Opinion
B295464
01-29-2020
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JASON EUGENE PERKINS, Defendant and Appellant.
Jared G. Coleman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(a). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115(a). Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. GA099253 APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Jared D. Moses, Judge. Dismissed. Jared G. Coleman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
In 2017, defendant Jason Eugene Perkins pled no contest to attempted burglary and admitted suffering a prior strike conviction. He was sentenced to nine years in state prison. In 2018, defendant filed a petition for "Judicial Administrative Records" he intends to use "for a civil action." He appeals from the trial court's postjudgment order denying his petition. We conclude the order does not affect defendant's substantial rights under Penal Code section 1237, subdivision (b), and dismiss the appeal.
All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. --------
BACKGROUND
By information filed January 4, 2017, defendant was charged with conspiracy to commit a crime (§ 182, subd. (a)(1); count 1) and attempted first degree burglary (§ 664/459; count 2). The information also alleged defendant had been convicted of first degree burglary in 2015, and that the conviction constituted both a strike prior (§ 667, subd. (d); § 1170.12, subd. (b)) and a serious-felony prior (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)). Defendant pled not guilty and denied the allegations.
On March 6, 2017, defendant withdrew his not guilty plea, pled no contest to the attempted burglary count, and admitted the strike and serious-felony prior allegations. The conspiracy count was dismissed. In accordance with the plea agreement, defendant was sentenced to a total term of nine years in prison, consisting of the two-year midterm for the attempted burglary count, doubled to four years under the Three Strikes law, plus five years for the serious-felony prior. The trial court awarded defendant a total of 476 days of custody credit. Defendant did not appeal from the judgment.
On November 13, 2018, defendant filed a request for "Judicial Administrative Records." Specifically, he sought "the records of lien attachment otherwise recorded as Affidavit for the Justification of Bail," as well as "all financial transaction records of deposits, interest earned and revenue, expenditure and reserves appropriated from the above-mentioned lien attachment or derivative instruments." The trial court denied the request on the same day.
On December 26, 2018, defendant filed a document captioned "Writ of Petition filed under California Rules of Court Rule 10.500(j)(1) and Government Code Section 71675" in the trial court (petition). Defendant argued that the court's prior denial of his request for judicial administrative records "obstructed [him] from gathering discovery for a civil action." The court denied the petition on December 27, 2018. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal from that order and we appointed counsel to represent him.
DISCUSSION
Appellate counsel filed a brief in which he raised no issues and asked us to review the record independently under People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. Thereafter, defendant filed a supplemental brief seeking reversal of the postjudgment order because the requested judicial administrative records are public records or writings subject to inspection and production. We conclude the challenged order is not appealable and dismiss the appeal.
"The right to appeal is statutory only, and a party may not appeal a trial court's judgment, order or ruling unless such is expressly made appealable by statute. [Citations.] Appeals by criminal defendants are governed by section 1237 ... ." (People v. Loper (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1155, 1159 (Loper).) Section 1237, subdivision (b) authorizes a defendant to appeal "[f]rom any order made after judgment, affecting the substantial rights of the party."
Section 1237 does not define the term "substantial rights." Moreover, the California Supreme Court has observed that "cases do not provide a comprehensive interpretation of the term 'substantial rights' as used in section 1237, subdivision (b) ... ." (Loper, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 1161, fn. 3.) In analyzing that term, however, the court has stated that "a postjudgment order 'affecting the substantial rights of the party' (§ 1237, subd. (b)) does not turn on whether that party's claim is meritorious, but instead on the nature of the claim and the court's ruling thereto." (Teal v. Superior Court (2014) 60 Cal.4th 595, 600.)
Courts have determined that a defendant's "substantial rights" within the meaning of section 1237, subdivision (b) include personal liberty interests that are implicated by, for example, compassionate release from prison due to a terminal illness, resentencing under the Three Strikes law, or the revocation of probation. (Gray v. Superior Court (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1164 (Gray) [citing cases].) "In addition, a criminal defendant's obligation to pay victim restitution for losses caused by the defendant's criminal conduct [citations] has been said to affect the defendant's substantial rights. [Citations.]" (Id. at pp. 1164-1165.)
"By contrast, courts generally do not find a defendant's substantial rights are implicated when a postjudgment order merely deprives the defendant of personal property." (Gray, supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 1165.) For example, in People v. Tuttle (1966) 242 Cal.App.2d 883, the defendant was convicted of forgery. (Id. at p. 884.) His subsequent motion for the return of personal property, including money, cigarettes, and liquor, that had been taken by the police upon his arrest was denied by the trial court. (Ibid.) On appeal, the appellate court determined that, even as to property that was used as an exhibit in the criminal action, the trial court's order denying the release of the property did "not affect any substantial right which was a subject of [the criminal] action." (Id. at p. 885.) The court reasoned that "[t]he proceeding resulting in such an order is entirely separate from the criminal proceeding as such because it does not involve in any manner the charge against defendant or his rights as affected by that charge." (Ibid.)
In this case, the trial court denied defendant's request for documents involving a lien attachment and related financial records for a potential civil lawsuit. Thus, the court's order did not affect any substantial right that was a subject of the criminal action; nor did the requested documents involve in any manner the charges against defendant or his rights as affected by those charges. (See People v. Tuttle, supra, 242 Cal.App.2d at p. 885.) That, according to defendant, the court's denial implicated his civil statutory right to the documents does not change this analysis.
In sum, the order denying the petition is not an appealable order under section 1237, subdivision (b).
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
LAVIN, Acting P. J. WE CONCUR:
EGERTON, J.
DHANIDINA, J.