Opinion
A156770
01-28-2020
In re PAUL J., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. PAUL J., Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Contra Costa County Super. Ct. No. J18-01078)
Paul J. appeals from a juvenile court order declaring him a ward of the court and committing him to the Youthful Offender Treatment Program (YOTP), which is located in juvenile hall. He claims that his commitment to YOTP was unauthorized under Welfare and Institutions Code section 730, subdivision (a) (section 730(a)), because alternative placements exist in the county. We disagree and affirm.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise noted.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND
The facts underlying Paul's offense are not relevant to the issue on appeal. Briefly, in late 2018, when he was almost 18 years old, Paul attacked his mother and father. In December of that year, the Contra Costa County District Attorney filed a wardship petition under section 602, subdivision (a), alleging a felony count of assault by force likely to cause great bodily injury, with an accompanying allegation that Paul personally inflicted great bodily injury, and two misdemeanor counts of battery.
The allegations were made under Penal Code sections 245, subdivision (a)(4) (assault), 12022.7, subdivision (a) (infliction of great bodily injury), and 242 and 243, subdivision (a) (battery). --------
In January 2019, Paul pleaded no contest to the assault count, and the great-bodily-injury allegation and battery counts were dismissed. The following month, the juvenile court declared Paul a ward of the court with no termination date and committed him to YOTP for a period not to exceed four years or until he turned 21, whichever occurred first. In doing so, the court rejected Paul's request that he instead be placed at the Orin Allen Youth Rehabilitation Facility (OAYRF), noting it did "not believe that adequate services could be provided [there]."
II.
DISCUSSION
Paul claims that he could not be committed to juvenile hall under section 730(a). That statute provides, "When a minor is adjudged a ward of the court on the ground that he or she is a person described by Section 602, the court may order any of the types of treatment referred to in Section 727, and as an additional alternative, may commit the minor to a juvenile home, ranch, camp, or forestry camp. If there is no county juvenile home, ranch, camp, or forestry camp within the county, the court may commit the minor to the county juvenile hall." Paul's claim presents an issue of statutory interpretation that we review de novo. (People v. Prunty (2015) 62 Cal.4th 59, 71.)
Paul argues that the second sentence of section 730(a) authorizes a commitment to juvenile hall only if there is no ranch, camp, or forestry camp within a county. He points out that Contra Costa County has a ranch, OAYRF, and claims that his commitment to YOTP was therefore statutorily unauthorized. The Attorney General responds that the statute permits a commitment to juvenile hall even where another listed facility exists if placement at that facility is unavailable.
The Second District Court of Appeal addressed the same issue in In re Calvin S. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 522 (Calvin S.). Calvin S. determined that the second sentence of section 730(a) does not "implicitly preclude a commitment to juvenile hall where, as here, there may be a juvenile home, ranch, camp, or forestry camp within the county. Rather, that provision merely authorizes commitment to juvenile hall when one of the listed facilities would be appropriate but is not available." (Calvin S., at pp. 529-530.) Relying on section 202, subdivision (e)(4), which authorizes commitments to juvenile hall, in conjunction with "a juvenile court's 'great discretion in the disposition of juvenile matters' in general," Calvin S. concluded that "the proper interpretation of the second sentence of . . . section 730[(a)] . . . is one that augments the juvenile court's flexibility in fashioning orders at disposition, rather than restricts it." (Calvin S., at pp. 531-532.)
Paul J. claims that Calvin S. was wrongly decided and is inconsistent with section 730(a)'s plain meaning. He urges us to follow instead a pair of older cases concluding that the statute does not authorize a commitment to juvenile hall when an alternative facility exists in the county. The first case, In re Debra A. (1975) 48 Cal.App.3d 327 (Debra A.), addressed whether the minor was properly ordered " 'placed in a juvenile home, ranch, camp, forestry camp or County Juvenile Hall' " on five consecutive weekends as a condition of her probation. (Id. at pp. 328-329.) The Second District Court of Appeal concluded that the order's inclusion of juvenile hall was erroneous under section 730 because "Los Angeles County has a facility for detention of female minors in addition to its Juvenile Hall, and that place is named 'Las Palmas School for Girls.' " (Debra A., at p. 330.)
Calvin S. acknowledged that Debra A.'s interpretation of the relevant language was "plausible" in isolation. (Calvin S., supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at p. 530.) Nevertheless, Calvin S. declined to follow Debra A. because the decision "did not have to reconcile its interpretation . . . with the provision in . . . section 202, subdivision (e)(4), authorizing juvenile hall commitment," a statute that was enacted in 1984, several years after Debra A. (Calvin S., at p. 531.) Section 202 "contain[ed] a new statement of the purposes of the juvenile delinquency law, including, for the first time, 'a definition and statement as to the use of punishment' " and authorization of a commitment to juvenile hall. (Calvin S., at p. 531.) Nor had Debra A. "attempt[ed] to harmonize its interpretation with 'the broad discretion afforded to juvenile courts to make dispositional orders and impose conditions under . . . section 730' [citation] or a juvenile court's 'great discretion in the disposition of juvenile matters' in general." (Calvin S., at p. 531.)
We agree with Calvin S.'s analysis of Debra A. In addition, we note that Debra A.'s disposition is consistent with Calvin S.'s interpretation of section 730(a). In Debra A., the juvenile court clearly contemplated that placements other than juvenile hall were available, as it ordered the minor's weekend confinement to be "in a juvenile home, ranch, camp, forestry camp or County Juvenile Hall." (Debra A., 48 Cal.App.3d at p. 328, italics added.) Thus, the Debra A. minor's commitment to juvenile hall would not have been authorized even under Calvin S.'s interpretation of section 730(a). (See Calvin S., supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at p. 530 [statute "merely authorizes commitment to juvenile hall when one of the listed facilities would be appropriate but is not available"].) Here, in contrast, the juvenile court specifically determined that OAYRF was an inappropriate placement for Paul.
For similar reasons, the second case on which Paul relies, In re Gerald B. (1980) 105 Cal.App.3d 119, also provides little support for his reading of section 730(a). In that case, this division reversed a juvenile court order "calling for [the minor's] summary detention in juvenile hall on account of a reported absence from school." (Gerald B., at p. 126.) Gerald B. cited Debra A. in observing that even if the minor's probation had been otherwise validly revoked, the juvenile court "would have been expressly prohibited from ordering the minor's commitment to the county juvenile hall unless a less restrictive facility was unavailable," consistent with the "legislative intent that juvenile hall detention be employed as a last resort." (Gerald B., at pp. 126-127, italics omitted.) But as noted above, the legislative context changed with the subsequent enactment of section 202, which specifically authorizes "punishment that is consistent with the rehabilitative objectives" of juvenile delinquency law, including commitment to "juvenile hall." (§ 202, subds. (b), (e)(4).) Moreover, Gerald B.'s discussion is more consistent with Calvin S.'s interpretation of section 730(a) than with Paul's: Instead of emphasizing the existence of an alternative facility in a county as precluding placement in juvenile hall, Gerald B. emphasized the availability of such a facility as precluding placement in juvenile hall, which was to "be employed as a last resort." (Gerald B., at pp. 126-127.) At least under the circumstances here, where the juvenile court determined that placement in an alternative facility would be inappropriate, Gerald B. does not support Paul's position.
In short, we conclude that section 730(a) did not prevent the juvenile court from committing Paul to YOTP.
III.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
/s/_________
Humes, P.J. WE CONCUR: /s/_________
Margulies, J. /s/_________
Banke, J.