.Y.S.2d 413 [1994],lv. dismissed83 N.Y.2d 858, 612 N.Y.S.2d 390, 634 N.E.2d 991 [1994],lv. denied83 N.Y.2d 915, 614 N.Y.S.2d 397, 637 N.E.2d 288 [1994] ). Even though defendant had no right to hybrid representation ( see People v. Rodriguez, 95 N.Y.2d 497, 501, 719 N.Y.S.2d 208, 741 N.E.2d 882 [2000] ), the court acceded to his request for an arrangement whereby he could switch back and forth between self-representation and representation by his legal advisor. Any disadvantages caused by that arrangement were of defendant's own making.
The evidence at the Hinton hearing established an overriding interest that warranted closure of the courtroom during an undercover officer's testimony ( see Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 104 S.Ct. 2210, 81 L.Ed.2d 31 [1984];People v. Ramos, 90 N.Y.2d 490, 497, 662 N.Y.S.2d 739, 685 N.E.2d 492 [1997],cert. denied sub nom. Ayala v. New York, 522 U.S. 1002, 118 S.Ct. 574, 139 L.Ed.2d 413 [1997] ), as well as a need for the officer to testify under her shield number ( see People v. Waver, 3 N.Y.3d 748, 788 N.Y.S.2d 630, 821 N.E.2d 934 [2004] ). We have considered and rejected defendant's arguments on these issues.