Opinion
C080829
05-29-2018
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DINETTE PATTERSON, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. 14F01427)
A group of friends who had known each other for years reconnected after growing apart. In the process, defendant Dinette Patterson stabbed Charles Jordan, killing him. A complaint deemed an information charged defendant with murder and personal use of a deadly weapon. (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 12022, subd. (b)(1).) Defendant's first jury trial ended in a mistrial. A second jury found defendant guilty and the court sentenced defendant to 26 years to life in state prison. Defendant appeals, arguing when the defense moved for a judgment of acquittal at the conclusion of the first trial insufficient evidence supported the verdict, and the court erred in admitting testimony concerning motive during the second trial. We shall affirm the judgment.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Following a reunion of six friends, defendant stabbed Jordan. A complaint deemed an information charged defendant with first degree murder and alleged defendant personally used a deadly weapon. A jury trial followed. After the prosecution rested, the court denied defendant's motion for a judgment of acquittal under section 1118.1. After the jury deadlocked, the trial court declared a mistrial.
The court impaneled a jury for a second trial. The following evidence was introduced at the second trial.
The Group of Friends
Defendant, Jordan, Henderson Rogers, Dennis Merritt, Darrell Gaines, and Jerome Griffin knew each other for over fifteen years. Although they had drifted apart, they got together again in 2013, gathering in Merritt's apartment.
The Gathering
In March 2014 Merritt and Jordan were playing video games when Rogers and Griffin arrived. They drank beer and smoked marijuana.
Defendant arrived. He shook hands with everyone and sat next to Jordan. Everyone joked about defendant's ring, which sported the image of a dog. Defendant said it was to enhance his punching when he got into a fight. The group watched Merritt and Jordan play video games.
When Gaines arrived, defendant was in the bathroom cutting his hair. Gaines helped cut defendant's hair and noticed the handles of two hunting knives inside defendant's backpack. A short time later, Rogers and Griffin, followed thereafter by Gaines, left the apartment. Defendant, Jordan, and Merritt remained.
Merritt lived in the apartment with his two sons. On the day of the murder only one son was present, playing in his room. Jordan frequently visited the apartment and was very close to Merritt.
The Murder
After Rogers, Griffin, and Gaines left, Merritt and Jordan continued playing video games. Merritt glimpsed defendant through his peripheral vision. Suddenly Merritt heard a double thud, like two punches. It was louder than the sound of the video game. Merritt jumped up and looked at Jordan who sat by the front door. Merritt yelled at defendant, "what are you doing?"
Defendant stood over Jordan, who said "you stabbed me." Defendant turned slowly and looked at Merritt. Merritt saw defendant glance into the hallway. Merritt saw his son standing still and he took his son back to the bedroom and told him to stay there. After he left the room, Merritt looked down the hallway and called out "man, what [are] you doing, man?" After receiving no response, Merritt called 911.
On the 911 call Merritt shouted, "He's not breathing," "Oh my God," "He stabbed my friend, man," and "I see blood everywhere." As the operator attempted to ask questions Merritt said he did not know where the victim had been stabbed.
The Aftermath
Security camera footage showed Merritt and his son stepping out of the apartment door that evening. Merritt and his son waited downstairs for the police to arrive. Merritt was crying and upset. No security footage showed defendant leaving the apartment.
Kiera Spencer, a neighbor, testified she checked on Merritt that evening. Spencer saw Merritt crying and screaming for help on his cell phone. Merritt told her "his friend had stabbed his friend" and gave her the phone to talk to the 911 operator. The 911 operator asked Spencer to begin CPR. However, Jordan's eyes were open and blood was coming out of his mouth, so Spencer could not perform CPR.
Deputy Andrew Stepanick arrived at the scene and Merritt directed him to the apartment. Stepanick found Jordan slumped on a couch next to the front door. Officers found the master bedroom window open. Merritt later showed detectives dried blood on the windowsill. Beneath the window is an alley which leads to a wooden fence with broken boards allowing passage to a vacant lot. DNA analysis of the blood yielded a mixture of two possible contributors consistent with defendant and Jordan.
A forensic pathologist found Jordan had been stabbed five times resulting in six wounds. Jordan's injuries included stabbing wounds in the collarbone, chest, diaphragm, liver, and shoulder.
Merritt cooperated with detectives. He consented to several searches of his apartment and gave them his password to his Facebook account.
Merritt also answered questions about defendant's ex-girlfriend, Sarah Bricksin. Merritt met Bricksin online in 2012 or 2013 and they had sex on their second date. Afterwards they became friends and Merritt introduced her to defendant in 2013. Defendant and Bricksin began a romantic relationship and he moved into her apartment. One night, defendant invited Jorden over to Bricksin's apartment. Defendant told Merritt that Jordan and Bricksin had sex after defendant left the room.
Bricksin testified she met defendant through Merritt. After living together for a few months, Bricksin considered asking defendant to move out. Defendant was abusing methamphetamine and began accusing her of having sex with other people. However, he also asked her to have three-way sex with his friend Jordan, which she declined.
Once, Bricksin fell asleep in her daughter's room instead of the room she shared with defendant. Defendant pulled Bricksin out of the bed by her hair, held a knife to her throat, and accused her of cheating on him. Bricksin managed to calm defendant down, but after he went outside the next morning she called the police. Bricksin did not tell officers about defendant's attack or his drug use; she just wanted him out of the apartment.
This incident was the only time defendant was violent and Bricksin had never witnessed defendant being violent toward anyone else. After Bricksin learned of defendant's arrest, she contacted police to tell them about the incident in 2013.
Defense Case
Defendant testified in his own defense. According to defendant, Merritt stabbed Jordan.
Defendant often gathered with a group of friends which included Merritt and Jordan. The day of the murder, defendant arrived at Merritt's apartment to hang out with friends. He left his backpack in the kitchen and went into the bathroom to cut his hair. Gaines helped him cut his hair. Defendant stayed in the bathroom for one to two hours.
When defendant walked out of the bathroom, he heard Jordan say, "Why you stabbed me?" Defendant saw Merritt standing over Jordan with "this rage in his eyes." Defendant had seen Merritt angry before, so he jumped out the window, leaving behind a backpack. Defendant ran down the alley and knew how to get away because he had used that route before. When he reached a vacant lot, defendant did not yell for help or attempt to flag down drivers. Defendant did not go to the sheriff's station for help.
Instead, defendant went to San Diego to visit his brother. Defendant did not contact police in Sacramento or San Diego because he did not think Jordan had died. Nor did defendant call friends to check on Jordan's condition. Defendant did not tell his brother about the stabbing. He intended to return to Sacramento before his arrest in San Diego. Defendant admitted three convictions for domestic violence, battery with serious bodily injury, and a felon in possession of a firearm.
Defendant also testified about his relationship with Bricksin. Merritt had sex with Bricksin first, and then she had sex with defendant. Defendant asked Bricksin to have sex with Jordan, which she did once. Defendant was not jealous because his relationship with Bricksin was casual.
Defendant testified he never lived with Bricksin and never threatened her with a knife. Bricksin called the police when defendant refused to return two watches she had given him. When officers arrived, defendant returned the watches and they split up.
During this period, defendant testified he injected methamphetamine almost daily. He did not do so the day of the murder. Defendant kept a knife for protection because he was homeless. Two or three times a week he slept on a couch in Merritt's apartment. Defendant had witnessed Merritt get violent with Jordan and Rodgers.
Two days after the murder, defendant met with his brother in San Diego. Defendant did not have his backpack with him. Ten days later defendant was arrested. His backpack was never located.
Eugene Roeder, Ph.D., testified as a clinical and forensic psychology expert. Dr. Roeder testified defendant experiences delusional thinking which is paranoid in nature. In his interview with defendant, defendant stated he had been up for several days before the stabbing. Defendant injected methamphetamine and could not remember what happened. He did not recall going to Merritt's apartment.
Dr. Roeder acknowledged defendant's trial testimony was inconsistent with his statements in the interview. However, Dr. Roeder's reaffirmed his diagnosis of defendant. According to Dr. Roeder, mentally ill individuals' memories may not be precise, but they still can remember some things.
Dr. Roeder testified defendant's recollection of events was not consistent with police reports. In addition, he stated defendant was sometimes not truthful during their interview. Nor has defendant ever been diagnosed with any psychological impairment before.
Verdict and Sentencing
The jury found defendant guilty of murder and found he personally used a deadly weapon. The court sentenced defendant to 26 years to life in state prison: 25 years to life on count one, plus one year on the enhancement. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
MOTION FOR ACQUITTAL IN THE FIRST TRIAL
Defendant argues his first degree murder conviction must be reduced to second degree murder, because the trial court erred in the first trial in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal under section 1118.1. Defendant insists that while evidence at the conclusion of the prosecution's case in the first trial was sufficient to establish that he stabbed the victim and the stabbing was done with malice, evidence of premeditation and deliberation was completely lacking; a finding of those elements could only have been based on speculation. As a consequence, he could only be tried and found guilty of second degree murder in his second trial.
Preliminarily, the People argue defendant has failed to preserve this claim on appeal. People v. Harris (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1269 (Harris), is at odds with the People's position. In Harris, the defendant was charged with two counts of murder in the first degree. At the close of the prosecution case, the defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal under section 1118.1 on the second count, asserting there was insufficient evidence of premeditation and deliberation. The court denied the motion, but thereafter the jury could not reach a unanimous verdict on the second count and a mistrial was declared. On appeal, the defendant asserted that the trial court erroneously denied his motion for acquittal. The Supreme Court agreed with the defendant the trial court's denial of his motion for acquittal left him open to retrial for first degree murder and thus the issue could be raised on appeal notwithstanding the mistrial. (Harris, at p. 1286.) We thus reject the People's position and address defendant's argument.
At oral argument the People asserted that, unlike the present case, Harris, supra, 43 Cal.4th 1269 did not involve an appeal following a second trial after the defendant's motion to acquit in the first trial was denied and the jury subsequently deadlocked. According to the People, the rule in such circumstance is that the defendant must object to retrial on the charge that was the subject of the motion to acquit. Having failed to do so, the defendant forfeits the right to challenge the ruling on the motion. The People cite no authority for such a rule and, most importantly, failed to assert such a theory in its respondent's brief. The argument is thus waived. (People v. Grajales (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 580, 591-592.)
The Prosecution Case—First Trial
Much of the evidence introduced at the first trial was also introduced at the second trial. However, at the second trial the prosecution introduced evidence that defendant used methamphetamine and that he was jealous that Bricksin had cheated on him. The prosecution also introduced evidence at the second trial that defendant had suggested Jordan have sexual relations with Bricksin 10 months before the murder and had once threatened Bricksin with a knife in a jealous rage. This additional evidence, missing from the prosecution's case in chief at the first trial, supported a finding of premeditation and deliberation.
At the conclusion of the prosecution's case in chief at the first trial, the defense moved for a judgment of acquittal, asserting the absence of any evidence of premeditation; the stabbing was a spontaneous act. The question presented here is whether the record of trial at the close of the prosecution's case reflects substantial evidence of premeditation and deliberation essential to a finding of first degree murder.
Section 1118.1 permits a defendant to test the adequacy of the evidence. It provides: "In a case tried before a jury, the court on motion of the defendant . . . at the close of the evidence on either side and before the case is submitted to the jury for decision, shall order the entry of a judgment of acquittal of one or more of the offenses charged in the accusatory pleading if the evidence then before the court is insufficient to sustain a conviction of such offense or offenses on appeal."
We uphold the trial court's denial of a motion to acquit under section 1118.1 where, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and presuming every fact which the trier of fact could have reasonably deduced from the evidence, there is substantial evidence to support the finding on every element of the charge. We independently review the trial court's ruling. (People v. Scott (2011) 52 Cal.4th 452, 487; People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1212-1213.)
In response to the motion, the prosecution pointed to evidence of planning: that defendant brought luggage with knives and waited for everyone but the victim and the apartment owner to leave before committing the act. The court invited defense counsel to respond, but he declined, whereupon the court opined that there was sufficient evidence to allow the jury to decide, pointing to the fact that defendant brought the knife with him.
On appeal, defendant dismisses the prosecution's arguments at trial: the fact that defendant brought a knife to the apartment is of no consequence in light of evidence that defendant always had a knife, and there was no evidence to show that defendant would have expected the victim to be at the apartment that day. In light of this evidentiary vacuum, defendant insists that the verdict rendered at the second trial must be reduced to a judgment of guilty of second degree murder.
The adequacy of evidence supporting premeditation and deliberation has been the subject of numerous published decisions. There are no hard and fast rules. In People v. Anderson (1968) 70 Cal.2d 15, 26-27 (Anderson), our Supreme Court undertook to articulate standards for determining premeditation and deliberation based on a review of the published cases. Thus, evidence establishing premeditation and deliberation include: (1) facts about a defendant's behavior before the incident that show planning; (2) facts about any prior relationship or conduct with the victim from which the jury could infer motive; and (3) facts about the manner of the killing from which the jury could infer the defendant intended to kill the victim according to a preconceived plan. (Ibid.)
The Anderson standards are guides to analysis; they are not rules and they are not exclusive. "Unreflective reliance on Anderson for a definition of premeditation is inappropriate. The Anderson analysis was intended as a framework to assist reviewing courts in assessing whether the evidence supports an inference that the killing resulted from preexisting reflection and weighing of considerations. It did not refashion the elements of first degree murder or alter the substantive law of murder in any way. [Citation.] Anderson identifies categories of evidence relevant to premeditation and deliberation that we 'typically' find sufficient to sustain convictions for first degree murder." (People v. Thomas (1992) 2 Cal.4th 489, 517 (Thomas).) Evidence of all three Anderson elements is not essential to sustain a conviction. (People v. Edwards (1991) 54 Cal.3d 787, 813-814.)
It is undisputed that defendant carried a knife in the backpack he brought with him to the apartment. The trial court found this fact significant; it supported the inference that defendant planned the murder. Defendant minimize its significance by arguing defendant regularly carried a knife in his backpack. However, as the People noted at oral argument, defendant was homeless and carried knives and other personal articles with him in light of his nomadic lifestyle. But on the evening of the crime, his personal belongings were elsewhere, at a friend's dwelling. It is significant that he chose to bring a knife with him to the gathering of friends that preceded the murder rather than leaving it behind with his other belongings. In any event, the significance of his possession of a knife was for the jury to determine in light of all the evidence presented, including defendant's actions leading up to the crime.
Evidence at the first trial established that defendant, Jordan, and Gaines hung around with friends. Jordan was a frequent visitor at Merritt's apartment. The day of the murder, the friends gathered at Merritt's apartment, including Jordan and defendant. In the apartment, defendant waited for all the other guests to leave except for Jordan. As Jordan played video games, defendant stabbed him five times causing six deep wounds. Defendant fled the apartment out of a second-floor window and down a nearby alley.
The method of killing by itself may support a conclusion that sufficient evidence supports a finding of premeditated murder. (People v. Memro (1995) 11 Cal.4th 786, 863-864.) Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational jury could infer from this evidence that defendant brought a concealed knife to a gathering of friends, waited until the victim was alone and preoccupied and then repeatedly and viciously stabbed him, and that defendant harbored sufficient "preexisting reflection" before committing the deadly act. (Thomas, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 517.)
Defendant cites People v. Boatman (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1253 (Boatman) in disagreement. In Boatman, the appellate court found a lack of any evidence of planning to support a conviction for first degree murder: "Defendant, along with his younger brother, picked up Marth [the victim] from her house and drove back to his home, not to a remote or isolated location. The house was occupied by four other people who could identify him. There is no evidence that defendant left the room or the house to get a gun, or that he even moved from his squatting position on the floor. Indeed, the only evidence regarding his possession of the gun was that he took it away from Marth just prior to the shooting. Defendant testified that he did not intend to shoot Marth." (Id. at p. 1267) In addition, the defendant's behavior after the shooting—attempting to resuscitate the victim and notifying the police—was consistent with someone horrified and distraught, not someone who had fulfilled a preconceived plan. (Ibid.)
Defendant analogizes the facts of the case before us to Boatman. The analogy fails. From all accounts, the murder in Boatman appeared to be a spontaneous act, consummated by the pull of a trigger from a gun wrested from the victim. Here, defendant brought the knife with him to the apartment where Jordan and other friends gathered. He waited until all the other guests left, stood over Jordan, and stabbed him deeply and repeatedly, with a coolness and calculation at odds with the notion of an impulsive act. After the stabbing, defendant jumped out a back window and fled into an alley, darted through an opening in a fence, and thereafter left town. Unlike the court in Boatman, the trial court here did not err in denying defendant's motion for acquittal in the first trial.
ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE OF UNCHARGED ACT
Defendant challenges the trial court's admission of evidence of the prior bad act, his assault on Bricksin with a knife. According to defendant, this evidence was cumulative of other admitted evidence relevant to motive. In addition, defendant argues the prior bad act focused on identity, not motive.
Background
Prior to trial, the People moved to admit evidence of uncharged acts under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b) to prove motive. Defendant opposed the motion.
Following argument, the court, citing People v. Walker (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 782, determined motive may be established by uncharged acts that differ from the charged crimes if they share common features. The court found jealousy could be a motivating factor of murder when both the defendant and the victim had a common girlfriend.
According to the court, both the uncharged assault against Bricksin and the murder of Jordan were unprovoked and involved a knife and drugs: "I would say the major common theme is perhaps the theme of jealousy, both in the prior threats and thoughts of this person is cheating on me, this person is having a relationship with somebody else."
The court also considered Evidence Code section 352: "[T]he People's theory that a jealousy manifests itself in violence, particularly with regard to a knife, and that is true in both instances. . . . [¶] The relevance is high, particularly when you consider that, as I understand the homicide, there doesn't appear to be any other explanation or provoking stimulus or trigger, either in words or in anything. It just appears to happen instantaneously and for no apparent reason. So the probative value of that is, at least trying to get to the defendant's mindset, in my view, is high [and] it is not substantially outweighed by the possible prejudice of that prior offense. [¶] . . . Further, I don't believe there is any significant chance for confusion or a mixing of the issues between the homicide event and the 1101(b) event . . . ."
As noted, Bricksin testified she was defendant's girlfriend prior to the murder. One night she fell asleep in her daughter's bed. Defendant pulled her out of the bed by her hair, held a knife to her throat, and accused her of cheating. Defendant believed Bricksin and Jordan had sex.
The court instructed pursuant to CALCRIM No. 303: "During the trial, certain evidence was admitted for a limited purpose. You may consider that evidence only for that limited purpose and for no other." (CALCRIM No. 303, as given.) In addition, the court instructed on the limited use of uncharged offenses under CALCRIM No. 375: "If you decide the defendant committed the uncharged offense, you may but are not required to, consider that evidence for the limited purpose of deciding whether or not: [¶] The defendant had a motive to commit the offense alleged in this case." (CALCRIM No. 375, as given.) The court further instructed: "Do not consider this evidence for any other purpose. [¶] Do not conclude from this evidence that the defendant has a bad character or is disposed to commit crime. [¶] If you conclude the defendant committed the uncharged offense . . . [i]t is not sufficient by itself to prove that the defendant is guilty of the charged crime." (CALCRIM No. 375, as given.)
Discussion
In general, "evidence of a person's character or a trait of his or her character (whether in the form of an opinion, evidence of reputation, or evidence of specific instances of his or her conduct) is inadmissible when offered to prove his or her conduct on a specified occasion." (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (a).) Such evidence is admissible, however, "when relevant to prove some fact (such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident . . .) other than his or her disposition to commit such an act." (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (b).)
When the commission of the criminal act is a disputed issue, evidence of motive may become relevant. "Motive is itself a state-of-mind or state-of-emotion fact. Motive is an idea, belief, or emotion that impels or incites one to act in accordance with his state of mind or emotion. Thus, evidence, offered to prove motive, that defendant committed an uncharged offense meets the test of relevancy by virtue of the circumstantial-evidence-reasoning process that accepts as valid the principle that one tends to act in accordance with his state of mind or emotion." (People v. Spector (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1335, 1383 (Spector).) "Other crimes evidence is admissible to establish two different types of categories of motive evidence. In the first category, 'the uncharged act supplies the motive for the charged crime; the uncharged act is cause, and the charged crime is effect. [Citation.] 'In the second category, the uncharged act evidence the existence of a motive, but the act does not supply the motive. . . . [T]he motive is the cause, and both the charged and uncharged acts are effects. Both crimes are explainable as a result of the same motive.' " (Id. at p. 1381.)
As the Supreme Court has pointed out, a continuum exists concerning the degree of similarity between the charged and uncharged offense required for admissibility, depending on the purpose for which the evidence is to be introduced: "The least degree of similarity . . . is required in order to prove intent. . . . In order to be admissible [for that purpose], the uncharged misconduct must be sufficiently similar to support the inference that the defendant ' "probably harbor[ed] the same intent in each instance." [Citations.]' " (People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 402.) In contrast, a high degree of similarity is required to prove common design or plan, and the highest degree of similarity is required to prove identity. (Id. at pp. 402-403.)
In addition, to its relevance to an issue other than predisposition or propensity, to be admissible under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b), the probative value of the charged crimes must be substantial and not outweighed by the probability that its admission would create a serious danger of undue prejudice, confusing the issues or misleading the jury. (People v. Kipp (1998) 18 Cal.4th 349, 371.)
Defendant claims the trial court erred in failing to recognize the prior bad act against Bricksin was merely cumulative as to the existence of motive and in failing to recognize motive in the present case bore on identity. We disagree.
The court admitted the prior uncharged act as relevant to defendant's motive in stabbing Jordan: defendant was jealous of Jordan's relationship with Bricksin. Several months before the murder, defendant told Merritt he thought Jordan and Bricksin had sex behind his back. One night, when Bricksin fell asleep in her daughter's bed, defendant pulled her out by her hair. He held a knife to Bricksin's throat and accused her of cheating. Defendant's attack caught Bricksin by surprise.
Both the uncharged assault and defendant's stabbing of Jordan were explainable, as the trial court reasoned, as provoked by the same motive: jealousy. The evidence of defendant's prior assault of Bricksin was admissible because it tended to show defendant acted with the same state of mind or emotion in both the assault and Jordan's murder. (Spector, supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at p. 1383.)
Nor was the evidence cumulative or unduly inflammatory. We agree with the trial court that the uncharged assault was more probative and prejudicial because there was no other explanation, provocation, or trigger for defendant's stabbing of Jordan and because the evidence revealed defendant's "mindset." The trial court minimized the possible prejudicial impact of the evidence by instructing the jury that the uncharged assault could not be considered as proof of defendant's bad character or by itself sufficient to prove defendant guilty. We find no error in the trial court's admission of the prior uncharged act.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
RAYE, P. J. We concur: ROBIE, J. HOCH, J.