Opinion
C097657
04-25-2024
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. MELVIN JAMAN PEETE, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
(Super. Ct. No. 02F00882)
Krause, J.
Defendant Melvin Jaman Peete appeals from an order denying his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6 at the prima facie stage. The trial court found that he was ineligible for relief as a matter of law because the record of conviction shows that he was convicted as the "actual killer." Defendant contends the record of conviction does not conclusively establish that he was the actual killer and therefore the trial court erred in denying his petition without issuing an order to show cause and holding an evidentiary hearing.
Undesignated section references are to the Penal Code. Effective June 30, 2022, former section 1170.95 was renumbered and recodified as section 1172.6 with no substantive change in the text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) For clarity, we refer to former section 1170.95 by its new designation.
Defendant also appeals from an order denying a postjudgment motion under People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 (Franklin) to make a record for an eventual youth offender parole hearing. Defendant concedes that he is statutorily ineligible for a parole hearing because he was sentenced to life without parole (LWOP) for an offense committed when he was 25 years old. However, defendant contends the statutory exclusion of young adult LWOP offenders violates equal protection.
We disagree with defendant's contentions and therefore affirm both orders.
BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEDURE
On our own motion, we incorporate by reference the record in defendant's direct appeal from his convictions, as well as our nonpublished opinion in People v. Peete (Sep. 28, 2006, C047514 & C047770) [nonpub. opn.] (Peete).
In October 2001, defendant and Derrick Kinte Courtney (Courtney) committed a home invasion robbery. Defendant and Courtney used handguns to force the victims to lie on the floor, while they collected jewelry and other personal items from throughout the house. As they attempted to flee the property, one of the robbery victims (Manuel Trillo) pursued them with a shotgun. An exchange of gunfire ensued, during which Trillo suffered a fatal gunshot wound to the stomach. (Peete, supra, C047514 &C047770.)
This factual summary is based on this court's opinion in defendant's direct appeal. (Peete, supra, C047514 & C047770.) We recite these facts only to provide context for the parties' arguments; we do not rely on the facts contained in that opinion to resolve the issues presented in this appeal.
In 2004, the prosecution filed an information jointly charging defendant and codefendant Courtney with murder (§ 187, subd. (a); count one) and robbery in concert (§§ 211/213, subd. (a)(1)(A); count two). The information included special circumstance allegations (§ 190.2) as to count one, and firearm enhancements based on use, discharge, and discharge causing great bodily injury and death (§§ 12022.53, subds. (b), (c), (d); 12022.5, subd. (a)(1)) as to counts one and two. The information also separately charged both defendant and Courtney with being a felon in possession of a firearm (former § 12021, subd. (a)(1); counts three and four).
A robbery-murder special circumstance (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17) was jointly alleged against defendant and Courtney, and a prior-murder special circumstance (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(2)) was separately alleged against Courtney.
After the trial, the jury found defendant and Courtney guilty of murder, robbery, and being a felon in possession of a firearm, and found true the robbery-murder special circumstance allegation. As to defendant, the jury found true the enhancement allegations for personal use and intentional discharge of a firearm causing great bodily injury and death. As to Courtney, the jury found true the enhancement that Courtney personally used a firearm (§§ 12022.53, subd. (b) &12022.5, subd. (a)(1)) but found not true the allegations that Courtney discharged a firearm and discharged a firearm causing Trillo's death (§§ 12022.53, subds. (c) &(d)).
The trial court sentenced defendant to LWOP for murder with a robbery-murder special circumstance; plus 25 years to life for discharge of a firearm causing great bodily injury and death (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)); plus a concurrent term of two years (the midterm) for possession of a firearm by a felon. The court stayed the sentence for robbery and the other firearm enhancements pursuant to sections 654 and 12022.53, subdivision (f). On appeal, this court struck certain fines but otherwise affirmed the judgment. (Peete, supra, C047514 &C047770.)
Defendant's Petition for Resentencing
On March 10, 2022, defendant filed a form petition for resentencing under section 1172.6. The trial court appointed counsel and received briefing from the parties. After hearing argument, the court denied the petition at the prima facie stage. The court reasoned that the jury's true finding that defendant discharged a firearm causing Trillo's death, combined with the jury's rejection of the allegation that Courtney discharged a firearm, "leads to the inescapable conclusion" that the jury found defendant was the shooter and actual killer in this case, rendering him ineligible for relief as a matter of law. Defendant timely appealed the order denying his resentencing petition.
Defendant's Franklin Motion
On December 5, 2022, defendant, who was 25 years old when he committed the controlling offense, filed a motion under Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at page 261, to develop a record for a future youth offender parole hearing (§ 3051). The trial court denied the motion. Defendant timely appealed the order denying his Franklin motion.
The" '[c]ontrolling offense'" is the offense or enhancement for which the sentencing court imposed the longest term of imprisonment. (§ 3051, subd. (a)(2)(B).)
DISCUSSION
I
Defendant's Resentencing Petition
A. Legal Background
Effective January 1, 2019, the Legislature passed Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437), which altered the law of accomplice liability for murder in two ways. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, §§ 1-3.) First, the bill eliminated aider and abettor liability for murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine by adding the following language to section 188: "Except [for felony murder liability] as stated in subdivision (e) of Section 189, in order to be convicted of murder, a principal in a crime shall act with malice aforethought. Malice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in a crime." (§ 188, subd. (a)(3); Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 2.) Second, the bill narrowed the application of the felony-murder rule by amending section 189 to provide that a person can be liable for felony murder only if the person was (1) the actual killer, (2) an aider and abettor to the murder who acted with intent to kill, or (3) a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life. (§ 189, subd. (e)(1)-(3); Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 3.)
Senate Bill 1437 also added section 1172.6, creating a procedure for those who were convicted of murder under the prior law, but who could no longer be convicted because of the changes to the law, to petition to vacate the conviction and be resentenced on any remaining counts. (§ 1172.6.) "Under section 1172.6, the process begins with the filing of a petition declaring that '[t]he petitioner could not presently be convicted of murder or attempted murder because of changes to Section 188 or 189' made by Senate Bill 1437. [Citation.] The trial court then reviews the petition to determine whether a prima facie showing has been made that the petitioner is entitled to relief. [Citation.] 'If the petition and record in the case establish conclusively that the defendant is ineligible for relief, the trial court may dismiss the petition. [Citations.]' [Citation.] Otherwise, the court must issue an order to show cause [citation] and hold an evidentiary hearing at which the prosecution bears the burden 'to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is guilty of murder or attempted murder' under the law as amended by Senate Bill 1437 [citation]." (People v. Wilson (2023) 14 Cal.5th 839, 869, fn. omitted.)
Senate Bill No. 775 (2020-2021 Reg. Sess.) subsequently amended section 1172.6, effective January 1, 2022. Among other changes, Senate Bill No. 775 expanded section 1172.6 to include defendants convicted of murder based on any "theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person's participation in a crime ...." (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(1); Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2.)
In determining whether a petitioner has made a prima facie case, the court may consider the record of conviction, which may include the jury instructions, closing arguments, and jury verdicts. (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 970 (Lewis); People v. Jenkins (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 924, 935.) The court may appropriately deny a petition at the prima facie stage if the record of conviction shows the petitioner is ineligible for relief as a matter of law. (People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708.) Nevertheless, in reviewing the record of conviction, the court should not engage in factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion. (Lewis, supra, at p. 972.) The court should not reject the petitioner's factual allegations on credibility grounds unless the record of conviction refutes them. (Id. at pp. 971-972.)
Whether a trial court has properly denied a petition for resentencing at the prima facie stage is a question of law, which we review de novo. (People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 52 (Harden).)
B. Analysis
A defendant convicted under a theory of felony murder is ineligible for resentencing relief under section 1172.6 if the record of conviction demonstrates that he was the actual killer. (Harden, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 53.) Here, the People argue that the record of conviction conclusively establishes that the jury determined defendant was the actual killer. We agree.
We begin with the observation that this was a single victim homicide in which it was undisputed that the victim (Trillo) died from a gunshot wound. Both defendant and Courtney were charged with murder (with a robbery-murder special circumstance) and multiple firearm enhancements, including the personal discharge of a firearm causing death (§ 12022.53 subd. (d). The jury instructions and closing arguments show that the murder charges proceeded solely on a theory of first-degree felony murder.
The trial court instructed the jury with CALJIC Nos. 8.21, 8.21.1, and 8.27, but did not instruct the jury with CALJIC Nos. 8.10, 8.11, 8.30, or 8.31.
As to the murder charge, the jury was instructed that it could convict each defendant of felony murder either as a direct perpetrator (CALJIC No. 8.21) or as an aider and abettor to the underlying robbery (CALJIC No. 8.27). CALJIC No. 8.21 informed the jury that "[t]he unlawful killing of a human being, whether intentional, unintentional or accidental, which occurs during the commission of the crime of robbery is murder of the first degree when the perpetrator had the specific intent to commit that crime." CALJIC No. 8.27 informed the jury: "If a human being is killed by any one of several persons engaged in the commission of the crime of robbery, all persons, who either directly and actively commit the act constituting that crime, or who with knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator of the crime and with the intent or purpose of committing, encouraging, or facilitating the commission of the offense, aid, promote, encourage, or instigate by act or advice its commission, are guilty of murder of the first degree, whether the killing is intentional, unintentional, or accidental." Together, these instructions made clear that felony-murder liability applied if the victim was killed by one or more of the persons engaged in the commission of the robbery. (Harden, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 55; People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 221-222; see People v. Gonzalez (2012) 54 Cal.4th 643, 654; People v. Swanson (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 604, 617, review granted Feb. 17, 2021, S266262, review dismissed, and case ordered non-citable and nonprecedential to the extent it is inconsistent with Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th 952.)
The California Judicial Council withdrew the CALJIC instructions and adopted the new CALCRIM instructions, effective January 1, 2006. (People v. Thomas (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 461, 465.)
As to the enhancement for personal discharge of a firearm causing death (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)), the trial court instructed the jury with CALJIC No. 17.19.5. As relevant here, the jury was informed that "[i]f you find a defendant guilty of one or more of the crimes charged in Counts 1 and 2, you must determine whether each defendant . . . intentionally and personally discharged a firearm and proximately caused death to a person in the commission of robbery...."
The instruction defined a "proximate cause of death" as "an act or omission that sets in motion a chain of events that produces as a direct, natural and probable consequence of the act or omission the death and without which the death would not have occurred." The jury was not instructed on concurrent (CALJIC No. 3.41) or supervening causes of death. (See CALJIC No. 3.40, Use Note; People v. Brady (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1314, 1327-1330.)
During closing arguments, the prosecution argued the jury should find both defendant and Courtney guilty on all counts and find true the alleged special circumstances and firearm enhancements, with one prominent exception. The prosecution argued that only defendant was liable for the section 12022.53, subdivision (d) enhancement because defendant was the "actual killer," i.e., the one who discharged a firearm causing Trillo's death. The prosecution argued that Courtney "[wa]sn't guilty of that" because he was "not the guy" who shot Trillo.
Consistent with the prosecutor's closing argument, the jury subsequently found both defendants guilty of first-degree special-circumstances murder. As to defendant, the jury found all the alleged firearm enhancements true. As to Courtney, the jury found true that he personally used a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)), but rejected the allegations that he discharged a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (c)) and that he discharged a firearm causing Trillo's death (§ 12022.53, subd. (d).)
By finding the defendants guilty of felony murder for killing Trillo, finding true the allegation that defendant personally discharged a firearm causing Trillo's death, and finding not true the allegation that Courtney discharged a firearm, the jury implicitly found that defendant was the one who shot and killed Trillo. (See People v. Cornelius (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 54, 58, review granted Mar. 18, 2020, S260410, review dismissed, and case ordered non-citable and nonprecedential to the extent it is inconsistent with Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th 952.) As an "actual killer," defendant is therefore ineligible for relief under section 1172.6 as a matter of law. (Harden, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 53.)
Defendant argues that the jury's verdict shows only that the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Courtney discharged a firearm in the commission of Trillo's murder, and that this finding does "not establish as a matter of law that [defendant] killed Trillo because it remains possible that Courtney killed" him. This argument misses the bigger picture. Taken together, the jury instructions, the closing arguments, and the verdicts irrefutably show the jury found that the evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was the one who shot and killed Trillo. Thus, the trial court properly found the defendant was ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law.
II Franklin Motion
A. Legal Background: Section 3051
In response to a series of court decisions addressing Eighth Amendment limits on juvenile sentencing, (see, e.g., Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48, 74 [176 L.Ed.2d 825, 845] (Graham); Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460, 489 [183 L.Ed.2d 407, 430] (Miller); People v. Caballero (2012) 55 Cal.4th 262, 268) (Caballero), the Legislature added section 3051, establishing a youth offender parole hearing procedure. (People v. Sands (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 193, 197-198 (Sands); Stats. 2013, ch. 312 §§ 1, 4.) In enacting the statute, the Legislature "explained that recent developments in neuroscience showed that 'youthfulness both lessens a juvenile's moral culpability and enhances the prospect that, as a youth matures into an adult and neurological development occurs,' such individuals can, by demonstrating rehabilitation and maturity, become contributing members of society. [Citations.]" (Sands, supra, at p. 198.) With the addition of section 3051, the Legislature declared its intent "to establish a parole eligibility mechanism that provides a person serving a sentence for crimes that he or she committed as a juvenile the opportunity to obtain release when he or she has shown that he or she has been rehabilitated and gained maturity, in accordance with the decisions [in Graham, Miller, and Caballero]." (Stats. 2013, ch. 312, § 1.)
By ensuring that eligible juvenile offenders would have a meaningful opportunity for release no more than 25 years into their incarceration, section 3051 made it unnecessary for courts to decide Eighth Amendment challenges to their sentences. (In re Woods (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 740, 750, review granted June 16, 2021, S268740, briefing deferred.)
As originally enacted, section 3051 afforded youth offender parole hearings only to juvenile offenders, and excluded juvenile offenders sentenced to LWOP. (People v. Morales (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 326, 346 (Morales).) The Legislature subsequently increased the age threshold for offenders, first to 23 years, and then to 25 years, citing scientific research showing that cognitive brain development continues beyond the age of 18 into the mid-20's. (Morales, supra, at p. 346; Sands, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 198.) The Legislature also amended section 3051 to extend youth offender parole hearings to juveniles sentenced to LWOP-a change intended to bring California into compliance with the constitutional requirements of Miller, supra, 567 U.S. 460 and Montgomery v. Louisiana (2016) 577 U.S. 190 (Montgomery). (Morales, at p. 346; Sands, at p. 198.)
As a result of these amendments, most persons convicted of an offense committed before the age of 26 are now eligible for a youth offender parole hearing after 15, 20, or 25 years in prison, depending on their controlling offense. (Sands, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 198; § 3051, subds. (a) &(b).) However, section 3051, subdivision (h) continues to exclude certain categories of offenders from the youth offender parole hearing process, including youth offenders sentenced to LWOP who committed the controlling offense between the ages of 18 and 25. (Sands, at p. 199; § 3051, subd. (h).)
Against this backdrop, the California Supreme Court recognized a right for offenders who are eligible for a youth offender parole hearing to make a record of youth-related mitigating evidence so that the parole board, years later, may properly discharge its obligation to determine whether the offender is fit to rejoin society. (Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 268-269, 284; In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439, 446-447 (Cook).) In Cook, our Supreme Court extended this right to a "Franklin proceeding" to youth offenders whose judgments are otherwise final, and explained that the proper avenue to request such a proceeding is through a motion under section 1203.01. (Cook, supra, at pp. 451, 458.)
B. Equal Protection
"Both the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 7 of the California Constitution guarantee to all persons the equal protection of the laws. The right to equal protection of the laws is violated when 'the government . . . treat[s] a [similarly situated] group of people unequally without some justification.' [Citation.]" (People v. Jackson (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 189, 195.)
Historically, California courts have used a two-part inquiry to evaluate equal protection claims. (People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834, 848 (Hardin).) We first ask whether the state has adopted a classification that affects two or more similarly situated groups in an unequal manner. (Ibid.) If it is demonstrated that two similarly situated groups have been treated differently, we then analyze whether there is sufficient justification for the unequal treatment. (Ibid.)
However, our Supreme Court recently held that the similarly-situated test serves no real purpose in cases like this one, "in which the only real question is whether a facial difference in treatment is adequately justified by the purposes the law was meant to serve." (Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 850.) In such cases, the "only pertinent inquiry is whether the challenged difference in treatment is adequately justified under the applicable standard of review." (Id. at p. 851.) Here, both sides agree that because the statutory classification involves neither a suspect class nor a fundamental right, rational basis review applies. (Id. at pp. 847, 851.)
"Rational basis review 'sets a high bar' for litigants challenging legislative enactments. [Citation.]" (Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 852.) "Under this deferential standard, we presume that a given statutory classification is valid 'until the challenger shows that no rational basis for the unequal treatment is reasonably conceivable.' [Citation.] The underlying rationale for a statutory classification need not have been 'ever actually articulated' by lawmakers, nor 'be empirically substantiated.' [Citation.] ....'If a plausible basis exists for the disparity, courts may not second-guess its" 'wisdom, fairness, or logic.'"' [Citation.] '[T]he logic behind a potential justification need [not] be persuasive or sensible-rather than simply rational.' [Citation.]" (Ibid.)
C. Analysis
As an individual sentenced to LWOP for a controlling offense committed when he was 25 years old (a "young adult LWOP offender"), defendant concedes that he is statutorily ineligible for a youth offender parole hearing under section 3051, subdivision (h). Defendant argues, however, that this statutory exclusion violates equal protection because it denies a parole hearing to young adult LWOP offenders, while extending that benefit to young adult offenders sentenced to "de facto" life sentences. Defendant contends the two groups are similarly situated and there is no conceivable rational basis for distinguishing between them.
When the parties submitted their briefing, the courts of appeal were divided over whether section 3051's exclusion of young adult LWOP offenders violated the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection guarantee. (See People v. Ngo (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 116, 122-127, review granted May 17, 2023, S279458, briefing deferred, and cases discussed therein.) The vast majority of courts rejected the claim that section 3051 violated equal protection by excluding young adult LWOP offenders from parole consideration. (People v. Ngo, supra, at pp. 122-127; Sands, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 203-205; Morales, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at pp. 347-349; People v. Jackson, supra, 61 Cal.App.5th at pp. 199-200; People v. Acosta (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 769, 780-781; In re Williams (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 427, 433-436.) Only one published decision reached the opposite conclusion: People v. Hardin (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 273, review granted January 11, 2023, S277487, judgment reversed on March 4, 2024. This was the case on which defendant relied to support his equal protection claim.
The California Supreme Court granted review in People v. Hardin, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at page 273, to resolve the conflict among the courts of appeal. As noted, the Supreme Court has now issued its decision in Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pages 838841, 866 and settled the issue, holding that the statutory exclusion of young adult LWOP offenders withstands rational basis scrutiny and therefore does not facially violate constitutional guarantees of equal protection. (Ibid.) We are bound by this holding. (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455.) We therefore reject defendant's equal protection claim and conclude that the trial court properly denied his motion for a Franklin proceeding.
DISPOSITION
The orders denying defendant's petition for resentencing and Franklin motion are affirmed.
We concur: Robie, Acting P. J., Duarte, J.