Opinion
B164270.
10-15-2003
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CHAD PASTOR, Defendant and Appellant.
Marta I. Stanton, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters and G. Tracey Letteau, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Chad Pastor appeals from the judgment entered after a jury convicted him of receiving stolen property. He contends his conviction is not supported by substantial evidence and the trial court erred in instructing the jury. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. The Charges
Pastor was charged with one count of grand theft auto (Pen. Code, § 487, subd. (d)(1)) and one count of receiving stolen property (§ 496, subd. (a)).
All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified.
2. The Peoples Evidence
On June 19, 2002 about 9:00 p.m. Xochi Diaz parked and locked her Honda Civic across the street from her house on Pepperwood Avenue in Long Beach. She was awakened the next morning about 4:00 a.m. by her mother-in-law, who was concerned because she had heard the altered muffler of Diazs car about 3:00 a.m. Diaz looked outside and saw that her car was no longer where she had parked it the night before. She had not given anyone permission to drive her car and, therefore, reported to the police her car had been stolen.
About 5:00 a.m. on the morning of June 20 Janifer Hardin was asleep in her apartment on East Spring Street in Long Beach when she was awakened by "banging against a garage and tools." She looked out her window to the nearby carports and saw two men near a small Honda. One man had a tool and was trying to open the hood of the car, while the other man was walking back and forth near the car as if he were acting as a look out. The two men took turns trying to open the hood. Hardin noticed a third man inside the car. Hardin called the police. Hardin identified Pastor — at a field show-up and at trial — as one of the men who had been outside of the Honda.
When the police arrived, the two men outside the Honda ran from the car. Long Beach Police Officer Javier Valencia found Pastor at a carport about 100 feet from where the Honda was parked. Tools were found on the ground near the Honda, one of which was similar to that seen by Hardin. The other man who had been outside the Honda was not found. The man who had been inside the car was apprehended.
Pastor was taken into custody, and Long Beach Police Officer Todd Jenkins advised Pastor of his rights to remain silent, to the presence of an attorney, and, if indigent, to appointed counsel. (Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [86 S.Ct. 1062, 16 L.Ed.2d 694].) Pastor agreed to talk to Officer Jenkins and said someone had driven him to Lakewood where he stole the Honda Civic and then drove it back to the location on East First Street. There, Pastor said, he met another individual and they agreed to strip parts of the stolen car.
When her car was recovered, Diaz noticed it had been damaged: The center console area was torn off, the steering wheel column was damaged, the wheels and rims were scratched, the moon roof did not shut properly and the doors had small dings on them.
3. The Defenses Evidence
Rachelli Pastor, Pastors wife, testified she was with Pastor, her brother and two other friends at Pastors house in the evening on June 19, 2002. According to Rachelli, Pastor watched television and played video games all night and did not leave the house until about 4:50 a.m. the following morning when he drove his two friends home. One of those friends lives in an apartment on East Spring Street in Long Beach. Rachelli testified Pastor had a reputation for being an honest person.
Because Pastor and his wife share the same last name, we refer to Rachelli Pastor by her first name for purposes of clarity.
Pastor testified in his own defense. He said he was watching television and playing video games at his house on the night of June 19 and did not leave until 4:50 a.m. the following morning when he drove his two friends home. Pastor testified he was at the location on East Spring Street in Long Beach because he had driven his friend who lives there home. According to Pastor, when he arrived at his friends apartment, he asked his friend for a glass of water and waited outside for his friend to bring it to him. After drinking the water, Pastor said he was walking back to his car when he was stopped by the police.
Pastor denied he had stolen the Honda Civic, driven it to East Spring Street, tried to open the hood of the car and tampered with its parts. He testified he had no idea the Honda Civic had been stolen. Pastor also denied he had told Officer Jenkins that he had stolen the car and tampered with its parts. According to Pastor, Officer Jenkins was lying when he testified Pastor had admitted stealing the car and stripping its parts and Hardin was lying when she said she saw Pastor trying to open the hood of the car.
4. The Jurys Verdict and Sentencing
The jury found Pastor guilty of receiving stolen property but not guilty of grand theft auto. The trial court placed Pastor on formal probation for three years. Pastor appealed.
CONTENTIONS
Pastor contends: (1) his conviction should be reversed because there was no substantial evidence he possessed the car and had knowledge that the car was stolen; (2) the trial court committed prejudicial error by refusing to instruct the jury that mere proximity to stolen goods is insufficient to infer possession; (3) the trial court committed prejudicial error by refusing to instruct the jury with CALJIC No. 1.21, the definition of "knowingly"; and (4) the trial court misstated CALJIC Nos. 2.22, 3.31 and 14.65 when orally instructing the jury.
DISCUSSION
1. Substantial Evidence Supports Pastors Conviction
In reviewing a claim of insufficiency of evidence in a criminal case, we determine whether, on the entire record viewed in the light most favorable to the People, any rational trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Ochoa (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1199, 1206; People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 667.) "In making this assessment the court looks to the whole record, not just the evidence favorable to the [defendant] to determine if the evidence supporting the verdict is substantial in light of other facts. [Citations.]" (Holt, at p. 667.)
"Substantial evidence" in this context means "evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value — such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578; accord, People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 848-849 ["`"When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged on appeal, the court must review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it contains substantial evidence — i.e., evidence that is credible and of solid value — from which a rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." [Citations.]"].) "Although the jury is required to acquit a criminal defendant if it finds the evidence susceptible of two reasonable interpretations, one of which favors guilt and the other innocence, it is the jury, not the appellate court, which must be convinced of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." (People v. Millwee (1998) 18 Cal.4th 96, 132.)
"[T]o sustain a conviction for receiving stolen property, the prosecution must prove (1) the property was stolen; (2) the defendant knew the property was stolen; and, (3) the defendant had possession of the stolen property. [Citations.]" (People v. Land (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 220, 223.) Pastor contends the evidence is insufficient to support two of the elements of the crime: knowledge and possession.
"The knowledge element of receiving stolen property is normally proved not by direct evidence but by an inference from circumstantial evidence. [Citation.]" (People v. Alvarado (1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 1003, 1019.) For example, knowledge may be "inferred from the defendants failure to explain how he came to possess a stolen item or his offer of an unsatisfactory explanation or from suspicious circumstances attendant upon his possession of the item. [Citations.]" (Id. at pp. 1019-1020.) Moreover, "proof of knowing possession by a defendant of recently stolen property raises a strong inference of the other element of the crime: the defendants knowledge of the tainted nature of the property. This inference is so substantial that only `slight additional corroborating evidence need be adduced in order to permit a finding of guilty. [Citation.]" (People v. Anderson (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 414, 421.)
"Possession of the stolen property may be actual or constructive and need not be exclusive. [Citations.] Physical possession is also not a requirement. It is sufficient if the defendant acquires a measure of control or dominion over the stolen property. [Citations.]" (People v. Land, supra, 30 Cal.App.4th at pp. 223-224, fn. omitted.) "However, . . . mere presence near the stolen property, or access to the location where the stolen property is found is not sufficient evidence of possession, standing alone, to sustain a conviction for receiving stolen property. [Citations.]" (Id. at p. 224.) Nevertheless, "the necessary additional circumstances may, in some fact contexts, be rather slight." (People v. Zyduck (1969) 270 Cal.App.2d 334, 336.)
The evidence here is sufficient to establish that Pastor both possessed the stolen Honda Civic and knew the car was stolen. Hardin identified Pastor as one of the men she saw trying to open the hood of the car with a tool. Officer Jenkins testified Pastor admitted taking the car to strip its parts. Tools, including one similar to that held by the men who were trying to open the hood of the car, were discovered near the vehicle. This evidence is sufficient to allow a rational trier of fact to conclude Pastor possessed the car and knew it was stolen. In other words, we cannot say that no rational trier of fact reasonably could have concluded from such evidence that Pastor had the requisite possession and knowledge to be guilty of receiving stolen property. Pastors denial that he possessed the car and knew it was stolen does not change this result. The jury was free to weigh the evidence and reject Pastors testimony, a decision we cannot second guess on appeal.
2. The Trial Court Did Not Commit Prejudicial Error By Failing to Instruct the Jury That Proximity to Stolen Goods Is Insufficient to Infer Possession
Pastor requested the trial court specially instruct the jury pursuant to People v. Myles (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 423 that, "The prosecution must prove that the defendant exercised dominion and control over the property allegedly stolen. Mere access or proximity to stolen goods is not enough to infer possession." The trial court refused, finding CALJIC No. 14.65 adequately covered the possession element of the crime and defense counsel could argue to the jury that the evidence was insufficient to infer possession.
"A criminal defendant is entitled, on request, to a[n] instruction `pinpointing the theory of his defense. [Citations.]" (People v. Wharton (1991) 53 Cal.3d 522, 570.) "[H]owever, instructions that attempt to relate particular facts to a legal issue are generally objectionable as argumentative [citation] . . . ." (Id. at p. 570.) It is not necessary for "detailed instructions on every issue to come before a criminal jury[,]" because certain matters are properly "addressed in argument without aid of a specific instruction . . . ." (People v. Daniels (1991) 52 Cal.3d 815, 871.) The court may properly refuse to give proposed instructions that are redundant, repetitious, elaborations on general instructions or otherwise adequately covered by other instructions. (See, e.g., People v. Sanders (1995) 11 Cal.4th 475, 560; People v. Wright (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1126, 1134.)
The trial courts decision not to give the proposed instruction was proper because it did not pinpoint the crux of Pastors defense. Pastors theory at trial was not that his proximity to the Honda Civic was insufficient to convict him of receiving stolen property. Rather, he argued that he was found far from the Honda — 100 feet away — and focused his defense on attacking Hardins eyewitness identification and Officer Jenkinss testimony that Pastor had confessed to stripping the parts of the vehicle. The purpose of a pinpoint instruction is to reflect the defense presented. (People v. Wharton, supra, 53 Cal.3d at pp. 570-571; People v. Rincon-Pineda (1975) 14 Cal.3d 864, 885 [pinpoint instruction reflects the crux of a defendants case].)
Moreover, the concept of "possession" was adequately covered by other instructions. The jury was instructed pursuant to CALJIC No. 14.65 that, to convict Pastor under section 496, subdivision (a), it must find that he "received" the stolen property or "concealed" or "withheld" the property from its owner. These terms defined for the jury the concept of "possession" as more than mere access or physical proximity to the stolen property. (People v. Gatlin (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 31, 44-45 [terms in CALJIC No. 14.65 define "possession" for jury; no error to refuse special instruction pursuant to People v. Myles, supra, 50 Cal.App.3d 423].) The jury also was instructed pursuant to CALJIC No. 2.15, which further refined the concept of "possession" by stating that possession by itself is not sufficient to establish guilt and that the jury should consider the attributes of possession — the time, place and manner, whether the defendant had an opportunity to commit the crime, the defendants conduct, any false or contradictory statements made with reference to the property, any false accounts of how he acquired the property and any other evidence tending to connect the defendant with the crime charged.
In any event, the trial courts failure to give the pinpoint instruction was not prejudicial in light of the evidence of Pastors guilt: Pastor was seen trying to open the hood of the car, and Officer Jenkins testified Pastor admitted trying to strip the vehicles parts. The case against Pastor was not based on mere access or proximity to the stolen vehicle. Based on this evidence, it is not reasonably probable the jury would have reached a different verdict had it been specially instructed that mere proximity to stolen goods is not enough to infer possession. (People v. Gatlin, supra, 209 Cal.App.3d at pp. 45-46 [failure to instruct pursuant to People v. Myles, supra, 50 Cal.App.3d 423 not prejudicial when evidence more than sufficient to establish defendant received clothing with knowledge it had been stolen]; see People v. Earp (1999) 20 Cal.4th 826, 887 [People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 (Watson) standard of prejudice applies to claim trial court erred by refusing to give pinpoint instruction requested by defendant].)
3. The Trial Court Did Not Commit Prejudicial Error By Refusing to Instruct the Jury with CALJIC No. 1.21
The trial court instructed the jury pursuant to CALJIC No. 14.65 that generally the crime of receiving stolen property requires the defendants "knowing the property to have been stolen." In listing the elements of the crime, also pursuant to CALJIC No. 14.65, the trial court instructed, to convict Pastor of receiving stolen property, the jury must find that he "actually knew the property was stolen or obtained by theft."
Relying on People v. Speaks (1981) 120 Cal.App.3d 36 (Speaks), Pastor contends the trial court erred by rejecting his request to instruct the jury with CALJIC No. 1.21, the definition of "knowingly."[] He contends "[f]ailure to give CALJIC No. 1.21 where evidence supports a finding that the defendant did not have knowledge the property was stolen is reversible error." But Speaks did not involve the trial courts failure to instruct with CALJIC No. 1.21. Rather, Speaks involved a proposed instruction emphasizing to the jury that the defendant could not be convicted of receiving stolen property without knowledge that the property, located in the trunk of a car, was stolen. Nothing in Speaks suggests the trial court must define the term "knowingly" in a case in which a defendant charged with receiving stolen property denies knowing the property was stolen. And Pastor did not request a pinpoint instruction like the one in Speaks. (People v. Saille (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1103, 1119 [pinpoint instructions need not be given sua sponte].)
CALJIC No. 1.21 provides: "The word `knowingly, means with knowledge of the existence of the facts in question. Knowledge of the unlawfulness of any act or omission is not required. [A requirement of knowledge does not mean that the act must be done with any specific intent.]"
The proposed instruction in Speaks provided: "`The charge against defendant requires that he had knowledge of the presence of the stolen money in his trunk and proof alone that the defendant owned and had control of the vehicle and access to a place in which the money was found without knowledge of the presence of said money is insufficient for conviction." (Speaks, supra, 120 Cal.App.3d at p. 39.)
Moreover, the purpose of CALJIC No. 1.21 is to "narrow[] the common definition of `knowingly by excluding knowledge of the unlawfulness of an act." (People v. Gregory (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 665, 680; see § 7, subd. 5.) Here, the broader common meaning of "knowledge" was applicable for the jury to determine whether Pastor knew the Honda Civic was stolen. (Gregory, at pp. 680-681 [defendant entitled to have jury use broader common meaning of "knowingly" "to consider whether defendant knowingly presented a claim for payment [under Medi-Cal] for the purpose of obtaining greater compensation than that to which he was legally entitled"].)
Finally, the trial courts failure to instruct pursuant to CALJIC No. 1.21, even if it were error, was not prejudicial because it is not reasonably probable the jury would have reached a different verdict had the instruction been given. (People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 489-490 [Watson standard of prejudice applies to claim of instructional error].) CALJIC No. 14.65 sufficiently instructed the jury that knowledge of the propertys stolen nature was an element of the crime, and the jury was free to reject Pastors testimony that he had no idea the car was stolen.
4. The Trial Courts Oral Misstatements of CALJIC Nos. 2.22, 3.31 and 14.65 Do Not Require Reversal
Pastors contention he was prejudiced by the trial courts minor mistakes in reading CALJIC Nos. 2.22, 3.31 and 14.65 to the jury lacks merit. A correct written instruction prevails over an oral misstatement of an instruction. Jurors are presumed to be guided by the written version of instructions. (People v. McLain (1988) 46 Cal.3d 97, 111, fn. 2.) In People v. Garceau (1993) 6 Cal.4th 140, the Supreme Court found the trial courts error of failing to read the complete version of an instruction was harmless because the jury received the correct version of the instruction in its written form. (Id. at p. 189; see also People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 687; People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 138 [oral misstatement of instruction that was correct in written form was harmless error].) The written instructions cured any misconceptions the jury might have been given by the trial courts minor misstatements.[]
Pastor asserts "[t]he oral instructions control over the written instructions because it is not known if the jury consulted the written instructions" but cites no authority to support his assertion and fails to confront the abundance of authority to the contrary.
Because we find no instructional error, we necessarily reject Pastors contention the cumulative effect of the instructional errors requires reversal.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: WOODS, J. and MU&Ntil;OZ, (AURELIO) J.