Opinion
D074828
02-14-2020
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JESUS C. PEREZ, Defendant and Appellant.
Elisabeth A. Bowman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Michael Pulos and Seth M. Friedman for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. SCD274342) APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Runston G. Maino, Judge. Affirmed. Elisabeth A. Bowman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Michael Pulos and Seth M. Friedman for Plaintiff and Respondent.
A jury found defendant Jesus C. Perez guilty of driving under the influence causing injury (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (a)), and driving with a blood alcohol concentration of .08 or more causing injury (id., subd. (b)); and found true he injured more than one victim (id., § 23558), had a blood alcohol concentration of at least .15 percent (id., § 23578), and personally inflicted great bodily injury. (Pen. Code, §§ 1192.7, subd (c)(8) & 12022.7, subd. (a).) The court sentenced defendant to time served plus five years of probation.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless noted otherwise.
On appeal, defendant claims the court abused its discretion in denying his new trial motion because the court's finding that defendant was the driver of one of the two vehicles involved in a traffic collision allegedly was unsupported by sufficient evidence. As we explain, we conclude the court properly exercised its broad discretion in independently reweighing the evidence and the credibility of witnesses, and determining sufficient evidence supported the jury's findings that defendant was the driver of one of the vehicles involved in, and was under the influence at the time of, the collision. Affirmed.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
We summarize the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment. (See People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 690.)
Paramedic Ken Foster testified he and his partner were the first, or one of the first, to respond at about 2:30 a.m. on November 4, 2017, to a traffic collision on the Interstate 15 overpass of State Route 56. Foster testified that upon arrival, they saw two vehicles, one with three male occupants, including defendant, and another with a single female occupant. Because they were one of the first responders at the scene and there was, according to Foster, "50 things to do," he found the scene "chaotic" because he was "only one person. So [he had] to figure out what need[ed] to be done first, and who need[ed] to be treated first."
As a result of damage from the collision, Foster found neither door to the vehicle with the three occupants would open. Foster tried to make contact with the occupants of that vehicle, but found none "were[] really responding." Foster thus had to wait for emergency personnel to pry open the vehicle's doors before he could render assistance. Recognizing there were multiple victims, Foster called for backup medical units.
According to Foster, emergency personnel from Poway Fire first opened the front passenger door of the vehicle with the three occupants, identified as a Toyota Scion. Foster, who happened to be standing near the gurney adjacent to the passenger door, helped extricate the front seat passenger from the vehicle, place him on a backboard, and then load him into the "Carmel Mountain medic unit's ambulance" for transport to the hospital. Foster was certain that the front seat passenger was the first occupant from the Scion to be extricated. Foster next went around to the driver's side of the Scion, and saw the door had been opened. Foster then helped load the Scion driver onto the gurney for transport to the hospital.
When asked whether any of the three males in the Scion were wearing seat belts, Foster testified he was "a hundred percent" certain the passenger in the back seat was not wearing a restraint. When asked if the vehicle's driver was wearing a seat belt, Foster noted his report, which he prepared shortly after the accident, stated the driver was restrained. After again reviewing his report, Foster's recalled that he accompanied the driver of the Scion in the ambulance to the hospital; that the driver had a "small laceration to his right wrist"; and that the driver had no other visible injuries or trauma. Foster used the driver's identification to determine his name, who Foster identified in his report and at trial as defendant.
As noted post, there is conflicting testimony regarding whether the back seat passenger was wearing a restraint.
California Highway Patrol (CHP) Officer Ryan Sanchez (R. Sanchez) testified (after an Evid. Code, § 402 hearing) that he was on duty in the early morning hours of November 4, 2017; that he and his partner, Officer Jason Sanchez (J. Sanchez), responded to a call of a two-vehicle collision at the overpass of State Route 56 and Interstate 15; that on arrival, they saw two vehicles at an intersection, including one vehicle with three males trapped inside; that he and his partner were the first officers to arrive on scene; and that he was the "investigating officer," while his partner was the "backup officer." Officer R. Sanchez confirmed the three men were riding in a two-door Toyota Scion, while the other vehicle was a Volvo being driven by a female occupant.
After parking their patrol vehicle and making sure the scene was safe from other traffic, Officer R. Sanchez first approached the driver's side door of the Scion and tapped on the window, which was "all the way up." Officer R. Sanchez testified that he then was only focused on the driver of the Scion because it helped him "visually recognize and remember" this individual; that he got a "good look" at the Scion driver when he went up to the driver's side window; and that the driver was a Hispanic male, with "short hair" and facial hair.
Officer R. Sanchez estimated he knocked for about 10 seconds on the driver-side window, but the driver just stared at him, at one point moving his eyes. Officer R. Sanchez testified the driver of the Scion was wearing a seat belt. Officer R. Sanchez noticed the Scion had front-end damage and "pretty major damage" to the passenger side of the vehicle.
While fire department personnel worked to pry open the Scion doors, Officer R. Sanchez contacted the driver of the Volvo, Sharon D. She complained of pain to her arms and ankles, and was crying. Officer R. Sanchez observed front-end damage to the Volvo. Based on his assessment of the damage to the two vehicles, Officer R. Sanchez initially concluded the front end of the Volvo collided with the front-end/passenger side of the Scion.
At some point, Officer R. Sanchez saw the driver of the Scion had been extricated from the vehicle and was on a gurney on the driver's side of the vehicle. Officer R. Sanchez estimated it took about five to 10 minutes for fire department personnel to extricate the driver from the Scion. Officer R. Sanchez recognized the individual on the gurney as the driver of the Scion because this was the same individual the officer had observed sitting behind the steering wheel when he attempted to make contact with the driver.
Officer R. Sanchez obtained the driver's passport and "three plastic card[s], ID cards, Mexico ID cards" from another CHP officer on scene. Using the picture identification taken from the driver, Officer R. Sanchez "matched" the identification to the "actual person," who was the same individual Officer R. Sanchez had seen sitting in the driver's seat of the Scion. Officer R. Sanchez testified that the driver's name was "Jesus de Nair Castillo Perez"; and that he was "[a]bsolutely certain" this individual—defendant in the instant case—had been sitting in the driver's seat of the Scion when he and his partner arrived on scene.
About 20 minutes after the Scion driver had been transported by ambulance to the hospital, Officer R. Sanchez left the accident scene to contact the driver. Once in the trauma room at the hospital, using the driver's passport Officer R. Sanchez again confirmed the name of the Scion driver, which identification also matched the person Officer R. Sanchez had seen in the driver's seat. Officer R. Sanchez testified that, even without the passport, he was "mentally sure" that the individual in the trauma room was in fact the driver of the Scion, whom the officer "[i]mediately" recognized upon entering the room. Officer R. Sanchez noted this individual was then conscious and dressed in a hospital gown.
Officer R. Sanchez in English asked this individual, "Are you Jesus?" to which the man responded in English, "Yes." Officer R. Sanchez then asked the man a series of questions about the collision, including "where [they were] coming from, what lane he was in, how fast he was going, where he [was] head[ed] to, if he was driving, [and was] that his car."
Based on the man's responses, which Officer R. Sanchez found entirely appropriate, the officer determined the man understood the questions being asked of him, despite just being involved in the collision. Although the man could not remember many of the details leading up to the collision, he stated he was the "regular driver of the Scion." The man then confirmed that he lived at the same address as provided on the Scion's registration, which was on Clairemont Drive in San Diego. Officer R. Sanchez then asked the man whether he was driving the Scion at the time of the accident. According to Officer R. Sanchez, the man without difficulty immediately responded "yes."
During the hospital interview, Officer R. Sanchez noticed the man had a "seat belt mark on his upper-left shoulder, or the lower portion of his neck, right were the seat belt would run across [his] body, a driver's seat belt anyway." (Italics added.) According to Officer R. Sanchez, if the man had been restrained in the passenger side of the Scion, he would have expected the man to have a seat belt mark, if any, on the right side of his body. Officer R. Sanchez described the "seat belt mark" as similar to a "rug burn" or a bruise, with a "discoloration of skin." Based on his training and experience, Officer R. Sanchez determined the location of the seat belt mark on the man was yet another indicator that the man had been driving the Scion when the collision occurred.
During their conversation, Officer R. Sanchez detected the odor of alcohol on the man's person and breath, and saw the man's eyes were red and watery. Based on his training and experience, Officer R. Sanchez determined these symptoms were consistent with alcohol consumption. As a result, Officer R. Sanchez next asked the man a series of "pre-field sobriety questions" in connection with a DUI investigation.
The man in response claimed that he was neither sick nor diabetic nor epileptic, nor had any physical impairments; that he was not taking any medications; and that the Scion had been in working order at the time of the collision. Officer R. Sanchez again asked the man if he had been driving the Scion at the time of the collision, and the man again replied "Yes." At no time during the interview did the man deny being the driver of the Scion at the time of the collision.
The man also told Officer R. Sanchez during the hospital interview that he had been driving "[h]ome" when the collision took place. The man then admitted he had been drinking alcohol before the accident, claiming he had consumed three beers. However, the man could not recall when he started and stopped drinking the beer, and denied feeling any "effects" from his alcohol consumption.
Because of the severity of the accident, Officer R. Sanchez decided not to make the man stand and participate in field sobriety tests. Instead, Officer R. Sanchez used a preliminary alcohol screening device to determine whether the man was under the influence of alcohol. Officer R. Sanchez testified that he received training at the academy regarding the use of this device; that he routinely used the device in connection with his duties as an officer in determining whether a person was driving under the influence; that the device was "[r]elatively easy" to use, as a person merely needed to blow into a mouthpiece until told to stop; and that to ensure accuracy, he required a person give at least two samples with the device.
The man submitted to the test. Before administering it, Officer R. Sanchez ensured the device was properly working. The man's two samples, taken within minutes of each other, came back with a preliminary blood alcohol reading of .196 and .194, or more than twice the .08 legal limit. Based on these numbers, Officer R. Sanchez concluded the man had been driving under the influence of alcohol at the time of the collision. Officer R. Sanchez advised the man he was under arrest and was required to take a mandatory blood test to determine his "actual blood alcohol concentration." The man agreed, and submitted to a blood test collected at 4:17 a.m. that same morning by a mobile phlebotomist.
A criminalist with the San Diego County Sheriff's Regional Crime Lab testified defendant's blood alcohol level when drawn was .196. Using a calculation method called "retrograde extrapolation," the criminalist was able to estimate defendant's blood alcohol level at about 2:20 a.m., when the collision occurred. The criminalist opined defendant's blood alcohol at that earlier time was between .20 and .25. Based on defendant's gender and weight, the criminalist further opined that defendant had consumed between six and 12 "standard drinks," measured at the time of the collision.
As noted ante, CHP Officer J. Sanchez also testified at trial. He was working with his partner Officer R. Sanchez in the early morning hours of November 4, 2017 when they responded to the State Route 56 overpass area of Interstate 15, after a report of a collision between two vehicles. Working as the "backup officer," once on scene Officer J. Sanchez found three male occupants in the Toyota Scion and a female occupant in the Volvo. Because he was backup, Officer J. Sanchez did not prepare an investigation report.
Officer J. Sanchez contacted the driver of the Volvo at the collision scene, and later contacted at the hospital the backseat passenger of the Scion, whom the officer identified as Jose Guadalupe Aguilar Zarate. Officer J. Sanchez further testified he used his personal cellphone to take pictures of the identification taken from the occupants of the Scion. Although he typically did not use personal equipment such as a cellphone while on duty, Officer J. Sanchez testified he made an "exception" in this case because the men's identification were all from another country, and he was unsure how to read and understand the addresses on their identification. Officer J. Sanchez then submitted the pictures to Officer R. Sanchez for use in the latter's report.
Neither Zarate nor the other occupant in the Scion, Adan Aguilar, testified at trial, despite the attempts of the People to locate, notify, and subpoena them. During the trial and outside the presence of the jury, in addressing this issue the prosecutor informed the court that neither Zarate nor Aguilar wanted to testify because they were "undocumented immigrants" and were concerned they would be "deported."
Christina E. testified she was familiar with the State Route 56 overpass at Interstate 15 because she passed by there every day for work, including in the early morning hours of November 4, 2017. At about 2:20 a.m. while stopped at a light, Christina saw a collision between two vehicles. According to Christina, the Volvo was heading east and the Scion was "heading towards kind of south." When asked to explain what she meant, Christina stated she saw the Scion make "an illegal turn" by "trying to get onto the 15-South on-ramp," despite the fact the lane was "marked as a no turning lane." Christina saw the Scion make a left-hand turn and impact the Volvo.
After the collision, Christina stopped her vehicle and called 911. Christina approached the Scion and saw it was "totaled." Inside Christina initially saw only the driver and a passenger in the front seat. She then made her way to the Volvo, and saw only one occupant in the vehicle. After talking to the female in the Volvo, Christina went back to the Scion and tried, but was unable, to open the vehicle's doors.
Christina, who was still on the phone with dispatch, testified the passenger side of the Scion had the most damage, although the front end of the vehicle was also damaged. Christina saw the passenger in the front seat was bleeding and was trying to climb out the vehicle window, which had been shattered by the impact. Christina noticed the driver of the Scion was unconscious. Based on the dispatcher's instructions, Christina told the passenger in the front seat not to move. The passenger, however, continued his attempt to climb out the vehicle window.
Christina did not see the third passenger in the backseat of the Scion until another good Samaritan stopped and shined a flashlight into the vehicle. Christina saw the backseat passenger was not moving, and was bleeding from a "big gash" on his face. Christina waited at the scene for paramedics and law enforcement to arrive.
Sharon also testified at trial. In the early morning hours on November 4, 2017, Sharon was driving home in her Volvo on State Route 56 after working a late shift at a restaurant in Del Mar. As she was heading east she saw lights all of the sudden and then her Volvo was struck on the driver's side by another vehicle. Initially, Sharon saw the other vehicle was going very fast, but believed it was traveling straight, when it suddenly turned and slammed into her vehicle, causing its airbags to deploy.
Sharon testified the force of the impact caused a piece of the Volvo's dash to lodge into her right groin area. Thirteen staples were required to close the wound, which left a scar about four inches long. Sharon also testified that immediately after the crash, she could not move her right leg, her left wrist was injured, and she was in shock and in pain, including on her face from the impact of the airbag. Subsequent tests showed Sharon's ankle and wrist were broken. Sharon's ankle required surgery, and her wrist was in a cast for about two months. Sharon further testified she was in "severe amount of pain" after the collision; and, at the time of trial, was still having some problems as a result of her injuries, including swelling to her surgically repaired ankle.
Dylan Dabasinskas of the San Diego Fire-Rescue Department was working at Fire Station 33 when San Diego Fire responded to the early morning collision involving the Scion and the Volvo. Dabasinskas testified that he personally worked on opening the driver's side door of the Scion using what he referred to as a "Holmatro tool"; that it took about 10 minutes to open; that as he worked to pry open the door, he asked a series of questions to the driver, who merely shook his head in response; that as San Diego Fire worked on the driver's side door, Poway Fire worked to open the passenger side door; and that after opening the driver's side door, Dabasinskas was able to "coach" the driver out of the vehicle, such that the driver—with some assistance—"was able to stand, pivot, and get onto a gurney." Once the driver was out of the Scion, Dabasinskas and his team worked to extricate the back seat passenger, who had significant injuries. Dabasinskas recalled all three occupants of the Scion were wearing their restraints at the time of the collision.
As noted ante, there was conflicting evidence whether the backseat passenger was wearing a seatbelt when the collision occurred.
Dabasinskas noted a strong odor of alcohol in the Scion, including from its driver. Dabasinskas did not see any "visible injuries" to the driver, nor was the driver bleeding. At trial, Dabasinskas identified defendant as the driver of the Scion, noting he got a "good look" at the driver's face as the driver was "just . . . sitting there with—with his arms on the steering wheel and just staring straight ahead, nodding his head to [Dabasinskas's questions] for approximately five to ten minutes that [they] were working to get him out of the car." Dabasinskas noted the driver had short hair and a mustache, and looked as if he had not shaven for a few days. When asked if he was certain that the person he had identified in court as defendant was the driver of the Scion, Dabasinskas stated "100 percent."
Dabasinskas testified that at the time of the accident, he was relatively new on the job and thus, this accident "kind of stood out to [him]." The accident was also memorable for Dabasinskas because he testified San Diego Fire should not have been dispatched to respond to the call, as the accident took place in an area covered by other responders.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
As noted ante, following the jury's guilty verdicts and true findings on the enhancements, defendant moved for a new trial under section 1181. As relevant to this appeal, defendant claimed there was insufficient evidence to support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that he was the driver of the Scion at the time of the collision. In support of his motion, defendant argued that the testimony of Officer R. Sanchez was neither credible nor trustworthy, and that Dabasinskas's identification of defendant as the driver of the Scion was also not credible.
The record shows defendant never claimed to be the back seat passenger, but rather that he was the passenger in the front seat of the Scion.
The People opposed the motion, arguing that defendant twice admitted to Officer R. Sanchez during the hospital interview that he was the driver of the Scion. The People also argued that the "physical evidence, the collision damage, the fact that [defendant had] no injury where he should have [had] an injury if he [was] the front passenger, the eyewitness ID from both the officer and the firefighter, the fact that nobody left the car, the fact that everybody was pinned in the car until the firefighters pulled them out," when taken together, was sufficient credible evidence to support the jury's findings that defendant was the driver of the Scion and was under the influence at the time of the collision.
At the hearing on the new trial motion, the court was critical of the CHP's investigation of the collision involving the Scion and Volvo, at one point calling it both "incompetent" and "pathetic." The court found Foster was not a "reliable" witness, as he stated the wrong side of the Scion had been damaged and he could not remember how he obtained defendant's identification. The court also was critical of Officer R. Sanchez's failure to use his personal cellphone to take a picture of the occupants of the Scion when he and his partner arrived on scene, as that would have solved "a lot of the problems" at trial. The court also did not find Dabasinskas to be a "particularly reliable" witness.
However, the court did find that Officer R. Sanchez's hospital interview of defendant was "fine" and not "unreliable"; that the circumstantial evidence regarding defendant's injuries, or lack thereof, supported a finding defendant was not the front seat passenger in the Scion, as he claimed, inasmuch as the passenger side of the vehicle sustained the most damage; and that, although there was conflicting testimony by the officers, that conflict did mean the officers were lying. In fact, while the court was critical of the investigation by the CHP, as noted, the court also found it was not "disregarding entirely the investigation [by CHP] at the scene."
After hearing argument from counsel, and (correctly) recognizing it was not bound by the jury's determination regarding the weight to be accorded to the evidence or the credibility of the witnesses, but instead was to review independently all the evidence, the court denied the new trial motion. In so doing, the court found there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's guilty verdicts and true findings on the enhancements, based on the jury's determination that defendant was in fact the driver of the Scion at the time of the collision. The court noted if this case had been a bench trial, the evidence "met the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt" and thus, under this circumstance it too would have returned guilty verdicts against defendant.
DISCUSSION
A. Guiding Principles
We review the trial court's denial of a motion for a new trial for an abuse of discretion. (People v. Fuiava (2012) 53 Cal.4th 622, 730 (Fuiava); People v. Watts (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 102, 115 (Watts).) The trial court "has broad discretion in ruling on a new trial motion, and the court's ruling will not be overturned absent a clear and unmistakable abuse of that discretion." (People v. Carter (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 322, 328 (Carter); accord, Fuiava, at p. 730.)
However, a trial court will be deemed to have abused its discretion if it "misconceives its duty, applies an incorrect legal standard, or fails to independently consider the weight of the evidence." (Carter, supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at p. 328; accord, People v. Robarge (1953) 41 Cal.2d 628, 634 [finding the trial court abused its discretion in denying motion for new trial where it disbelieved much of eyewitness's testimony, but incorrectly concluded that it "was bound by the contrary conclusion of the jury" and that the jurors were the sole judges of witness credibility]; Watts, supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at pp. 111, 115 [finding the trial court abused its discretion in denying motion for new trial with respect to a gang enhancement allegation because the court did not independently review the evidence, but instead incorrectly concluded it was not required to reweigh the evidence].)
As relevant here, section 1181, subdivision 6 (hereinafter, section 1181(6)), provides a trial court may grant a new trial " '[w]hen the verdict or finding is contrary to law or evidence.' " "The court extends no evidentiary deference in ruling on a [section] 1181(6) motion for new trial. Instead, it independently examines all the evidence to determine whether it is sufficient to prove each required element beyond a reasonable doubt to the judge, who sits, in effect, as a '13th juror.' " (Porter v. Superior Court (2009) 47 Cal.4th 125, 133 (Porter); accord, Watts, supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at p. 112; Carter, supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at p. 327.) "If the court is not convinced that the charges have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, it may rule that the jury's verdict is 'contrary to [the] . . . evidence.' [Citations.] In doing so, the judge acts as a 13th juror who is a 'holdout' for acquittal. Thus, the grant of a section 1181(6) motion is the equivalent of a mistrial caused by a hung jury." (Porter, at p. 133.)
Although, in considering a motion for a new trial, a trial court must be "guided by a presumption in favor of the correctness of the verdict" (Fuiava, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 729), " 'this means only that the court may not arbitrarily reject a verdict which is supported by substantial evidence.' " (Watts, supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at p. 112; accord, Carter, supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at p. 328 [recognizing that the "presumption that the verdict is correct . . . does not affect the court's duty to apply its independent determination to the probative value of the evidence"]; People v. Dickens (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1245, 1252 [same].) The trial court " 'is not bound by the jury's determinations as to the credibility of witnesses or as to the weight or effect to be accorded to the evidence. [Citations.] . . . If the court finds that the evidence is not sufficiently probative to sustain the verdict, it must order a new trial.' " (Watts, at p. 112; accord, Carter, at p. 328.)
B. Analysis
We conclude the court properly exercised its broad discretion under section 1181(6) when it independently reviewed the credibility of witnesses and the evidence, and determined there was sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the offenses and enhancements. (See Porter, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 133.) We further conclude substantial record evidence supports the court's findings, including that defendant was the driver of the Scion, and was under the influence, when the collision occurred.
Indeed, the record shows both Officer R. Sanchez and firefighter Dabasinskas testified they were 100 percent certain that defendant was the driver of the Scion when the collision took place. Officer R. Sanchez specifically testified that he was "focused" on the driver of the Scion when he arrived on scene; that he got a "good look" at the driver, whom he later identified as defendant, when he tapped on the driver's side window for about 10 seconds, in an attempt to make contact with defendant driver; that the identification, including a passport, he obtained from another officer at the scene matched the identity of the driver he personally saw sitting behind the wheel of the Scion, a vehicle in which the occupants—including defendant driver—were "trapped"; that defendant twice admitted during the hospital interview that he was the driver of the Scion, as defendant claimed he was driving "home" when the collision took place; and that defendant's injuries, or lack thereof, observed by Officer R. Sanchez at the hospital and other witnesses were consistent with defendant being the driver, as defendant had a seat belt mark on his upper-left shoulder, and unlike the other two occupants in the vehicle, was relatively uninjured in the collision. This record evidence alone is more than sufficient to support the court's findings sitting as a "13th juror." (See Porter, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 133; People v. Vega (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 706, 711 [noting the "testimony of one witness, if believed, is sufficient to prove any fact"].)
But that's not all. Dabasinskas testified that he personally was responsible for prying open the driver's side door to extricate the driver from the Scion; that he attempted to interact with the driver for about five to 10 minutes as he worked to free him; that he was only focused on the driver of the Scion and not the passenger in the Scion, because Poway Fire was separately working to open the passenger side door of the vehicle; and, as noted, that he was 100 percent certain defendant was sitting in the driver's seat of the Scion immediately after the collision. This testimony buttresses our conclusion that there was ample evidence to support the findings of the trial court in denying defendant's motion for new trial under section 1181(6).
That there was conflicting testimony by witnesses, including the officers and/or the paramedic on scene, and/or that the CHP's investigation of the collision was less than perfect, and perhaps even "incompetent," including as a result of the lack of any photographs of the occupants trapped in the Scion, does not change our decision in this case. As a court of review, we do not reweigh the evidence or resolve evidentiary conflicts (see People v. Valenti (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 1140, 1157-1158); and we are bound by the principle that the testimony of a single witness will be sufficient to uphold a conviction, "even when there is significant countervailing evidence, or [such] testimony is subject to justifiable suspicion." (Ibid.)
In sum, because substantial evidence supports the court's findings beyond a reasonable doubt, and because the trial court's ruling denying defendant's new trial motion did not amount to a "manifest and unmistakable abuse" of that court's discretion (see People v. Bonilla (2018) 29 Cal.App.4th 5th 649, 659), we reject this claim of error.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
BENKE, Acting P. J. WE CONCUR:
IRION, J.
DATO, J.