People v. Peter

6 Citing cases

  1. People v. Gates

    2023 Ill. App. 211422 (Ill. App. Ct. 2023)   Cited 5 times
    In Gates, the court found that, although the defendant, who was 18 years old at the time of the offense and sentenced to 48 years, could be eligible for parole after serving 20 years under the parole statute, "the possibility for parole does not preclude [the defendant] from serving a de facto life sentence."

    ¶ 80 Pursuant to section 5-4.5-115(b) of the Unified Code of Corrections, if a defendant is eligible for parole review after serving 20 years in prison, his sentence is not a de facto life sentence. See, e.g., People v. Peter, 43 Ill.App.3d 1068, 1071 (1976) (finding that "[a]mong the factors that may be considered in determining whether a sentence is excessive is the defendant's eligibility for parole"). In People v. Elliott, 2022 IL App (1st) 192294, ¶ 56, we held that a 20-year-old sentenced to a 70-year prison term did not receive a de facto life sentence because he was eligible for parole after serving 20 years in prison.

  2. People v. Elliott

    2022 Ill. App. 192294 (Ill. App. Ct. 2022)   Cited 25 times
    In People v. Elliott, 2022 IL App (1st) 192294, ¶ 56, we held that a 20-year-old sentenced to a 70-year prison term did not receive a de facto life sentence because he was eligible for parole after serving 20 years in prison.

    Decisions predating the 1978 changes indicate that this court has found eligibility for parole to be a proper factor to consider when determining whether a sentence is excessive. See, e.g., People v. Peter, 43 Ill.App.3d 1068, 1071 (1976) (finding that a defendant convicted of murder sentenced to an indeterminate term of 90 to 180 years in prison was not excessive since he was eligible for parole upon serving 20 years). Accordingly, we find that Elliott's eligibility for parole militates against finding his sentence excessive, greatly at variance with the spirit and purpose of the law, or manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the offense.

  3. People v. Sheppard

    549 N.E.2d 971 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990)   Cited 7 times

    The court simply considered no improper factor in the fashioning of defendant's sentence in this instance. The trial court sitting both through the trial and the sentencing hearing had a far superior opportunity to make a sound determination as to what defendant's punishment should be. (See People v. Perruquet (1977), 68 Ill.2d 149, 154, 368 N.E.2d 882, 884; People v. Peter (1976), 43 Ill. App.3d 1068, 1070, 358 N.E.2d 31, 33.) It is not our function to serve as a sentencing court, and absent any abuse of the trial court's discretion, we will not alter the sentence imposed. ( Perruquet, 68 Ill.2d at 153-56, 368 N.E.2d at 883-85.)

  4. People v. Wyatt

    413 N.E.2d 82 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980)   Cited 2 times

    Under the indeterminate sentencing scheme which previously existed, defendant would have been eligible for parole consideration after serving 20 years less statutory good-time credit which, if fully received, would have rendered him eligible for parole in slight excess of 11 years. People v. Lykins (1979), 77 Ill.2d 35, 40, 394 N.E.2d 1182; People v. Peter (1976), 43 Ill. App.3d 1068, 1071, 358 N.E.2d 31. The co-defendant Taylor, on the other hand, will be theoretically released after serving 10 years.

  5. People v. Campbell

    65 Ill. App. 3d 317 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978)

    Although reviewing courts have the power to reduce sentences, the authority is limited to those cases where the punishment is at variance with the fundamental purposes of our laws or is disproportionate to the offense. People v. Peter (1976), 43 Ill. App.3d 1068, 358 N.E.2d 31. In the instant case we do not find any abuse of discretion by the trial court.

  6. People v. Frazier

    369 N.E.2d 398 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977)   Cited 4 times
    Stating the doctrine of transferred intent renders one criminally responsible "'where in the execution of an intent to do wrong, an unintended act resulting in a wrong ensue as a natural and probable consequence,'" and holding the defendant, who "knowingly and intentionally struck [his intended victim] in the face with a gun which discharged and wounded [an innocent bystander on a nearby barstool]," was "responsible for the resulting discharge of the weapon whether or not it was accidental" and, thus, was guilty of aggravated battery of the bystander (quoting People v. Hickman, 291 N.E.2d 523, 527 (Ill. App. Ct. 1973) (citing 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law § 83, at 84))

    Supreme Court Rule 615(b)(4) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 110A, par. 615(b)(4)), allows us to reduce the punishment imposed by a trial court, but generally we will refrain from modifying the sentence of a trial judge who was able to observe defendant and assess the factors in aggravation and mitigation unless a clear abuse of his discretionary powers can be shown. ( People v. Morgan (1974), 59 Ill.2d 276, 319 N.E.2d 764.) Where the sentence is within the legislative limitations, a court of review will not disturb it unless it is greatly at variance with the purpose and spirit of the law or manifestly excessive. People v. Fox (1971), 48 Ill.2d 239, 252, 269 N.E.2d 720; People v. Peter (1976), 43 Ill. App.3d 1068, 1070, 358 N.E.2d 31. • 6 Defendant was convicted of aggravated battery after the trial court found he caused great bodily harm to Leon Woods. Aggravated battery is a Class 3 felony subject to an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment with a maximum in excess of 1 year, but not exceeding 10 years.