Manning claims that our decision is inconsistent with two cases where the appellate court held that counterclaims against the State were barred by sovereign immunity. We recognize that the courts in People ex rel. Department of Transportation v. Cook Development Co., 274 Ill. App.3d 175, 653 N.E.2d 843 (1995), and People v. Patrick J. Gorman Consultants, Inc., 111 Ill. App.3d 729, 444 N.E.2d 776 (1982), concluded that counterclaims against the State were properly dismissed because of sovereign immunity. The courts, in both cases, determined that a party may not raise a counterclaim against the State in the circuit court if the same action would ordinarily be barred by the State Lawsuit Immunity Act.

It is clear that Illinois law recognizes some form of prosecutorial immunity, though Illinois courts often analyze prosecutorial immunity under the rubric of "public official immunity." See Aboufariss, 713 N.E.2d at 812 (applying "public official immunity" to state law claims against an assistant state's attorney); People v. Patrick J. Gorman Consultants, Inc., 444 N.E.2d 776, 778-79 (Ill.App.Ct. 1982) (applying "public official immunity" to state law claims against the Illinois Attorney General and his assistants); contra White, 861 N.E.2d at 1088 (discussing "absolute prosecutorial immunity" in a case involving only state law claims against state's attorneys). Under Illinois public official immunity, officials are protected only for acts "performed within their official discretion." Aboufariss, 713 N.E.2d at 812 (citing Patrick J. Gorman, 444 N.E.2d at 779).

That is the critical issue for decision, an issue on which the appellate court has issued conflicting opinions. Compare the opinion below in this case ( 292 Ill. App.3d 346 (defendant may raise issues in the circuit court by way of counterclaim otherwise barred by sovereign immunity)) with People ex rel. Department of Transportation v. Cook Development Co., 274 Ill. App.3d 175 (1995) (circuit court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate a counterclaim raising claims barred by sovereign immunity), and People v. Patrick J. Gorman Consultants, Inc., 111 Ill. App.3d 729 (1982) (same). The Director of the Illinois Department of Conservation (the Director) filed a complaint against the defendant, Patrick Nickerson, in the circuit court of McDonough County.

(Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 85, par. 2-201; People v. Patrick J. Gorman Consultants, Inc. (1982), 111 Ill. App.3d 729, 731.) Discretionary acts have been defined as those "which are unique to the particular public office and not merely ministerial in nature."

Accordingly, pleadings which state mere conclusions and characterize acts rather than set forth facts are insufficient to state a cause of action. People v. Patrick J. Gorman Consultants, Inc. (1982), 111 Ill. App.3d 729, 444 N.E.2d 776. • 2 In the present case, upon review of the pleadings, it is our opinion that count I of plaintiffs' amended complaint is replete with vague allegations, characterizations and conclusions and lacks the necessary well-pleaded facts to support an allegation of unlawful restraint.

( 98 Ill. App.3d 445, 447, 424 N.E.2d 821, 822-23.) Similar reasoning was used recently in People v. Patrick J. Gorman Consultants, Inc. (1982), 111 Ill. App.3d 729, 444 N.E.2d 776. There, the Attorney General filed charges against the defendant for violation of a statute, and the defendant counterclaimed against the State for damages, alleging that the action was tortiously brought and in violation of the Federal Civil Rights Act. The trial court dismissed the counterclaim, finding that the State was immune from suit.

The Illinois Appellate Court seems not to think so. See, e.g., Frank v. Garnati, 370 Ill.Dec. 931, 989 N.E.2d 319, 322 (Ill.App.2013); White v. City of Chicago, 369 Ill.App.3d 765, 308 Ill.Dec. 518, 861 N.E.2d 1083, 1087–88 (2006); Weimann v. Kane County, 150 Ill.App.3d 962, 104 Ill.Dec. 110, 502 N.E.2d 373, 377 (1986); People v. Patrick J. Gorman Consultants, Inc., 111 Ill.App.3d 729, 67 Ill.Dec. 540, 444 N.E.2d 776, 779 (1982); Coleson v. Spomer, 31 Ill.App.3d 563, 334 N.E.2d 344, 347 (1975). And the state's supreme court has not called a halt to the trend in the intermediate appellate court.

That's not absolute immunity. But 71 years on, it is doubtful that this is still the law in Illinois. The Illinois Appellate Court seems not to think so. See, e.g., Frank v. Garnati, 989 N.E.2d 319, 322 (Ill. App. 2013); White v. City of Chicago, 861 N.E.2d 1083, 1087-88 (Ill. App. 2006); Weimann v. Kane County, 502 N.E.2d 373, 377 (Ill. App. 1986); People v. Patrick J. Gorman Consultants, Inc., 444 N.E.2d 776, 779 (Ill. App. 1982); Coleson v. Spomer, 334 N.E.2d 344, 347 (Ill. App. 1975). And the state's supreme court has not called a halt to the trend in the intermediate appellate court. E.g., Frank v. Garnati, 996 N.E.2d 12 (Ill. 2013) (denying appeal).

As Illinois law now stands, the Attorney General is not authorized to waive Illinois' Eleventh Amendment immunity. People v. Patrick J. Gorman Consultants, Inc., 111 Ill. App.3d 729, 67 Ill.Dec. 540, 542, 444 N.E.2d 776, 778 (1982) ("[O]nly the General Assembly, and not the Attorney General can determine when claims against the state will be allowed. And the legislature has determined that sovereign immunity is waived only when suits against the State are brought pursuant to the Court of Claims Act.") (citations omitted); see also Local 3236 of Ill. Fed'n of State Office Educs. v. Illinois State Bd. of Educ., 121 Ill. App.3d 160, 76 Ill.Dec. 663, 666-667, 459 N.E.2d 300, 303-304 (1984).

Because the initiation and prosecution of criminal charges are core prosecutorial functions, Defendant is entitled to absolute immunity for these acts. See White, 308 Ill.Dec. 518, 861 N.E.2d at 1088; Aboufariss, 239 Ill. Dec. 273, 713 N.E.2d at 812; People v. Patrick J. Gorman Consultants, Inc., 111 Ill.App.3d 729, 67 Ill.Dec. 540, 444 N.E.2d 776, 779 (1982). Indeed, Plaintiff concedes that "in filing the complaint against him and initiating criminal charges, Defendant was acting in his core prosecutorial role and would thus be entitled to absolute immunity."