People v. Persaud

8 Citing cases

  1. People v. Moore

    263 A.D.2d 517 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999)   Cited 3 times

    Since the defendant had no prior felony convictions, his minimum sentence should have been one-third rather than one-half of the maximum ( see, Penal Law § 70.00[b]; see also, People v. Glass, 242 A.D.2d 305; People v. Toledo, 204 A.D.2d 667). Accordingly, the minimum sentence should be reduced from 2 years to 1 1/3 years. As the court clearly intended to sentence the defendant to the maximum possible term with respect to this count, the matter need not be remitted for resentencing ( see, People v. Fabian, 240 A.D.2d 591; People v. Correll, 207 A.D.2d 410; People v. Persaud, 166 A.D.2d 466). Moreover, the sentence imposed on the remaining convictions was neither harsh nor excessive ( see, People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80). The defendant's remaining contentions are without merit.

  2. People v. Fletcher

    258 A.D.2d 470 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999)   Cited 5 times

    Here, the defendant was sentenced to 12 1/2 to 25 years on that count. We note that this matter "need not be remitted for resentencing inasmuch as the court evidently intended to sentence the, defendant to the maximum possible term with respect to this count" ( People v. Persaud, 166 A.D.2d 466, 468; see, People v. Azzara, 138 A.D.2d 495). The defendant's remaining contentions are either unpreserved for appellate review or without merit.

  3. People v. Ricketts

    255 A.D.2d 341 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998)

    As the People correctly concede, the court improperly imposed an illegal sentence of 2 to 4 years imprisonment upon the defendant's conviction of unlawful imprisonment in the first degree rather than a sentence of 1 1/3 to 4 years imprisonment. Since the defendant had no prior felony convictions, his minimum sentence should have been one third rather than one half of the maximum ( see, Penal Law § 70.00 [b]; see also, People v. Glass, 242 A.D.2d 305; People v. Toledo, 204 A.D.2d 667). As the court clearly intended to sentence the defendant to the maximum possible term of imprisonment with respect to this count, the matter need not be remitted for resentencing ( see, People v. Persaud, 166 A.D.2d 466). O'Brien, J. P., Joy, Friedmann and Goldstein, JJ., concur.

  4. People v. Correll

    207 A.D.2d 410 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994)   Cited 5 times

    However, as the People concede, the amended sentence imposed upon the defendant for attempted criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fifth degree was illegal in that it was greater than the statutory maximum (see, Penal Law § 70.00 [e]; [3] [b]). We do not remit this matter for resentencing since it is clear that the court intended to sentence the defendant to the maximum possible term with respect to this conviction (see, People v. Persaud, 166 A.D.2d 466). The sentences imposed on the remaining convictions were not unduly harsh or excessive (see, People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80). We have reviewed the defendant's remaining contentions, including those raised in his supplemental brief and supplemental pro se brief, and find them to be without merit.

  5. People v. Beauford

    196 A.D.2d 545 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993)

    e sentence is modified, on the law, by reducing the terms of imprisonment imposed on the convictions of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree, assault in the second degree (two counts) and reckless endangerment in the first degree from 2 1/2 to 7 1/2 years imprisonment to 2 1/3 to 7 years imprisonment; as so modified, the sentence is affirmed. The defendant argues, and the People concede, that the concurrent indeterminate terms of 2 1/2 to 7 1/2 years imprisonment imposed upon the defendant's convictions of assault in the second degree (two counts), criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree, and reckless endangerment in the first degree exceed the legally permissibly maximum of 2 1/3 to 7 years (see, Penal Law § 70.02 [b]; § 70.00 [2] [d]; [3] [b]). Although the foregoing terms of imprisonment are illegal, the maximum authorized terms are clearly appropriate under the circumstances and we have reduced the terms accordingly (see, People v Singh, 175 A.D.2d 888; People v Persaud, 166 A.D.2d 466). The sentence imposed in connection with the two remaining counts of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree is not excessive (see, People v Kazepis, 101 A.D.2d 816; see also, People v Persaud, supra).

  6. People v. Goolsby

    177 A.D.2d 709 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991)   Cited 1 times

    A.D.2d 463; People v. Camacho, 120 A.D.2d 671). However, we agree that the defendant is entitled to the ameliorative benefit of the reclassification of the criminal possession of stolen property offenses which became effective prior to his resentencing (see, People v. Behlog, 74 N.Y.2d 237). Accordingly, his conviction of criminal possession of stolen property in the first degree must, as the People concede, be reduced to a conviction of criminal possession of stolen property in the fourth degree (see, e.g., People v. Young, 166 A.D.2d 625; People v. German, 157 A.D.2d 461; People v. Phillips, 154 A.D.2d 731). Moreover, inasmuch as the Supreme Court unequivocally stated its intention to sentence the defendant to the minimum permissible term on his possession of stolen property conviction, there is no need to remit the matter for resentencing, and we reduce his sentence of 2 to 4 years imprisonment to a term of 1 1/2 to 3 years imprisonment upon the reduced conviction (see generally, People v. Persaud, 166 A.D.2d 466). Kunzeman, J.P., Sullivan, Balletta and Copertino, JJ., concur.

  7. People v. Chalmars

    176 A.D.2d 239 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991)   Cited 11 times

    During a subsequent search of the rear room, which was in complete disarray, the police found an operable and loaded .30 caliber sawedoff rifle in a hole in the wall. Under these circumstances, the jury could reasonably conclude that the defendant, who was found in the locked and closely guarded apartment, which was arranged to be used only for the sale of drugs, was acting in concert with the codefendant who physically sold the cocaine to the undercover police officer, and that the defendant was in constructive possession of the drugs, the drug paraphernalia and the weapon found in the apartment (see, People v. Tirado, 38 N.Y.2d 955). "The facts from which the inference of the defendant's guilt is drawn are inconsistent with his innocence and exclude to a moral certainty every other reasonable hypothesis but guilt" (People v. Persaud, 166 A.D.2d 466, 467, citing People v. Giuliano, supra, at 767). In addition, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we find that the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence (see, CPL 470.15).

  8. People v. Singh

    175 A.D.2d 888 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991)   Cited 1 times

    The sentence of an indeterminate term of 12 1/2 to 25 years imprisonment imposed by the County Court was, therefore, illegal, and must be modified. Since the intent of the court was to impose the maximum sentence available under the law, we may substitute the maximum legal sentence for this crime and need not direct a resentencing (see, People v Persaud, 166 A.D.2d 466). Mangano, P.J., Bracken, Kooper, Balletta and Ritter, JJ., concur.