Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Super. Ct. No. SCD200122. Larrie R. Brainard, Judge.
McINTYRE, J.
Michael Leroy Peaches appeals a judgment arising out of his conviction of selling or furnishing a controlled substance. He contends that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury, sua sponte, with CALCRIM No. 203, which tells the jury to consider the evidence as to each charge for each defendant separately, and that his conviction must be reversed as a result of the error. The Attorney General concedes that the failure to give the instruction was error in accordance with People v. Mask (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 450, 457, but argues that the error was harmless in light of other instructions given to the jury and the arguments of counsel at trial. We agree with the Attorney General's argument and affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On July 6, 2006, San Diego Police officers conducted an undercover buy-bust operation in which Detective Michael Spears bought cocaine base for $20. Peaches was charged and convicted for his involvement in the sale, which consisted of taking the $20 and handing it to codefendant Ismael Russell, who had the cocaine. (Russell was charged and convicted in the same trial of possessing and selling the cocaine.) The court placed Peaches on three-years' formal probation.
DISCUSSION
In criminal cases, the trial court must, even in the absence of a request, instruct on the general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the evidence. (People v. Edwards (1985) 39 Cal.3d 107, 117.) The general principles of law governing the case are those principles that are closely and openly connected with the facts before the court and necessary for the jury's understanding of the case. (Ibid.) In accordance with the foregoing, when multiple defendants are prosecuted in a single proceeding, the established case law requires the court to instruct the jury to separately consider the guilt or innocence of each defendant as to each charged offense. (People v. Mask, supra, 188 Cal.App.3d at p. 457.)
Here, although the court failed to so instruct the jury, we conclude that the error does not require a reversal of the judgment. (People v. Mask, supra, 188 Cal.App.3d at p. 457.) In evaluating the correctness of the instructions given to the jury, we look at all the instructions rather than merely a single instruction or a part of an instruction. (People v. Musselwhite (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1216, 1248; People v. Castillo (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1009, 1016.) The court's instructions to the jury included the following:
"The fact that a criminal charge has been filed against the defendant is not evidence that the charge is true. You must not be biased against a defendant just because he's been arrested, charged with a crime, or brought to trial.
"A defendant in a criminal case is presumed to be innocent. This presumption requires that the People prove each element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
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" . . . Unless the evidence proves the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, he is entitled to an acquittal, and you must find him not guilty.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
"Before you may rely on circumstantial evidence to conclude that a fact necessary to find a defendant guilty has been proved, you must be convinced that the People have proved each fact essential to that conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt.
"Also, before you may rely on circumstantial evidence to find a defendant guilty, you must be convinced that the only reasonable conclusion supported by the circumstantial evidence is that the defendant is guilty. . . .
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" . . . [A]s to count one[,] each of these gentlemen is accused of selling or participating in [the sale of cocaine base]. . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
"The People are not required to prove that any defendant had a motive to commit any of the crimes charged. In reaching your verdicts you may, however, consider whether the defendant had a motive.
"Having a motive may be a factor tending to show that the defendant is guilty. Not having a motive may be a factor for tending to show the defendant is not guilty."
The court also instructed the jury as to the requirements for aider and abettor culpability, including an instruction that in order to find a person other than the perpetrator guilty of selling cocaine, the jury had to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the perpetrator committed the crime, the defendant knew the perpetrator intended to commit a crime and, before or during the commission of the crime, the defendant intended to aid and abet the perpetrator in committing the crime and the defendant did in fact aid and abet the perpetrator's commission of the crime. The court's instruction as to the elements of count one referred to "the defendant" in the singular. We must presume the jury followed these instructions (People v. Horton (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1068, 1121), which collectively made clear that the prosecution was required to separately establish each defendant's culpability.
Because the court's instructions were sufficient to effectively inform the jury that it had to separately assess Peaches' guilt, the trial court's failure to specifically instruct the jury in that regard will support a reversal of the judgment only if there is a reasonable (rather than merely theoretical) possibility that the instructional error affected the outcome of the trial. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13; People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 165, 173; People v. Mayo (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 535, 538-539, 541, 543-549.) No such possibility is established in the record before us, as the arguments of all counsel (the prosecutor and both defense attorneys) reinforced that the guilt of each defendant had to be separately determined and the court provided the jury with a separate verdict form for Peaches as to count one. Under these circumstances, it is not reasonably probable that the jury would have found Peaches not guilty of selling cocaine base if the omitted instruction had been given and thus the instructional error was harmless. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: NARES, Acting P.J., AARON, J.