¶ 80 Pursuant to section 5-4.5-115(b) of the Unified Code of Corrections, if a defendant is eligible for parole review after serving 20 years in prison, his sentence is not a de facto life sentence. See, e.g., People v. Peter, 43 Ill.App.3d 1068, 1071 (1976) (finding that "[a]mong the factors that may be considered in determining whether a sentence is excessive is the defendant's eligibility for parole"). In People v. Elliott, 2022 IL App (1st) 192294, ¶ 56, we held that a 20-year-old sentenced to a 70-year prison term did not receive a de facto life sentence because he was eligible for parole after serving 20 years in prison.
Decisions predating the 1978 changes indicate that this court has found eligibility for parole to be a proper factor to consider when determining whether a sentence is excessive. See, e.g., People v. Peter, 43 Ill.App.3d 1068, 1071 (1976) (finding that a defendant convicted of murder sentenced to an indeterminate term of 90 to 180 years in prison was not excessive since he was eligible for parole upon serving 20 years). Accordingly, we find that Elliott's eligibility for parole militates against finding his sentence excessive, greatly at variance with the spirit and purpose of the law, or manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the offense.
The court simply considered no improper factor in the fashioning of defendant's sentence in this instance. The trial court sitting both through the trial and the sentencing hearing had a far superior opportunity to make a sound determination as to what defendant's punishment should be. (See People v. Perruquet (1977), 68 Ill.2d 149, 154, 368 N.E.2d 882, 884; People v. Peter (1976), 43 Ill. App.3d 1068, 1070, 358 N.E.2d 31, 33.) It is not our function to serve as a sentencing court, and absent any abuse of the trial court's discretion, we will not alter the sentence imposed. ( Perruquet, 68 Ill.2d at 153-56, 368 N.E.2d at 883-85.)
Under the indeterminate sentencing scheme which previously existed, defendant would have been eligible for parole consideration after serving 20 years less statutory good-time credit which, if fully received, would have rendered him eligible for parole in slight excess of 11 years. People v. Lykins (1979), 77 Ill.2d 35, 40, 394 N.E.2d 1182; People v. Peter (1976), 43 Ill. App.3d 1068, 1071, 358 N.E.2d 31. The co-defendant Taylor, on the other hand, will be theoretically released after serving 10 years.
Although reviewing courts have the power to reduce sentences, the authority is limited to those cases where the punishment is at variance with the fundamental purposes of our laws or is disproportionate to the offense. People v. Peter (1976), 43 Ill. App.3d 1068, 358 N.E.2d 31. In the instant case we do not find any abuse of discretion by the trial court.
Supreme Court Rule 615(b)(4) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 110A, par. 615(b)(4)), allows us to reduce the punishment imposed by a trial court, but generally we will refrain from modifying the sentence of a trial judge who was able to observe defendant and assess the factors in aggravation and mitigation unless a clear abuse of his discretionary powers can be shown. ( People v. Morgan (1974), 59 Ill.2d 276, 319 N.E.2d 764.) Where the sentence is within the legislative limitations, a court of review will not disturb it unless it is greatly at variance with the purpose and spirit of the law or manifestly excessive. People v. Fox (1971), 48 Ill.2d 239, 252, 269 N.E.2d 720; People v. Peter (1976), 43 Ill. App.3d 1068, 1070, 358 N.E.2d 31. • 6 Defendant was convicted of aggravated battery after the trial court found he caused great bodily harm to Leon Woods. Aggravated battery is a Class 3 felony subject to an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment with a maximum in excess of 1 year, but not exceeding 10 years.