ony by the arresting officer regarding the mechanics of street level drug sales is admissible to explain "the absence of drugs or buy money on defendant at the time of the arrest." People v. Kelsey, 194 A.D.2d 248, 252-53, 606 N.Y.S.2d 621, 624 (1st Dep't 1994) (leading First Department case);accord, e.g., People v. Graves, 85 N.Y.2d 1024, 1026-27, 630 N.Y.S.2d 972, 973 (1995); People v. Smalls, 266 A.D.2d 570, 570, 699 N.Y.S.2d 114, 114 (2d Dep't 1999), appeal denied, 94 N.Y.2d 884, 705 N.Y.S.2d 17 (2000);People v. McAllister, 255 A.D.2d 241, 242, 682 N.Y.S.2d 129, 130 (1st Dep't 1998), appeal denied, 93 N.Y.2d 876, 689 N.Y.S.2d 438 (1999);People v. Taylor, 247 A.D.2d 277, 278, 667 N.Y.S.2d 909, 910 (1st Dep't) ("The limited testimony regarding typical roles played by participants in street-level drug sales was admissible to explain the absence of prerecorded buy money on defendant and his brother at the time of their arrests."), appeal denied, 91 N.Y.2d 978, 672 N.Y.S.2d 857 (1998); People v. Parks, 237 A.D.2d 105, 105, 654 N.Y.S.2d 365, 366 (1st Dep't) (police testimony "regarding the general practices of the drug trade . . . was appropriate to explain why drugs and money were not found on defendant when he was arrested."), appeal denied, 90 N.Y.2d 862, 661 N.Y.S.2d 189 (1997); People v. Simmons, 232 A.D.2d 152, 648 N.Y.S.2d 10 (1st Dep't) (testimony about street drug sales properly admitted "to explain why defendant was not in possession of prerecorded buy money or drugs when arrested"), appeal denied, 89 N.Y.2d 929, 654 N.Y.S.2d 732 (1996); People v. Reed, 215 A.D.2d 209, 210, 626 N.Y.S.2d 765, 766 (1st Dep't) ("Contrary to the contention by defendant that New York jurors are so familiar with the mechanics of drug dealing that they do not need an expert [police officer] to enlighten them as to such a matter as a drug sale, courts have consistently allowed expert testimony as to the intricacies of drug transactions.

Counsel is generally afforded "wide latitude" on summation (People v Rupnarine, 140 AD3d 1204, 1205 [2016]) and "[a] defendant not necessarily entitled to a missing witness charge may nonetheless try to persuade the jury to draw inferences from the People's failure to call an available witness with material, noncumulative information about the case" (People v Williams, 5 NY3d 732, 734 [2005] [emphasis added]; see People v Tankleff, 84 NY2d 992, 994-995 [1994]). Here, however, the victim was unavailable to testify for them on the retrial and, therefore, County Court did not err in instructing the jury — in response to defense counsel's summation noting the victim's absence — that it "must not draw any inference favorable or unfavorable to either side from the fact that the victim was not called as a witness in the case" (see People v Wood, 245 AD2d 200, 201 [1997], lv denied 91 NY2d 946 [1998]; People v Parks, 237 AD2d 105, 105 [1997], lv denied 90 NY2d 862 [1997]; People v Ramirez, 221 AD2d 178, 179 [1995], lv denied 87 NY2d 1023 [1996]). In any event, we would find that any error in giving the curative instruction was harmless in light of the overwhelming proof of defendant's guilt (see People v McCollough, 16 AD3d 183, 184 [2005], lv denied 4 NY3d 855 [2005]; compare People v Williams, 5 NY3d 732, 735 [2005]).

Defendant had no good faith basis for such a comment ( see People v Tankleff, 84 NY2d 992, 994-995). The buyer's sole connection with the prosecution was adversarial, in that the same District Attorney's Office had prosecuted him for possessing the drugs he bought in this incident, and there was no reason to expect the People to call him as a witness ( see People v Parks, 237 AD2d 105, lv denied 90 NY2d 862; see also People v Bailey, 271 AD2d 370, lv denied 95 NY2d 903). In any event, were we to find any error in the court's ruling or in its jury instruction, we would find it to be harmless in view of the overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt.

Defendant was not deprived of a fair trial by the court's preclusion of cross-examination of the arresting officer concerning the lack of effort by the People to locate, as a potential prosecution witness, the buyer in this observation sale case. This issue was entirely collateral, since there was no reason to expect the People to call the buyer in the first place (see, People v. Tamayo, 256 A.D.2d 98, lv denied 93 N.Y.2d 979;People v. Parks, 237 A.D.2d 105, lv denied 90 N.Y.2d 862; People v. Jenkins, 226 A.D.2d 116, lv denied 88 N.Y.2d 937). Contrary to defendant's claim, the People never insinuated that the buyer would have incriminated defendant. The court's curative actions prevented the challenged portion of the People's summation from causing any prejudice.

35; People v. Buford, 69 N.Y.2d 290, 298; People v. Boston, 182 A.D.2d 494, lv denied 80 N.Y.2d 894). Once defendant elicited from the police officer the fact that the civilian buyer stated that he purchased the drugs for $70, and attempted to use that statement to prove that defendant was not the seller, defendant opened the door to the admission into evidence of that portion of the hearsay statement wherein the civilian buyer identified defendant as the seller ( see, People v. King, 197 A.D.2d 440, lv denied 83 N.Y.2d 855; People v. Wortherly, 68 A.D.2d 158, 161-163). The court properly denied defendant's request for a missing witness charge concerning the civilian drug buyer, since there was no evidence that the buyer was under the People's control or that the People would be expected to call him as a witness ( see, People v. Gonzalez, 68 N.Y.2d 424, 427-431; People v. Parks, 237 A.D.2d 105, lv denied 90 N.Y.2d 862; People v. Jenkins, 226 A.D.2d 116, lv denied 88 N.Y.2d 937). The buyer's statement to the police incriminating defendant was not enough, standing alone, to create a relationship with the prosecution within the concept of "control". Defendant's remaining contentions are unpreserved and we decline to review them in the interest of justice.

The request, made after both sides had rested, was untimely ( People v. Vega, 215 A.D.2d 206, lv denied 86 N.Y.2d 742). Further, defendant did not make the required showing that the witness was available to the People or would be expected to testify favorably for them ( People v. Parks, 237 A.D.2d 105, lv denied 90 N.Y.2d 862). The court's charge to the jury regarding the definition of sexual intercourse clearly was designed to assist the jury in assessing the medical evidence presented, and served to clarify the statutory definition without changing its essence.

The evidence was introduced not to establish criminal propensity but rather to establish defendant's motive for robbing his mother, and his mother's state of mind and reason for testifying against her son ( People v. Grier, 162 A.D.2d 416, lv denied 76 N.Y.2d 1021), all of which was relevant to the particular issues developed at trial. The court properly precluded defense counsel from commenting during summation on the People's failure to call a witness to the robbery in light of the fact that she was the mother of defendant's son and refused to return the calls of the prosecutor ( see, People v. Huhn, 140 A.D.2d 760, lv denied 72 N.Y.2d 919). Although comment upon the absence of a witness is not governed by the same standards as a request for a missing witness charge ( People v. Tankleff, 84 N.Y.2d 992, 995), in this case there was no basis whatsoever for such a comment ( see, People v. Parks, 237 A.D.2d 105, lv denied 90 N.Y.2d 862; People v. Ramirez, 221 A.D.2d 178, lv denied 87 N.Y.2d 1023). Concur — Murphy, P.J., Milonas, Wallach, Rubin and Mazzarelli, JJ.