In any event, the argument is without merit. On the whole, the charge was balanced and neutral in tone and directed at the jurors in general ( see People v Gonzales, 281 AD2d 432; People v Arnold, 226 AD2d 468; People v Ramirez, 223 AD2d 656, 656-657; People v Fleury, 111 AD2d 504, 505). Additionally, the instructions did not urge that a dissenting juror abandon his or her own conviction, attempt to coerce or compel the jury to reach a particular verdict, or shame the jury into reaching a verdict ( see People v Gonzales, 281 AD2d 432; People v Perdomo, 204 AD2d 358; People v Fleury, 111 AD2d at 505). Contrary to the defendant's contention, the trial court's instructions to the jurors to "be open to reason," "not to hesitate to change [their] views," and to "harmonize" their opinions, which were also given during the main charge, were balanced by the court's admonition that the jurors should only agree if they could do so "without violating [their] own conscience" and should not "change their opinion simply for the purpose of returning a verdict."
Moreover, the trial court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in denying the defendant's request for a mistrial ( see CPL 310.60[1][a]; People v. Coleman, 64 A.D.3d 787, 788, 882 N.Y.S.2d 710; People v. Love, 307 A.D.2d 528, 530–531, 762 N.Y.S.2d 162), and in declining to give an Allen charge ( see Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 17 S.Ct. 154, 41 L.Ed. 528; People v. Clemente, 84 A.D.3d 829, 922 N.Y.S.2d 193, lv. denied 17 N.Y.3d 793, 929 N.Y.S.2d 101, 952 N.E.2d 1096; People v. Love, 307 A.D.2d at 531, 762 N.Y.S.2d 162). The defendant's contention that the trial court's supplemental instructions were coercive is unpreserved for appellate review ( see People v. Hyland, 45 A.D.3d 781, 781, 847 N.Y.S.2d 201; People v. Ali, 301 A.D.2d 609, 609, 753 N.Y.S.2d 851) and, in any event, is without merit ( see People v. Dacus, 215 A.D.2d 578, 578, 627 N.Y.S.2d 58; People v. Velez, 150 A.D.2d 514, 515, 541 N.Y.S.2d 109; see also People v. Perdomo, 204 A.D.2d 358, 358, 611 N.Y.S.2d 560). The sentence imposed was not excessive ( see People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80, 85–86, 455 N.Y.S.2d 675).
Moreover, the trial court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in denying the defendant's request for a mistrial ( see CPL 310.60[a];People v Coleman , 64 AD3d 787, 788; People v Love, 307 AD2d 528, 530-531), and in declining to give an Allen charge ( see Allen v United States, 164 US 492; People v Clemente , 84 AD3d 829, lv denied 17 NY3d 793; People v Love, 307 AD2d at 531). The defendant's contention that the trial court's supplemental instructions were coercive is unpreserved for appellate review (see People v Hyland , 45 AD3d 781, 781; People v Ali, 301 AD2d 609, 609) and, in any event, is without merit ( see People v Dacus, 215 AD2d 578, 578; People v Velez, 150 AD2d 514, 515; see also People v Perdomo, 204 AD2d 358, 358). The sentence imposed was not excessive ( see People v Suitte, 90 AD2d 80, 85-86).
In any event, contrary to the defendant's contention, the charge, on the whole, was balanced and neutral ( see People v McKenzie, 48 AD3d 594, 595; People v Kendrick, 256 AD2d 420, 421). The court's instructions were directed at the jurors in general, and "did not urge that a dissenting juror abandon his or her own conviction, attempt to coerce or compel the jury to reach a particular verdict, or shame the jury into reaching a verdict" ( People v McKenzie, 48 AD3d at 595; see People v Gonzales, 281 AD2d 432; People v Perdomo, 204 AD2d 358). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution ( see People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
05; People v McKenzie, 48 AD3d 594, 594-595; People v Auguste, 294 AD2d 371, 371-372; People v Petty, 282 AD2d 551, 552). In any event, the court's Allen charge was not coercive ( see People v Applewhite, 50 AD3d 1046, 1047 ; People v McKenzie, 48 AD3d at 595; People v Kinard, 215 AD2d 591; People v Perdomo, 204 AD2d 358) and, on the whole, the charge was balanced and neutral in tone and directed at the jurors in general (see People v Pagan, 45 NY2d 725, 727; People v Gonzales, 281 AD2d 432; People v Arnold, 226 AD2d 468, 469). In fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.
The defendant's claim that he was deprived of a fair trial because the court's Allen charge ( see Allen v United States, 164 US 492) was unbalanced and coercive also is not preserved for appellate review, as he did not ask for specific language for the charge ( see People v Auguste, 294 AD2d 371; People v Arnold, 226 AD2d 468). In any event, the court's Allen charge was not coercive ( see People v Kinard, 215 AD2d 591; People v Perdomo, 204 AD2d 358; People v Austin, 168 AD2d 502).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed. The defendant's contention that the trial court's comments to one of the jurors after the first full day of deliberations were coercive is unpreserved for appellate review because the defendant did not object or request a supplemental instruction ( see People v Ramkisson, 245 AD2d 393; People v Perdomo, 204 AD2d 358). In any event, the trial court's comments, which merely suggested that the juror, a college student, would be able to attend his first class if the jury reached a verdict during the next day of deliberations, were open-ended and not an attempt to compel the jury to reach a verdict.
The defendant contends that the second Allen charge was improper. Since the defendant failed to request specific language for the second Allen charge and failed to object to the charge as given, his claim is unpreserved for appellate review (see People v. Petty, 282 A.D.2d 551; People v. McRae, 266 A.D.2d 241; People v. Arnold, 226 A.D.2d 468; People v. Perdomo, 204 A.D.2d 358). In any event, contrary to the defendant's contention, the charge adequately advised the jurors that they were not to abandon their individual beliefs and that the jury verdict must be the verdict of each individual juror (see People v. Sims, 226 A.D.2d 564; cf. People v. Ali, 65 A.D.2d 513, affd 47 N.Y.2d 920). Moreover, in light of the overall propriety of the charge, the jury's brief deliberation after the court issued the Allen charge did not demonstrate that the charge was coercive (cf.
The defendant's claim that the trial court's Allen charge (Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492) coerced the jury into returning a verdict after they had reported a deadlock is unpreserved for appellate review. The defense counsel neither requested a specific charge nor objected to the charge as given (see, People v. Perdomo, 204 A.D.2d 358). In any event, the charge, which stressed the importance of reaching a verdict without forcing any juror to yield a conscientious belief, was proper when taken as a whole (see, People v. Alvarez, 86 N.Y.2d 761; People v. Davis, 259 A.D.2d 627).
Resolution of issues of credibility, as well as the weight to be accorded to the evidence presented, are primarily questions to be determined by the jury, which saw and heard the witnesses (see, People v. Gaimari, 176 N.Y. 84, 94). Its determination should be accorded great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed unless clearly unsupported by the record (see, People v. Garafolo, 44 A.D.2d 86, 88). Given the undercover officer's testimony that he observed the defendant take money from another man and pour methadone into that man's empty bottle, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (see, CPL 470.15). The defendant's contention that the trial court's Allen charge (see, Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492) was coercive is unpreserved for appellate review, as he neither requested a specific charge nor objected to the charge given (see, People v. Ahmed, 269 A.D.2d 458; People v. Perdomo, 204 A.D.2d 358). In any event, the charge was balanced andneutral in tone, and it did not urge any dissenting jurors to abandon their convictions and acquiesce in the opinion of the other jurors, attempt to coerce or compel the jurors to reach a particular verdict, or shame them into reaching a verdict (see, People v. Ahmed, supra; People v. Perdomo, supra; People v. Fleury, 177 A.D.2d 504).