Opinion
January 19, 1999.
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Queens Count (Hanophy, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is modified, on the law, by providing that all of the terms of imprisonment shall run concurrently with each other; as so modified, the judgment is affirmed.
A court has broad discretion in examining potential jurors to assure that an impartial jury is impaneled. In this case, the court properly examined the jury pool during voir dire on the issue of jury nullification ( see, Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 189; Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 594-595; People v. Vargas, 88 N.Y.2d 363, 377).
There is no merit to the defendant's contention that since an eyewitness could not positively identify him at a pretrial lineup, his in-court identification of the defendant was inadmissible. A witness's failure to identify a defendant at a pretrial lineup goes to the weight of the witness's in-court identification, not to its admissibility ( see, People v. Finley, 190 A.D.2d 859, 860; People v. Cruz, 167 A.D.2d 306).
Inasmuch as the defendant's convictions for robbery in the first degree and murder in the second degree (felony murder) were part of the same act, the Supreme Court erred in imposing consecutive sentences for two of the counts of robbery in the first degree. Accordingly, we modify those sentences to run concurrently ( see, People v. Ramirez, 89 N.Y.2d 444, 452-453; People v. Laureano, 87 N.Y.2d 640, 644; People v. Alston, 243 A.D.2d 573, 574). We reject the defendant's contention that the sentences are excessive ( see, People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80, 86-87; People v. Alston, supra).
The defendant's remaining contentions are either unpreserved for appellate review or without merit.
Joy, J.P., Krausman, Florio and Luciano, JJ., concur.