" ( Ibid.) In People v. Jackson (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 380, 387 [ 242 Cal.Rptr. 1] [First Dist., Div. One] and People v. Pennington (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 173, 176-177 [ 261 Cal.Rptr. 476] [Third Dist.] the courts implicitly disagreed with the Slaughter analysis. So do we.

Upon revoking probation, is a trial court required to give a statement of reasons when it decides to impose a state prison sentence where no sentence has previously been imposed? The answer is yes. ( People v. Jones (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 1309, 1312-1315 [ 274 Cal.Rptr. 527]; People v. Pennington (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 173, 176-177 [ 261 Cal.Rptr. 476]; People v. Jackson (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 380, 387 [ 242 Cal.Rptr. 1]; contra dictum, People v. Slaughter (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 95, 98-99 [ 239 Cal.Rptr. 337] [but see conc. and dis. opn.].) A.

Other courts have concluded that the trial court is not required to state reasons for denying probation, but under California Rules of Court, rule 439(d), it need only state its reasons for imposing a midterm state prison sentence and may do so "directly with explicit reasons or indirectly by stating why probation was deemed inappropriate." ( People v. Crouch (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 902, 904 [ 182 Cal.Rptr. 701]; see People v. Pennington (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 173, 176 [ 261 Cal.Rptr. 476]; People v. Bobb (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 88, 96-97 [ 254 Cal.Rptr. 707]; People v. Gopal (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 524, 548-549 [ 217 Cal.Rptr. 487]; People v. Butler (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 251, 254, fn. 4 [ 165 Cal.Rptr. 709] [Fourth Dist., Div. One]; People v. Ramos (1980) 106 Cal.App.3d 591, 599 [ 165 Cal.Rptr. 179]; see also People v. Douglas (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 1691, 1696 [ 239 Cal.Rptr. 252].

All subsequent decisions, however, have disagreed with Slaughter, concluding that a statement of reasons is required. ( People v. Hawthorne (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 789, 792-794 [ 277 Cal.Rptr. 85]; People v. Jones (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 1309, 1312-1315 [ 274 Cal.Rptr. 527]; People v. Pennington (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 173, 176-177 [ 261 Cal.Rptr. 476]; People v. Jackson (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 380, 387 [ 242 Cal.Rptr. 1].) We follow the precedent of these cases requiring a statement of reasons.

(2) Upon finding a probation violation (admitted or otherwise), a court has three options — reinstate probation on the same terms, reinstate it on modified terms, or terminate it and order a commitment to prison. ( People v. Pennington (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 173, 176 [ 261 Cal.Rptr. 476]; Pen. Code, § 1203.2; rules 435(a) and 435(b)(1).) (1b) We hold that when a court reinstates probation under the circumstances present here, a later sentence upon revocation of the reinstated probation may take into account events occurring between the original grant and the reinstatement.

Upon revocation of probation the defendant is entitled to a hearing and to be sentenced, before he can be committed to the appropriate institution. Stephens v. Toomey, 51 Cal.2d 864, 338 P.2d 182, 187 (1959) (citation omitted); see also People v. Pennington, 213 Cal.App.3d 173, 261 Cal.Rptr. 476, 478 (1989) ("Where no sentence is imposed at the time probation is granted, a subsequent decision terminating probation requires that judgment be pronounced." (citing Cal.Penal Code § 1203.2, subd. (c))); United States v. Qualls, 108 F.3d 1019, 1023 (9th Cir. 1997) ("There is no judgment pending against a probationer when the court withholds imposition of judgment and suspends further proceedings.

In making this determination, we reject Villasenor's contention that an exercise of discretion cannot be implied on these facts because the trial court failed to provide a statement of reasons for its sentencing choice as required by law. Where imposition of sentence is initially suspended and probation is subsequently revoked, the trial court "must pronounce judgment and sentence and if it chooses to impose a state prison sentence rather than probation it must give a statement of reasons in support of that sentence choice." (People v. Hawthorne (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 789, 794; see People v. Pennington (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 173, 176-177.) In contrast, execution of a previously imposed sentence after revocation of probation is not a " 'sentence choice' " requiring a statement of reasons.

Moreover, where a court initially suspends imposition of sentencing and places a defendant on probation but later revokes probation and imposes a sentence, it must state its reasons for choosing imprisonment over reinstatement of probation. (People v. Cotton (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 1072, 1080-1081; Jones, supra, 224 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1312-1315; People v. Pennington (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 173, 176-177; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.406(b)(2).) In our view, the trial court's statements that it was imposing sentencing because defendant violated the terms of his drug court program were directed toward its decision not to reinstate probation, rather than to the imposition of the upper term.

(Cf. People v. Pennington (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 173, 176-177 [" 'that probation is not appropriate' " is a sufficient basis for refusing to reinstate probation following revocation of probation and a sufficient statement of reasons for the trial court's sentencing choice].)

When the court denies probation, it is “not also required to justify the middle term, for the reasons for denying probation are the reasons for selecting a state prison sentence and need not be stated twice.” (People v. Jones (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 1309, 1316; see also People v. Pennington (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 173, 176.) We review the trial court’s determination of the appropriate term for abuse of discretion.