Many Colorado cases have addressed void for vagueness challenges to statutes. See, e.g., People v. Perea, 74 P.3d 326, 332 (Colo.App. 2002). We have found no Colorado case, however, and the parties have cited none, applying the void for vagueness doctrine to conditions of probation, although cases from other jurisdictions have done so.

We denied certiorari review of this issue and reject Townsend's attempt to revisit it. Townsend concedes that a parolee's failure to report to his residence of record constitutes escape under sections 18-8-208(2) and 17-27.5-104 in light of a long line of precedent from the court of appeals, including People v. Sa'ra, 117 P.3d 51, 55 (Colo. App. 2004); People v. Smith, 77 P.3d 751, 754-56 (Colo.App. 2003); People v. Taylor, 14 P.3d 396, 399-00 (Colo.App. 2002); People v. Perea, 74 P.3d 326, 331 (Colo.App. 2002); and People v. Williams, 33 P.3d 1187, 1188-89 (Colo.App. 2001). Accordingly, we perceive no error in the possibility that he was convicted for escape for failing to report to his residence of record under the terms of the ISP.

Although no published Colorado case has explicitly addressed this issue, it appears that Colorado appellate courts have reviewed the record of sentencing de novo to determine whether a court afforded a defendant the opportunity to speak. See People v. Garcia, 752 P.2d 570, 575–77 (Colo.1988) ; People v. Perea, 74 P.3d 326, 336 (Colo.App.2002) ; Marquantte, 923 P.2d at 186. Moreover, a defendant's right to speak at sentencing is prescribed by statute, and trial courts have no discretion in this area.

If a defendant's conduct is clearly proscribed by the statute—that is, the statute is not vague as applied to the defendant's conduct—the defendant cannot successfully challenge the vagueness of the law on its face or as applied to the conduct of others. SeePeople v. Perea, 74 P.3d 326, 332 (Colo. App. 2002). ¶ 28 We apply familiar principles of statutory interpretation in analyzing a vagueness challenge.

The district court also explained that "mandatory parole" under Colorado law "is mandatory in the sense that it is required to be included in a sentence involving imprisonment, not that release is mandated before the term of imprisonment is completed." R., Vol. 1 at 191 (Order on Recommendation of Magistrate Judge, dated May 11, 2009, 2009 WL 1328633) (citing People v. Perea, 74 P.3d 326, 333-34 (Colo.Ct.App. 2002)). Furthermore, the district court concluded that Mr. Scott had no due process rights because his grant of parole was "contingent upon [his] successful completion of the reentry, program."

In People v. Perea, a Colorado Court of Appeals considered whether a defendant's sentence for a felony committed when the defendant was already serving a mandatory period of parole for a prior crime should be served concurrently with the sentence for the prior offense. 74 P.3d 326, 334-35 (Colo.Ct.App. 2002) (cited in Barber, on which the ICA relied). In the course of answering that question, the appellate court explained the development of the mandatory parole period within the broader context of Colorado's sentencing laws:

In People v. Perea, a Colorado Court of Appeals considered whether a defendant's sentence for a felony committed when the defendant was already serving a mandatory period of parole for a prior crime should be served concurrently with the sentence for the prior offense. 74 P.3d 326, 334-35 (Colo.Ct.App.2002) (cited in Barber, on which the ICA relied). In the course of answering that question, the appellate court explained the development of the mandatory parole period within the broader context of Colorado's sentencing laws:

A law is unconstitutionally vague "only if it specifies no standard of conduct at all, and not if it requires a person to conform his or her conduct to an imprecise, but comprehensible normative standard." People v. Perea, 74 P.3d 326, 332 (Colo. App. 2002). Thus, the supreme court in People v. Garcia, 197 Colo. 550, 554, 595 P.2d 228, 231 (1979), held that, in evaluating a void for vagueness challenge,

3-401(1)(a)(V)(D), C.R.S.2006; People v. Luther, 58 P.3d 1013 (Colo. 2002); People v. Perea, 74 P.3d 326 (Colo.App. 2002). Thus, there is no period of confinement from which to deduct any additional presentence confinement.

People v. Boyd, 30 P.3d 819 (Colo.App. 2001) (citing People v. Cagle, 751 P.2d 614 (Colo. 1988)) (facial unconstitutionality); People v. Perea, 74 P.3d 326 (Colo.App. 2002) (unconstitutionality as applied). On petition for rehearing, plaintiffs argue that they could not have raised their constitutional arguments below because CCIOA became relevant only when the trial court adopted defendant's reply brief CCIOA argument and on that basis dissolved the injunction.