Opinion
2016–01382 Ind. No. 2607/13
06-10-2020
The PEOPLE, etc., Respondent, v. Ryiquan PELT, Appellant.
Paul Skip Laisure, New York, N.Y. (Dina Zloczower of counsel), for appellant. Melinda Katz, District Attorney, Kew Gardens, N.Y. (John M. Castellano, Johnnette Traill, and Roni C. Piplani of counsel), for respondent.
Paul Skip Laisure, New York, N.Y. (Dina Zloczower of counsel), for appellant.
Melinda Katz, District Attorney, Kew Gardens, N.Y. (John M. Castellano, Johnnette Traill, and Roni C. Piplani of counsel), for respondent.
RUTH C. BALKIN, J.P., COLLEEN D. DUFFY, HECTOR D. LASALLE, FRANCESCA E. CONNOLLY, JJ.
DECISION & ORDER
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Stephen A. Knopf, J.), rendered January 8, 2016, convicting him of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.
ORDERED that the judgment is reversed, on the law, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Queens County, for a new trial.
The defendant was convicted, after a jury trial, of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree. Prior to trial, the defendant moved to preclude evidence sought to be introduced by the People regarding DNA testing derived from the use of the Forensic Statistical Tool (hereinafter FST), or alternatively, to conduct a hearing pursuant to Frye v. United States , 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir.) to determine the admissibility of such evidence. The Supreme Court denied the defendant's motion, finding that FST was generally accepted in the scientific community.
Based upon the recent determinations by the Court of Appeals in People v. Foster–Bey , 35 N.Y.3d 959, 124 N.Y.S.3d 591, 147 N.E.3d 1129, 2020 N.Y. Slip Op. 02124 and People v. Williams , 35 N.Y.3d 24, 124 N.Y.S.3d 593, 147 N.E.3d 1131, 2020 N.Y. Slip Op. 02123, we find that it was an abuse of discretion as a matter of law for the Supreme Court to admit the FST evidence without first holding a Frye hearing "given [the] defendant's showing that there was uncertainty regarding whether such proof was generally accepted in the relevant scientific community at the time of [the defendant's] motion" ( People v. Foster–Bey, 35 N.Y.3d at 960–62, 124 N.Y.S.3d 591, 147 N.E.3d 1129, 2020 N.Y. Slip Op. 02124, *2 ; see People v. Williams, 35 N.Y.3d at 28–32, 124 N.Y.S.3d 593, 147 N.E.3d 1131, 2020 N.Y. Slip Op. 02123, *8 ). Additionally, we find that the error was not harmless (see People v. Crimmins, 36 N.Y.2d 230, 237, 367 N.Y.S.2d 213, 326 N.E.2d 787 ). Without this forensic evidence, proof of the defendant's guilt was not overwhelming as the only additional evidence linking the defendant to the weapon was the testimony of a lay witness which was circumstantial in nature. Accordingly, reversal of the judgment and a new trial are required (see id. ).
The defendant's remaining contentions need not be reached in light of our determination.
BALKIN, J.P., DUFFY, LASALLE and CONNOLLY, JJ., concur.