IV (protecting against unreasonable search and seizure); see also Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 6 (same). To reach this conclusion, the trial court used the analytical framework set out by the supreme court in People v. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d 220 (2003), and applied by this court in People v. Parra, 352 Ill. App. 3d 584 (2004). As discussed in part IIB below, although the trial court's ultimate conclusion was correct, the trial court's analysis was not.
Defendant, in turn, immediately acknowledged that he had received a box from the residence, admitted the box contained narcotics, and informed Officer Velez that his passenger was unaware of the narcotics transaction. Indeed, at oral argument, defense counsel conceded that the conversation was "brief." Accordingly, the facts in this case are readily distinguishable from those present in People v. Bunch, 207 Ill. 2d 7 (2003), and People v. Parra, 352 Ill. App. 3d 584 (2004), the primary cases defendant relies upon to support his contention that the police in this case prolonged the stop, because the records in Bunch and Parra revealed that the officers engaged in conversations unrelated to the purpose of the traffic stops with the defendants after they had concluded their investigations of the traffic stops. See Bunch, 207 Ill. 2d at 19 (finding that the defendant's fourth amendment rights were violated when "the purpose of the traffic stop concluded" but "[t]he officer's directions to defendant *** continued"); Parra, 352 Ill. App. 3d at 589 (explaining that "[b]ecause [the officer's] questions occurred after the purpose of the stop was completed, the questions impermissibly prolonged defendant's detention").
Questioning defendant about the presence of weapons was completely unrelated to the observed violation, which resulted from defendant's admission to possession of open alcohol on a public way and provided the basis for the stop. See People v. Bunch, 207 Ill.2d 7, 17 (2003); People v. Parra, 352 Ill.App.3d 584, 587 (2004). ¶ 36 A valid Terry stop can be broadened into an investigatory detention if the officer discovers specific, articulable facts which give rise to a reasonable suspicion that the defendant has committed or is about to commit a crime.
A Terry, analysis involves a dual inquiry: (1) whether the officer's action was justified at its inception, and (2) whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in the first place. People v. Parra, 352 Ill. App. 3d 584, 587 (2004), citing People v. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d 220, 228 (2003). While reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause, the fourth amendment requires at least a minimal level of objective justification for making the stop.
A Terry, analysis involves a dual inquiry: (1) whether the officer's action was justified at its inception, and (2) whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in the first place. People v. Parra, 352 Ill. App. 3d 584, 587 (2004), citing People v. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d 220, 228 (2003). While reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause, the fourth amendment requires at least a minimal level of objective justification for making the stop.
This court has noted, repeatedly and unassailably, that an unrelated and unsupported question about contraband "'convert[s] a routine traffic stop into a fishing expedition.'" People v. Parra, 352 Ill. App. 3d 584, 589 (2004), quoting People v. Hall, 351 Ill. App. 3d 501, 505 (2004). Thus, according to the Gonzalez test, the question violated Terry's scope requirement.
Although Officer Pate was aware of the burglaries, he did not have a description of the burglar or the vehicle the offender may have used. Also damaging to the State's position is the fact that the neighborhood was not a "high crime area," which, even in itself, does not justify stopping an individual. See People v. Parra, 352 Ill.App.3d 584, 588, 288 Ill.Dec. 16, 817 N.E.2d 141 (2004). Second, the time of day did not give Officer Pate a basis to stop defendant.