Opinion
223/03.
Decided May 12, 2004.
An indictment has been filed against the defendant accusing him, inter alia, of the class E felony of Rape in the Third Degree, in violation of Penal Law § 130.25(2). The charge is that on or about and between June 20, 2003 and June 22, 2003, the defendant, who was twenty-one years old or more, engaged in sexual intercourse with another person who was less than seventeen years old.
Defendant, claiming to be aggrieved by an unlawful or improper acquisition of evidence, has moved to suppress statements made by him to the police, on the ground that they were involuntarily made within the meaning of CPL § 60.45. In addition, the defendant asserts that with respect to certain of his statements, the notice served by the People was untimely, pursuant to CPL § 710.30(1)(a).
A confession or admission is admissible at trial in this State only if its voluntariness is established by the People beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Huntley, 15 NY2d 72 (1965); People v. Whittle, 96 AD2d 542 (2nd Dept. 1983).
A pre-trial Huntley suppression hearing was conducted before me on March 24, 2004. I give full credence to the testimony of the People's witness, Detective Jacqueline McMahon. The defendant produced no witnesses.
I make the following findings of fact:
On August 12, 2003, at about 9:00 am, the defendant was brought in to the 120 precinct by the Staten Island Warrant Squad and placed into a holding cell in the Detective Squad on the third floor. He was the subject of an investigation assigned to Det. McMahon, who had informed the Warrant Squad a day earlier she was looking for the defendant, and that the defendant had an active felony warrant regarding a crime committed in Richmond County. The detective was unable to converse with the defendant, because he was "irate" and "irrational," throwing benches around his cell and yelling. She testified that the defendant was coherent, but she could not recall the substance of what the defendant was yelling. Det. McMahon called Emergency Services at about 10:00 am. Emergency Services arrived at about 10:30 am, but, unable to calm the defendant, placed him in handcuffs. The defendant was brought to central booking on the second floor to be fingerprinted and photographed, but the defendant refused. Emergency Services then escorted the defendant to the first floor of the precinct, where he was placed in another cell. Det. McMahon testified that the defendant "flooded out the cells" by "stuff[ing] the toilet" and that he had defecated into a cup and threw it outside his cell. At approximately between 2:00-3:00 pm, the detective called for an ambulance to transport the defendant to the hospital. Det. McMahon accompanied the defendant — who was restrained with handcuffs and leg shackles — in the ambulance. She stated that the defendant made no statements in the ambulance.
Upon their arrival at Bayley Seton Hospital, Det. McMahon waited in the emergency room with the defendant. She testified that the defendant "calmed down right away once we got to the hospital," and asked the detective "what [she] was arresting him for." Det. McMahon replied, "for a rape case," whereupon the defendant stated, "yeah, I know, I fucked up." The detective testified that she did not speak to any doctor at the hospital, nor was she given any hospital paperwork regarding the defendant, but that she was told "they gave [the defendant] a shot to calm him down." The defendant was released to the detective's custody after a couple of hours spent at the hospital, and she transported the defendant back to the 120 precinct at about 6:00 pm.
At about 6:45 pm, the detective read Miranda warnings (People's Ex. 1) to the defendant. She was in a room with the defendant, who was handcuffed to a bar, but she was not sure whether the defendant was wearing leg shackles. She testified that the defendant was not falling asleep, and that he was calm and speaking rationally. The defendant did not have slurred speech or dazed or watery eyes, and was able to ascend three flights of stairs under his own power and had no trouble walking. She did not threaten or make any promises to the defendant. The defendant indicated that he understood each question, and initialed each question on the Miranda sheet, which he and Det. McMahon signed at the bottom. The defendant indicated he would speak with the detective and agreed to write out a statement, which he and the detective also signed (People's Ex. 2). The detective stated that the defendant did not ask for an attorney, nor did she try to determine whether the defendant had an attorney in connection with his warrant case.
I make the following conclusions of law:
At the conclusion of Det. McMahon's direct testimony, defense counsel moved for preclusion of the oral statement made by the defendant while in the emergency room area at the hospital, to wit, "yeah, I know, I fucked up," on the basis that the People failed to provide notice of their intent to introduce such statement as evidence at trial, pursuant to CPL § 710.30(1)(a). The Court reserved decision on this issue, and proceeded with the hearing. The Court notes that although the defendant was clearly in custody at the time he uttered his remark, the defendant was not the subject of any interrogation by the police, and therefore no Miranda warnings were required. While waiting to be seen by a doctor, the defendant, in a calm and apparently coherent manner, asked Det. McMahon what he was being arrested for. The detective's reply, "for a rape case," was made in response to the defendant's question, and was merely informative. It was not coercive or designed to elicit incriminating statements from the defendant. See, e.g., People v. Harrison, 251 A.D.2d 681 (2nd Dept.), lv denied, 92 NY2d 898 (1998); People v. Troisi, 224 A.D.2d 559 (2nd Dept.), lv denied, 88 NY2d 887 (1996); People v. Simmons, 210 A.D.2d 441 (2nd Dept. 1994); lv denied, 85 NY2d 866 (1995). The defendant's oral statement was voluntarily and spontaneously made, was not the product of coercion by the police, and was not made in response to any questions. Nevertheless, as the Court of Appeals stated in People v. Chase, 85 NY2d 493 (1995):
It is for the court and not the parties to determine whether a statement is truly voluntary or is one in which the actions of the police are the functional equivalent of interrogation causing the statement to be made. . . . In People v. Greer, 42 N.Y.2d 170 . . . we noted that the CPL 710.30(1)(a) notice need not be served on a defendant where "there is no question of voluntariness". . . . Since the statement here was made to a law enforcement official and the defendant had the right to have the court review the circumstances under which the statement was given and to determine its voluntariness, including whether it was truly spontaneous or the functional equivalent of interrogation . . ., defendant was entitled to notice under CPL 710.30(1)(a).
Id. at 500 (citations omitted; emphasis added).
In Chase, after being placed in the rear of a police vehicle while a criminal investigation proceeded, the defendant made a statement to a police officer in the vehicle without prompting. Here, as in Chase, it cannot be said that, with respect to the defendant's oral statement, "there is no question of voluntariness." Indeed, under the totality of the circumstances presented herein, especially in light of the testimony regarding the defendant's behavior at the 120 precinct over a period of several hours and consequent trip to the hospital, as well as the fact that this statement was made to a law enforcement official, the Court finds that the defendant was entitled to notice of and a hearing on the voluntariness of this statement. The issue of the voluntariness of the oral statement (made prior to the defendant receiving a "shot" at the hospital) in the instant case involves whether or not the defendant's will was overborne due to his physical and emotional condition ( see, discussion regarding the defendant's written statement, infra), thereby rendering it involuntary. Thus, as timely notice of this statement was not provided pursuant to CPL § 710.30(1)(a), and as the People have not demonstrated any good cause for the delay in disclosure, this statement must be precluded. See, People v. Chase, supra at 498-500; People v. O'Doherty, 70 NY2d 479 (1987); compare, People v. St. Martine, 160 AD2d 35 (1st Dept.), lv denied, 76 NY2d 990 (1990); People v. Brown, 140 AD2d 266 (1st Dept.), lv denied, 72 NY2d 955 (1988). Contrary to the People's contention, that the defendant's "written statement . . . was basically in sum and substance the same thing that was said in the hospital," such that the failure to give notice of the oral statement should be excused, the Court finds that, not only were the defendant's oral and written statement not "`part and parcel of the single interview of defendant'" by the detective, having been made by the defendant hours apart, but also that these two statements are not substantially the same. See, People v. Cooper, 78 NY2d 476, 484 (1991) (citation omitted); People v. Gilman, 194 AD2d 737 (2nd Dept.), lv denied, 82 NY2d 718 (1993). Thus, the defendant's motion for preclusion of the oral statement he made to Det. McMahon at the hospital on August 12, 2003, is granted.
Parenthetically, at the hearing, and in their brief, the People withdrew their intention to offer evidence at trial of the defendant's other alleged oral statement, i.e., "Is this for the knife incident? How much time am I looking at?", which was noticed in the People's Voluntary Disclosure Form dated August 15, 2003, as being made by the defendant to Det. McMahon at Bayley Seton Hospital on August 13, 2003. Thus, any issue with respect to such statement is not before the Court. As no evidence regarding this alleged oral statement was adduced at the hearing, any argument that it was "part and parcel of the same conversation" which produced the defendant's August 12, 2003, oral statement at issue is pure speculation.
The defendant also contends that the written statement he made to the police should be suppressed. Here, there is no dispute that the defendant was in custody, and that the defendant was given Miranda warnings at about 6:45 pm, prior to his interrogation by Det. McMahon on August 12, 2003, at the 120 precinct. The credible evidence adduced at the hearing indicates that at the time warnings were given, the defendant was calm, did not have slurred speech or dazed or watery eyes. He was able to ascend three flights of stairs under his own power and had no trouble walking, and he was able to converse with the detective in an intelligible, coherent fashion. Moreover, Det. McMahon testified that the defendant understood what she said to him, and that she has had the opportunity to observe individuals who have ingested drugs, and also individuals in a drug-induced state. No threats or promises were made to the defendant to induce any statements. The Court finds that Miranda warnings were properly administered to the defendant before the questioning took place, and that the defendant voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently waived his rights. People v. Yukl, 25 NY2d 585, cert denied, 400 US 851 (1970); People v. Rose, 187 AD2d 617 (2nd Dept. 1992), lv denied, 81 NY2d 976 (1993); People v. Love, 85 AD2d 799 (3rd Dept. 1981), aff'd, 57 NY2d 998 (1982). Although the defendant's "irate" and "irrational" behavior upon being brought into the 120 precinct prevented the police from fingerprinting or photographing the defendant, and prompted the police to transport him to the hospital where he received an apparently doctor prescribed "shot" to calm him down, there is no admissible evidence before the Court regarding the actual medication used, or its nature and effects, or, more importantly, that the defendant was so intoxicated by whatever medication had been administered to him, or so overwrought by emotion, that his will was overborne such that he was incapable of voluntarily waiving his rights or resisting interrogation. Simply put, under the totality of the facts and circumstances presented herein, the Court finds that at the time the defendant made his written statement, his condition did not render him incapable of waiving his rights or comprehending the import of such waiver and his statement. See, People v. Schompert, 19 NY2d 300, cert denied, 389 US 874 (1967); People v. Bell, 131 AD2d 859 (2nd Dept.), lv denied, 70 NY2d 749 (1987); People v. Sargent, 194 AD2d 865 (3rd Dept. 1993); compare, People v. Moore, 23 NY2d 673 (1968), cert denied, 396 US 911 (1969); People v. Boyce, AD3d, 2003 WL 21361757 (Sup.Ct. Kings Co.). Thus, the written statement made by the defendant will not be suppressed.
Contrary to defense counsel's conclusory claim, that the defendant "was treated [at the hospital] for disorganized behavior and sedated with Holdol and Benadryl," no admissible evidence was presented at the hearing concerning the nature of the defendant's diagnosis or medical treatment. Additionally, there is no evidence to support counsel's assertion that the defendant was "acting in a maniacal manner due to intoxication on angel dust, necessitating medical treatment where he was given mind altering drugs and sedatives. . . ."
Finally, although not raised by defense counsel in his brief, the Court notes that the fact that there was an active felony warrant in Richmond County for the defendant's arrest, prior to the defendant's arrest in the instant, unrelated case, does not compel the conclusion that the defendant's written statement must be suppressed. Here, there is no evidence that the defendant's right to counsel had attached, such that any statement obtained could be considered to have been procured in violation of such right. See, generally, People v. Ramos, 99 NY2d 27 (2002); People v. Bing, 76 NY2d 331 (1990); compare, People v. Ridgeway, 64 NY2d 952 (1985).
Accordingly, the defendant's Huntley motion is denied as indicated herein, and his motion made at the hearing for preclusion of his oral statement is granted.
The foregoing constitutes the opinion, decision and order of the Court.