Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Super. Ct. No. VA096010 Robert J. Higa, Judge. Affirmed.
Robert H. Pourvali, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters and Dana M. Ali, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
MANELLA, J.
Felipe Partida appeals from the judgment entered following a jury trial in which he was convicted of unlawful firearm activity (Pen. Code, § 12021, subd. (c)(1)) and resisting an executive officer (§ 69) and his admission that he suffered within the last 10 years a conviction for violating section 273.5. Execution of sentence was suspended and he was placed on formal probation for three years upon various terms and conditions. He contends there was insufficient evidence to support the charge that he violated section 69. For reasons stated in the opinion, we affirm the judgment.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
On June 24, 2006 at approximately 1:30 a.m., Ricardo Quinteros was working as a security guard at Kalua Nightclub in Huntington Park, attempting to “check [appellant] out” before letting him enter the club. Appellant got angry and Mr. Quinteros told him he was just doing his job. Mr. Quinteros summoned another security guard and they took appellant just outside of the front door of the nightclub. Appellant struggled with the guards and tried to fight. Mr. Quinteros grabbed appellant, put him against the wall, and removed a handgun appellant was carrying under his shirt. When Mr. Quinteros asked appellant what was he doing going into a nightclub bearing a weapon like that, appellant “got really tough” as though he wanted to hit both security guards. Appellant told Mr. Quinteros to “Go get fucked” and that he was “going to put a hit out on [him].” Mr. Quinteros’s partner summoned a patrol car that was driving in the area and the officers detained and arrested appellant.
Huntington Park Police Officer William Wallace was in uniform and on patrol in a marked police vehicle when he was flagged down by the security guard. Officer Wallace handcuffed appellant and had him sit down on the curb. Officer Guizar, a Spanish-speaking officer, interviewed the security officer and translated the conversation for Officer Wallace to further establish the details of the crime. When someone makes a report of another person being armed with a weapon and he (Officer Wallace) detains the armed suspect, that is part of his duties as a patrol officer. When Officer Wallace recovered the handgun from the security officer and showed it to appellant, appellant stated, “You’re fucking -- you guys aren’t doing anything about the drug dealers. You’re fucking with me over a gun.” Officer Wallace then arrested appellant and placed him in the police car to be transported to the Huntington Park Police Department. While being transported, appellant told Officer Wallace he was “a stupid white cop and that he had [Officer Wallace’s] face embedded in his memory, and [the officer] should beware, be careful.” When Officer Wallace asked appellant what he meant by that, appellant “indicated he had ties with the Mexican Mafia, and he belonged to a street gang known as Hooper Street.” Based on appellant’s belligerent demeanor, his gang affiliation and reference to the Mexican Mafia, Officer Williams took the threat seriously.
DISCUSSION
Appellant contends there was insufficient evidence to support the charge he violated section 69. He claims there was no sufficient evidence to show he made any threats to Officer Wallace with the specific intent of deterring or preventing the officer from performing a duty imposed by law. We disagree.
“‘The proper test for determining a claim of insufficiency of evidence in a criminal case is whether, on the entire record, a rational trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citations.] On appeal, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the People and must presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence. [Citation.] [¶] ‘Although we must ensure the evidence is reasonable, credible, and of solid value, nonetheless it is the exclusive province of the trial judge or jury to determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts on which that determination depends. [Citation.] Thus, if the verdict is supported by substantial evidence, we must accord due deference to the trier of fact and not substitute our evaluation of a witness’s credibility for that of the fact finder. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (People v. Ochoa (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1199, 1206.)
“The same standard applies to the review of circumstantial evidence. [Citation.] The court must consider the evidence and all logical inferences from that evidence . . . . [Citation.] But it is the jury, not the appellate court, which must be convinced of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] Therefore, an appellate court may not substitute its judgment for that of the jury. If the circumstances reasonably justify the jury’s findings, the reviewing court may not reverse the judgment merely because it believes that the circumstances might also support a contrary finding. [Citations.]” (People v. Ceja (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1134, 1138-1139.)
Section 69 provides, “Every person who attempts, by means of any threat or violence, to deter or prevent an executive officer from performing any duty imposed upon such officer by law, or who knowingly resists, by the use of force or violence, such officer, in the performance of his duty, is punishable by a fine not exceeding ten thousand dollars ($10,000), or by imprisonment in the state prison, or in a county jail not exceeding one year, or by both such fine and imprisonment.”
“The statute sets forth two separate ways in which an offense can be committed. The first is attempting by threats or violence to deter or prevent an officer from performing a duty imposed by law; the second is resisting by force or violence an officer in the performance of his or her duty. [Citation.]” (In re Manuel G. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 805, 814.)
“A threat, unaccompanied by any physical force, may support a conviction for the first type of offense under section 69. [Citation.] To avoid the risk of punishing protected First Amendment speech, however, the term ‘threat’ has been limited to mean a threat of unlawful violence used in an attempt to deter the officer. [Citations.] The central requirement of the first type of offense under section 69 is an attempt to deter an executive officer from performing his or her duties imposed by law; unlawful violence, or a threat of unlawful violence, is merely the means by which the attempt is made. [Citation.]” (In re Manuel G., supra, 16 Cal.4th at pp. 814-815.)
The jury here could reasonably construe appellant’s threats as an attempt to deter Officer Williams from continuing to transport appellant to the station and proceeding with his arrest and booking. The circumstances reasonably justify that finding and we will not reverse the judgment merely because the circumstances might also support a contrary finding.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur:WILLHITE, Acting P.J. SUZUKAWA, J.