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affirming breathalyzer testing certificates are not testimonial in part because they "do not directly inculpate defendant or prove an essential element of the charges against him"
Summary of this case from People v. AmbroseOpinion
No. 9.
2013-02-19
The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Robert PEALER, Appellant.
D.J. & J.A. Cirando, Esqs., Syracuse (John A. Cirando, Bradley E. Keem and Elizabeth deV. Moeller of counsel), for appellant. Jason L. Cook, District Attorney, Penn Yan, and Hannah E.C. Moore, New York Prosecutors Training Institute, Inc., Albany, for respondent.
D.J. & J.A. Cirando, Esqs., Syracuse (John A. Cirando, Bradley E. Keem and Elizabeth deV. Moeller of counsel), for appellant. Jason L. Cook, District Attorney, Penn Yan, and Hannah E.C. Moore, New York Prosecutors Training Institute, Inc., Albany, for respondent.
Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., District Attorney, New York City (Susan Axelrod of counsel), and Morrie I. Kleinbart, Staten Island, for District Attorneys Association of the State of New York, amicus curiae.
OPINION OF THE COURT
GRAFFEO, J.
The question presented in this appeal is whether records pertaining to the routine inspection, maintenance and calibration of breathalyzer machines can be offered as evidence in a criminal trial without producing the persons who created the records. We hold that because such documents are nontestimonial, the records are not subject to the Confrontation Clause requirements set forth in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004).
I
Early one morning in October 2008, the Penn Yan Police Department in Yates County received an anonymous telephone call indicating that someone who was possibly intoxicated had left a particular restaurant and was driving a gray car with a sticker on its rear window. Shortly after receiving this information, a police officer on patrol saw a gray 1996 Subaru and he followed the car for several minutes. After observing the car weaving, he stopped the vehicle for the illegal window sticker ( seeVehicle and Traffic Law § 375 [1] [b][i] ).
The driver, defendant Richard Pealer, stated that he had just left work at the restaurant that had been identified by the tipster. When asked if he had consumed any alcohol, defendant replied that he had “two beers” after finishing his shift. The officer noticed that defendant's eyes were red and glossy, his speech was impaired and defendant had an odor of alcohol. After defendant failed several field sobriety tests and a breath screening test confirmed that defendant had been drinking, he was arrested for driving while intoxicated (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192[3] ).
At the police station, defendant telephoned a lawyer and then agreed to take a breathalyzer test. A breath-test operator conducted the testing and the machine computed defendant's blood alcohol content at .15% (close to twice the legal limit). Defendant was eventually indicted for felony DWI (defendant had two prior felony DWI convictions).
During the jury trial, the People offered into evidence documents pertaining to the routine calibration and maintenance of the breathalyzer machine used in defendant's breath test, in order to demonstrate that it was in proper working order at the time defendant was tested. Specifically, two of the documents certified that the breathalyzer had been calibrated by the New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services in Albany in September 2008 and March 2009, respectively. The third document stated that a sample of the simulator solution had been analyzed and approved for use in the breathalyzer by the State Police. The People intended to introduce these records through the testimony of the officer who administered the breathalyzer test to defendant.
Defendant raised a Confrontation Clause challenge to these documents, contending that he was entitled to cross-examine the authors of the three records. County Court disagreed and allowed the documents to be received in evidence. The jury found defendant guilty of DWI as a D felony (along with driving while ability impaired) and defendant was later sentenced to a prison terra of 2 1/3 to 7 years.
The Appellate Division affirmed (89 A.D.3d 1504, 933 N.Y.S.2d 473 [4th Dept.2011] ), concluding that no Confrontation Clause error had occurred. It reasoned that the breathalyzer documents were neither accusatory nor testimonial because they merely established the functionality of the machine and did not directly prove an element of the charged crimes or specifically inculpate defendant.
A Judge of this Court granted defendant leave to appeal (18 N.Y.3d 961, 944 N.Y.S.2d 489, 967 N.E.2d 714 [2012] ) and we now affirm.
II
Defendant argues that the People's use of the three breathalyzer records violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause since he was not given an opportunity to cross-examine the persons who performed the testing of the machine or the simulator solution. According to defendant, the records were testimonial in nature since their purpose was to prove that the breathalyzer was in proper working order and, consequently, they were created in anticipation of their use in a criminal proceeding. The People counter that the documents were not testimonial because they were not generated for use against a specific individual, nor did they establish an element of the crimes charged.
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the “admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant ha[s] had a prior opportunity for cross-examination” ( Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. at 53–54, 124 S.Ct. 1354). The key inquiry focuses on the category that a statement falls into—whether the nature of the statement or record is testimonial or nontestimonial ( see Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. ––––, ––––, 131 S.Ct. 1143, 1152–1153, 179 L.Ed.2d 93 [2011];Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 823–824, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 165 L.Ed.2d 224 [2006] ). “[T]he basic objective of the Confrontation Clause ... is to prevent the accused from being deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant about statements taken for use at trial” and a statement will be treated as testimonial only if it was “procured with a primary purpose of creating an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony” ( Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. at ––––, 131 S.Ct. at 1155). If a different purpose underlies its creation, the issue of admissibility of the statement is subject to federal or state rules of evidence rather than the Sixth Amendment ( see id.).
Based on relevant precedent, we have identified two factors that are “especially important” in resolving whether to designate a statement as testimonial—“first, whether the statement was prepared in a manner resembling ex parte examination and second, whether the statement accuses defendant of criminal wrongdoing” ( People v. Rawlins, 10 N.Y.3d 136, 156, 855 N.Y.S.2d 20, 884 N.E.2d 1019 [2008],cert. denied sub nom., Meekins v. New York, 557 U.S. ––––, 129 S.Ct. 2856, 174 L.Ed.2d 601 [2009] ). Furthermore, the “purpose of making or generating the statement, and the declarant's motive for doing so,” also “inform these two interrelated touchstones” ( People v. Rawlins, 10 N.Y.3d at 156, 855 N.Y.S.2d 20, 884 N.E.2d 1019).
We have held that the Confrontation Clause applies to an affidavit of an employee of the Department of Motor Vehicles attesting to the revocation of an accused's license in a prosecution for aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in the first degree because the document had an accusatory purpose in that it provided proof of an element of the crime and resembled testimonial hearsay ( see People v. Pacer, 6 N.Y.3d 504, 512, 814 N.Y.S.2d 575, 847 N.E.2d 1149 [2006] ). Similarly, fingerprint comparison reports that directly linked the accused to the charged crimes “could be nothing but testimonial” ( People v. Rawlins, 10 N.Y.3d at 157, 855 N.Y.S.2d 20, 884 N.E.2d 1019). The same held true for an affidavit identifying a substance connected to the defendant as cocaine ( see Melendez–Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 310–311, 129 S.Ct. 2527, 174 L.Ed.2d 314 [2009] ) and a report certifying that the accused's blood alcohol content was above the legal limit ( see Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. ––––, ––––, 131 S.Ct. 2705, 2716–2717, 180 L.Ed.2d 610 [2011] )—both of these documents were generated for law enforcement purposes in order to establish a necessary element of the charged offenses.
In contrast, we determined that a graphical DNA report that did not explicitly tie the accused to a crime was deemed to be nontestimonial since it “shed no light on the guilt of the accused in the absence of an expert's opinion that the results genetically match a known sample” (People v. Rawlins, 10 N.Y.3d at 159, 855 N.Y.S.2d 20, 884 N.E.2d 1019;see also People v. Brown, 13 N.Y.3d 332, 340–341, 890 N.Y.S.2d 415, 918 N.E.2d 927 [2009];Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. ––––, ––––, 132 S.Ct. 2221, 2243, 183 L.Ed.2d 89 [2012, plurality op.] [“the primary purpose of the (DNA) report, viewed objectively, was not to accuse (the) petitioner or to create evidence for use at trial.... (I)ts primary purpose was to catch a dangerous rapist who was still at large, not to obtain evidence for use against (the) petitioner, who was neither in custody nor under suspicion at that time”] ). A similar conclusion applied to an autopsy report prepared by a civilian agency in that it was a contemporaneous, objective account of observable facts that did not link the commission of the crime to a particular person ( see People v. Freycinet, 11 N.Y.3d 38, 42, 862 N.Y.S.2d 450, 892 N.E.2d 843 [2008] ).
We now consider these principles in assessing the admissibility of the breathalyzer calibration and maintenance documents in this case. As our case law makes clear, to determine whether these records are the functional equivalent of in-court testimony, it is necessary to identify the primary purpose for their creation by evaluating the following factors:
“(1) whether the agency that produced the record is independent of law enforcement; (2) whether it reflects objective facts at the time of their recording; (3) whether the report has been biased in favor of law enforcement; and (4) whether the report accuses the defendant by directly linking him or her to the crime” ( People v. Brown, 13 N.Y.3d at 339–340 [890 N.Y.S.2d 415, 918 N.E.2d 927] ).
In examining these factors, the records at issue bear some resemblance to traditional testimonial hearsay because they contain certified declarations of fact attesting that the breathalyzer machine was functioning properly and its readings were accurate and reliable. Nevertheless, the remaining considerations weigh against application of the Confrontation Clause. Melendez–Diaz recognized the possibility that records “prepared in the regular course of equipment maintenance”—precursors to an actual breathalyzer test of a suspect—“may well qualify as non-testimonial records” (557 U.S. at 311 n. 1 ). It may reasonably be inferred that the primary motivation for examining the breathalyzer was to advise the Penn Yan Police Department that its machine was adequately calibrated and operating properly ( see generally People v. Boscic, 15 N.Y.3d 494, 500 [912 N.Y.S.2d 556, 938 N.E.2d 989] [2010] ). The testing of the machine was performed by employees of the Division of Criminal Justice Services, an executive agency that is independent of law enforcement agencies, whose task was to ensure the reliability of such machines—not to secure evidence for use in any particular criminal proceeding. The fact that the scientific test results and the observations of the technicians might be relevant to future prosecutions of unknown defendants was, at most, an ancillary consideration when they inspected and calibrated the machine.
Relatedly, it is also significant that, as with an autopsy report or a graphical DNA report, and unlike the certification of the accused's actual blood alcohol content in Bullcoming, the breathalyzer testing certificates do not directly inculpate defendant or prove an essential element of the charges against him. All three records simply reflected objective facts that were observed at the time of their recording in order to establish that the breathalyzer would produce accurate results, rather than to prove some past event. At their core, these documents should be viewed as business records ( seeCPLR 4518[a] ) which, as a class, are generally deemed nontestimonial ( see People v. Rawlins, 10 N.Y.3d at 150 n. 11, 855 N.Y.S.2d 20, 884 N.E.2d 1019;Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56, 124 S.Ct. 1354).
For these reasons, we believe that the U.S. Supreme Court's primary purpose test, and the analytical framework articulated in Rawlins, Freycinet and Brown, indicate that the breathalyzer calibration documents offered in this case were not testimonial in nature. Although it has been suggested that Melendez–Diaz pronounced a shift in Confrontation Clause analysis that might call our precedent into question, we reject this assertion. Melendez–Diaz itself avowed that it was not breaking new ground because it “involve [d] little more than the application of [the] holding in Crawford ” (557 U.S. at 329, 129 S.Ct. 2527). Moreover, both before and after Melendez–Diaz was decided, a virtually uniform national consensus emerged classifying documents similar to these as nontestimonial ( see e.g. State v. Benson, 295 Kan. 1061, 287 P.3d 927, 932 [2012];Chambers v. State, 2012 Ark. 407, –––S.W.3d ––––, ––––, 2012 WL 5360966, at *8 [2012];State v. Lutz, 820 N.W.2d 111, 117–118 [N.D.2012]; State v. Britt, 283 Neb. 600, 603, 813 N.W.2d 434, 437 [2012];Matthies v. State, 85 So.3d 838, 844 [Miss.2012],cert. denied,568 U.S. ––––, 133 S.Ct. 317, 184 L.Ed.2d 154 [2012];Commonwealth v. Zeininger, 459 Mass. 775, 788–789, 947 N.E.2d 1060, 1070 [2011],cert. denied,565 U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 462, 181 L.Ed.2d 301 [2011];State v. Chun, 194 N.J. 54, 144, 943 A.2d 114, 167–168 [2008],cert. denied,555 U.S. 825, 129 S.Ct. 158, 172 L.Ed.2d 41 [2008];State v. Fischer, 272 Neb. 963, 971–972, 726 N.W.2d 176, 182–183 [2007];Rackoff v. State, 281 Ga. 306, 309, 637 S.E.2d 706, 709 [2006];Commonwealth v. Walther, 189 S.W.3d 570, 575 [Ky.2006];State v. Carter, 326 Mont. 427, 437, 114 P.3d 1001, 1007 [2005] ).
Additionally, the Appellate Divisions that have considered this issue have concurred that, even under Melendez–Diaz, these types of records fall outside the ambit of the Confrontation Clause ( see e.g. People v. Hulbert, 93 A.D.3d 953, 953–954, 939 N.Y.S.2d 661 [3d Dept.2012]; People v. Damato, 79 A.D.3d 1060, 1061–1062, 913 N.Y.S.2d 740 [2d Dept.2010] ).
See also State v. Kramer, 153 Idaho 29, ––––, 278 P.3d 431, 438 (Ct.App.2012); State v. Lindner, 227 Ariz. 69, 71–72, 252 P.3d 1033, 1035–1036 (Ct.App.2010), cert denied565 U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 1111, 181 L.Ed.2d 993 (2012); Jacobson v. State, 306 Ga.App. 815, 818, 703 S.E.2d 376, 379 (2010); People v. Jacobs, 405 Ill.App.3d 210, 217, 345 Ill.Dec. 335, 939 N.E.2d 64, 71 (2010); Ramirez v. State, 928 N.E.2d 214, 220 (Ind.Ct.App.2010), transfer denied,940 N.E.2d 824 (2010); Settlemire v. State, 323 S.W.3d 520, 522 (Tex.Ct.App.2010); Commonwealth v. Dyarman, 2011 PA Super 245, 33 A.3d 104, 108 (2011), appeal granted,41 A.3d 1282 (2012); Hamilton v. State, 2010 WL 4260608, at *3, 2010 Alaska App. LEXIS 125, at *7–10 (Alaska Ct.App.2010); State v. Bergin, 231 Or.App. 36, 42, 217 P.3d 1087, 1090 (2009), review denied,348 Or. 280, 230 P.3d 933 (2010); Salt Lake City v. George, 189 P.3d 1284, 1289 (Utah Ct.App.2008), cert. denied,200 P.3d 193 (2008); Pflieger v. State, 952 So.2d 1251, 1254 (Fla.Ct.App.2007); State v. Marshall, 114 Hawai‘i 396, 402, 163 P.3d 199, 205 (Ct.App.2007), cert. denied,117 Hawai‘i 234, 2007 WL 4358284 (2007); United States v. Forstell, 656 F.Supp.2d 578, 581 (E.D.Va.2009). But see United States v. Gorder, 726 F Supp 2d 1307, 1314 (D.Utah 2010); People v. Carreira, 27 Misc.3d 293, 296, 893 N.Y.S.2d 844 (Watertown City Ct.2010).
We endorse this widely-held view and hold that documents pertaining to the routine inspection, maintenance and calibration of breathalyzer machines are nontestimonial under Crawford and its progeny. Consequently, the Confrontation Clause was not implicated in this case and the trial judge did not err in declining defendant's request to cross-examine the authors of the testing records before the court ruled on their admissibility.
III
Defendant raises additional issues, many of which are either unpreserved or otherwise unreviewable, and the remainder lack merit: the curative instruction during the prosecutor's summation corrected any perceived error (see People v. Heide, 84 N.Y.2d 943, 944, 620 N.Y.S.2d 814, 644 N.E.2d 1370 [1994] ); it was not an abuse of discretion to permit a rebuttal witness ( see People v. Anonymous, 96 N.Y.2d 839, 840, 729 N.Y.S.2d 434, 754 N.E.2d 193 [2001] ); defendant has failed to demonstrate that he was deprived of meaningful legal assistance (see e.g. People v. Baker, 14 N.Y.3d 266, 270, 899 N.Y.S.2d 733, 926 N.E.2d 240 [2010] ); and there was no basis for suppression (see e.g. People v. Edwards, 14 N.Y.3d 741, 742, 898 N.Y.S.2d 538, 925 N.E.2d 576 [2010] ).
[2] Probable cause to believe that the Vehicle and Traffic Law has been violated provides an objectively reasonable basis for the police to stop a vehicle and, contrary to the dissent's suggestion, there is no exception for infractions that are subjectively characterized as “de minimis” ( see e.g. People v. Robinson, 97 N.Y.2d 341, 349, 741 N.Y.S.2d 147, 767 N.E.2d 638 [2001] ).
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed.
PIGOTT, J. (dissenting in part).
While I concur with the majority's Confrontation Clause analysis, I part company with it on the reasonableness of the police officer's initial stop of defendant. The suppression court ruled that the police officer lacked probable cause to stop the defendant but for the fact that defendant had a Finger Lakes Community College sticker in the rear window (police officer: “I can't recall what side it was on, the left or the right”).
Prior to 2001, all four Departments of the Appellate Division uniformly held that evidence obtained as a result of pretext stops was inadmissible (see People v. Young, 241 A.D.2d 690, 660 N.Y.S.2d 165 [3d Dept.1997]; People v. Roundtree, 234 A.D.2d 612, 651 N.Y.S.2d 615 [2d Dept.1996]; People v. Laws, 213 A.D.2d 226, 623 N.Y.S.2d 860 [1st Dept.1995]; People v. Camarre, 171 A.D.2d 1002, 569 N.Y.S.2d 223 [4th Dept.1991] ). Then, in People v. Robinson, 97 N.Y.2d 341, 741 N.Y.S.2d 147, 767 N.E.2d 638 (2001), this Court adopted the rationale of Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996), which held that an investigatory stop is valid, regardless of the officer's motivation, so long as there is an objectively reasonable basis for it (see id. at 812–815, 116 S.Ct. 1769).
In my view, the stop in this case was not objectively reasonable, and was premised on what could only be deemed a “de minimis” violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 375(1)(b)(i). That section provides that “[t]he use or placing of posters or stickers on windshields or rear windows of motor vehicles other than those authorized by the commissioner, is hereby prohibited.” The concern, of course, as the commissioner notes in the regulations, is that the placement of such items not approved by the commissioner will “interfere with visibility” (15 NYCRR 174.1).
Here, the suppression court concluded that an anonymous tip and the fact that defendant's car was weaving, but within its lane of traffic, were insufficient to justify the stop. However, the suppression court found that the presence of a transparent college sticker located on the bottom, left-hand corner of the rear windshield of defendant's car at 1:26 a.m. provided sufficient justification to stop defendant's vehicle. While having a sticker on the car's back window may have transgressed section 375(1)(b)(i), this is the type of school pride that is commonly exercised by New York drivers every day and, I suspect, the statute is rarely, if ever, enforced. Stopping a vehicle at 1:26 in the morning because of a college sticker on the back window is, in my view, not objectively reasonable and therefore the evidence discovered as a result of the stop should have been suppressed.
SMITH, J. (concurring).
I join Judge Graffeo's majority opinion, and add this concurrence to reply to the dissent.
I concede that my dissenting colleague has a point; like him, I am uncomfortable with what happened in this case. It presents an extreme example of the opportunities given to law enforcement officers by the United States Supreme Court's holding in Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996), and ours in People v. Robinson, 97 N.Y.2d 341, 741 N.Y.S.2d 147, 767 N.E.2d 638 (2001), that a traffic stop made with probable cause may not be challenged as pretextual—i.e., that the motive for the stop is irrelevant. Here, the pretext—a small sticker in a corner of a car's rear window—is as transparent as the sticker. But under Whren and Robinson that does not matter.
The dissent suggests that, where police blatantly exploit a trivial offense, we can avoid the more unpleasant consequences of Whren and Robinson by finding the officers' actions to be “not objectively reasonable” (dissenting op at 457). The dissent's position is similar to that of the dissenters in Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 360–373, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001, O'Connor, J., dissenting)—a case involving an arrest, not just a traffic stop. In Atwater, a woman was arrested, without a warrant, for an offense (having her children in the front seat of a car without seatbelts) punishable only by a fine under state law. The Supreme Court majority held that the arrest was consistent with the Fourth Amendment. It concluded that a state does not violate the Federal Constitution when it authorizes warrantless arrest for a criminal offense, no matter how minor (532 U.S. at 354, 121 S.Ct. 1536).
It is clear from Atwater that there was no violation of the Federal Constitution here. Indeed, for two reasons, this case is a fortiori from Atwater; defendant here was not arrested for the traffic infraction, and his offense, unlike Atwater's, could theoretically be punished by imprisonment ( seeVehicle and Traffic Law § 375[32] ). We have not addressed the Atwater issue in interpreting our State Constitution (N.Y. Const., art. I, § 12), though we have held that the seriousness of an offense is relevant to the validity of a search incident to arrest ( People v. Marsh, 20 N.Y.2d 98, 102–103, 281 N.Y.S.2d 789, 228 N.E.2d 783 [1967] [search not justified by arrest for “minor traffic violations”]; see also People v. Troiano, 35 N.Y.2d 476, 478, 363 N.Y.S.2d 943, 323 N.E.2d 183 [1974] [suggesting that the rule of Marsh applies only “where an arrest was not necessary” ]; People v. Howell, 49 N.Y.2d 778, 426 N.Y.S.2d 477, 403 N.E.2d 182 [1980] [suppressing evidence in reliance on Marsh and Troiano ] ).
Today's dissent would hold that, under the State Constitution, an officer may be held to have acted unreasonably in stopping a car for a trivial violation of a statute. I would not accept this rule. Where the challenge is only to a traffic stop, the interference with a person's liberty is much less than when that person is arrested or searched. And while the dissent's rule may seem attractive in this case, it will be hard to administer: defendants will not hesitate to invoke it on less sympathetic facts than these, and deciding whether an officer used good judgment in stopping a car will become part of the routine fare of judges deciding suppression motions. The certainty and predictability that result from the Whren and Robinson holdings will be in large part lost.
My reluctance to agree with the dissent is fortified by my distaste for the suppression of relevant evidence as a remedy for every mistake a police officer makes. As I have said before, I think that the exclusionary rule is a blunt instrument that lets too many guilty people go free ( see People v. Weaver, 12 N.Y.3d 433, 451, 882 N.Y.S.2d 357, 909 N.E.2d 1195 [2009, Smith, J., dissenting]; People v. Gavazzi, 20 N.Y.3d 907, 909–910, 957 N.Y.S.2d 660, 981 N.E.2d 256 [2012, Smith, J., dissenting] ). There are surely other remedies for law enforcement that is too aggressive. Here, the remedy seems obvious enough: the legislature can amend Vehicle and Traffic Law § 375[1] [b][i] to remove the ban on small, transparent stickers. That is preferable, I think, to dismissing a well-founded drunk driving prosecution because we think the sticker law has been over-enforced. Chief Judge LIPPMAN and Judges READ and SMITH concur with Judge GRAFFEO; Judge SMITH in a separate concurring opinion; Judge PIGOTT dissents in part in an opinion; Judge RIVERA taking no part.
Order affirmed.