Opinion
47-2011.
Decided July 8, 2011.
Sullivan Legal Aid Panel, Inc., Monticello, NY, By: Stephan Schick, Esq., of counsel, Attorney for Defendant.
Hon. James R. Farrell, Sullivan County District Attorney, Lawrence H. Cooke Sullivan County Courthouse, Monticello, NY, Attorney for the People.
This matter comes before the Court decision following a Huntley hearing held on May 31, 2011.
At the conclusion of the hearing, it was agreed that written submissions would be made by both parties. The defendant submitted his written argument on June 17, 2011. The People submitted their written argument on June 23, 2011.
On the night of January 15, 2011, Town of Fallsburg Police Officer Jim Gibson, and other officers, were dispatched to an apartment complex in response to a 911 call about a stabbing in that area. After a brief conversation a female bystander at that location gave Officer Gibson a description of the alleged perpetrator and stated that he was behind one of the buildings.
Officer Gibson searched behind one of the apartment building and came upon an individual who matched said description. Upon being brought to the front of the building, a civilian identified the individual (now the defendant) as the person who had stabbed the victim.
The defendant was taken into police custody on January 15, 2011 at around 10:50 P.M. by Officer Gibson. After being handcuffed and placed in a patrol cruiser, the defendant was taken to an interview room at the Fallsburg Police Department.
A small room with no windows.
The defendant first received his Miranda warnings at1:02 A.M. on January 16, 2011. Through the use of a Spanish interpreter, Fallsburg Detective Travis Hartman advised the defendant of his rights by reading from his Miranda card. Thereafter, through an interpreter, the defendant indicated that he understood his rights. He did not ask for an attorney and continued to speak with the police with the interpreter present.
The defendant continued to be interrogated about the stabbing in three intervals. Each interrogation was conducted in the Fallsburg Police Station, by Fallsburg police officers, while the defendant remained in custody and in the presence of an interpreter. The first interrogation was held from about 1:05 A.M. to 1:55 A.M., the second from around 2:15 A.M. to 2:50 A.M. and the third from approximately 4:20 A.M. to 4:55 A.M. During all three of these interrogation sessions, the defendant denied any knowledge or involvement in the stabbing incident.
At about 5:06 A.M. the defendant was moved from the interrogation room and placed in a holding cell. While in the holding cell interrogation ceased and the defendant was given food and access to a bathroom. Interrogation resumed when the defendant was returned to the interrogation room around 7:42 A.M.
Interrogation continued with a break for breakfast and another for a drink. This session was preserved electronically, as was the next interview, as per People's exhibit #1 admitted into evidence on consent.
The Fallsburg Police deferred their questioning to Investigator William Young of the New York State Police, at about 12:45 P.M. on January 16, 2011. Investigator Young, a fluent Spanish speaker, began to speak with the defendant about the stabbing. Investigator Young was aware that the defendant had previously been given his Miranda warnings and began questioning the defendant without any further Miranda warnings. This interaction was recorded, and was the first time a Spanish-speaking police officer had conversed directly with the defendant while in custody, without the aid of an interpreter.
While initially identifying himself as "Detective Young of the State Police," Investigator Young took to a more unique approach in questioning the defendant. Young told the defendant that:
"I am going to help you look for the truth. And thank God, that you have this time now. Because He is watching us. If you don't want to tell me you're sorry, say sorry to that man up there. Because He is watching all of us. He sent me to talk to you. He sent me to give you a chance to explain why. Because if not, we have the words of all those other people, and that man that's looking at this case, the lawyer that is looking at this case, is going to think that you are a monster."
Later on in the interview, Investigator Young also stated that he had spoken with his boss, and that: "right now you are talking to me those are your words. Ask him, ask you, that I have a machine, a recorder. I will put it on T.V. of the table and we are going to talk about the same things that you told me. So the lawyer, can hear your voice, saying that if you could change time and that you're sorry, and all of that. You don't have to do it. But I have to give you a chance to do that."
Investigator Young spoke with the defendant for about an hour. During the interrogation session with Investigator Young, the defendant finally admitted to stabbing the victim multiple times with a knife.
The first issue is the voluntariness of the defendant's confession. A statement by a defendant is "involuntary" when it is obtained "by the use or threatened use of physical force upon the defendant or another person, or by means of any other improper conduct or undue pressure which impaired the defendant's physical or mental condition to the extent of undermining his ability to make a choice whether or not to make a statement." CPL § 60.45(2)(a).
The fact that the defendant was not re-read his Miranda rights before Investigator Young began his questioning does not invalidate the defendant's prior waiver of his Miranda rights when they were first administered upon arriving to the Fallsburg Police Department. The question of how much time must pass before a second reading of the Miranda warnings is necessary to continue the questioning of a defendant is not exact, but turns on whether the subsequent questioning occurred within a reasonable time after the initial warnings, and whether custody had remained continuous. People v. Myers , 17 AD3d 699 (2nd Dept, 2005); People v. Gauger , 268 AD2d 386 (1st Dept, 2000).
Here, although the officers conducting the interrogation may have changed faces, the defendant nevertheless remained in the same police department and all custodial interrogation took place in the same interrogation room. All interrogation sessions took place within a reasonable time of each other and defendant was continuously in custody throughout. In this scenario, the law does not require a fresh reading of Miranda warnings following each and every break in questioning by the same or different questioners.
The defendant argues that Investigator Young's statement that the "lawyer looking at this case" would think he was a "monster" unless he told what happened, violated the attorney-client relationship. The defendant contends that Investigator Young effectively crossed the line beyond investigating facts, and ventured directly into the lawyer-client relationship when he told the defendant that unless he told what had happened, the lawyer would conclude that the defendant was a monster. Therefore, the defense argues that Investigator Young was acting as interference between the defendant and his lawyer, in effect, telling the defendant that unless he spoke about what happened and confessed to the crime, his own lawyer would believe he was a monster.
This claim is without support in law nor in fact. The defendant never asked for an attorney at any point during his questioning. Nor did the defendant ever invoke his right to remain silent. Moreover, the mere reference to "the lawyer looking at this case" may not directly refer to the defendant's own lawyer, but rather the attorney for the People — the D.A. The defendant did not even have a lawyer at this time. In fact, as the D.A. argued, the defendant never indicated that he wanted an attorney to be appointed for him at any time while in custody either before or after the "monster" issue was raised by the Investigator.
The defendant also argues for a "bright-line" rule to prevent police from impersonating clergy or other religious figures as a tactic for obtaining confessions. For support, the defendant relies on the standard first set forth in People v. Tarsia , 50 NY2d 1 (1980), wherein the court of appeals held that for a statement to be suppressed, the conduct of the police in questioning must be "so fundamentally unfair as to deny due process."
In the instant case, the defendant had waived his Miranda rights prior to giving his voluntary confession. The defendant, in actuality, is a religious, vulnerable, non-English speaking indigent immigrant. However, there is nothing in the record to show that Investigator Young specifically appealed to this defendant's vulnerability, as opposed to his general use of religion to strike almighty fear in the increasingly disenfranchised defendant. Also, Investigator Young, the man who obtained the confession, identified himself as a member of the State Police to the defendant. Further, the defendant has not presented any evidence to show that he was particularly susceptible to religious pressure, nor that any of the officers involved with the interrogation knew of any such susceptibility which might be "so fundamentally unfair as to deny due process."
While these strategies are not, and should not, be advocated by the trial courts, the appellate law looks only whether the totality of the circumstances indicate that the defendant was treated "so fundamentally unfair as to deny due process." This is not the case here because the current state of the law does not expressly prohibit such deception.
This Court finds that the totality of circumstances herein was not fundamentally unfair it would be better practice if Investigator Young had re-Mirandized the defendant before his portion of the interrogation began.
Based on the above, it is
ORDERED that the defendant's motion to suppress his confession is denied.
This shall constitute the Decision and Order of this Court.