Opinion
2019-0070
04-04-2019
WILLIAM McCOY. LETITIA JAMES, Attorney General, (ALICIA M. LENDON, Esq of Counsel) Dulles State Office Building, 10th Floor 317 Washington Street Watertown, NY 13601.
WILLIAM McCOY.
LETITIA JAMES, Attorney General, (ALICIA M. LENDON, Esq of Counsel) Dulles State Office Building, 10th Floor 317 Washington Street Watertown, NY 13601.
James P. McClusky, J.
Petitioner William McCoy is presently serving an indeterminate term of 3 years to 9 years for Grand Larceny 2° and an indeterminate term of 1 1/3 to 4 years for one count of Scheme to Defraud 1°, with terms to run concurrently, having been sentenced by the Supreme Court of Nassau County following a conviction after trial.
In January of 2019, Petitioner filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to Article 70 of the CPLR, challenging the legality, sufficiency, and constitutionality of his indictment and conviction, specifically that the grand jury proceedings, the indictment, and trial were fatally flawed in that they failed to state facts or provide evidence to constitute the crimes charged against Petitioner, for which he was ultimately convicted.
Petitioner relies on People ex rel. Keitt v McMann , 18 NY2d 257 [1966] and its holding that "habeas corpus is an appropriate proceeding to test a claim that the relator has been imprisoned after having been deprived of a fundamental constitutional or statutory right in a criminal prosecution ... ", and that even though other means of relief may be available, such as a CPL 440 motion or direct appeal, "this should not foreclose the relator from proceeding by way of habeas corpus." Roberts v County Ct. of Wyoming County , 39 AD2d 246, 253 [4th Dept 1972].
The People also rely on Keitt stating, "While cases may arise where the right to invoke habeas corpus may take precedence over "procedural orderliness and conformity" we are not holding that habeas corpus is either the only or the preferred means of vindicating fundamental constitutional or statutory rights. Departure from traditional orderly proceedings, such as appeal, should be permitted only when dictated, [...] by reason of practicality and necessity." Keitt (supra).
This Court reads Keitt as authorizing the extraordinary relief of habeas corpus proceeding to challenge imprisonment based on the deprivation of a fundamental constitutional right in cases where particular facts or circumstances justify the departure from traditional orderly proceedings (either a direct appeal or a CPL 440 motion), see People ex rel. Shaffer v Leonardo , 178 AD2d 704 [3d Dept 1991]. This makes sense given that the Respondent (DOCCS) does not have ready access to the complete record of the proceedings from indictment to trial to sentencing as an Appellate Court would, nor does this Court have any familiarity with those proceedings as would a Trial Court hearing a CPL 440 motion.
Petitioner has not presented any such facts or circumstances to justify the relief he requests.
Thus, Petitioner's application for a writ of habeas corpus is hereby denied.