[Citation.] ‘Furthermore, specific intent to maim may not be inferred solely from evidence that the injury inflicted actually constitutes mayhem; instead, there must be other facts and circumstances which support an inference of intent to maim rather than to attack indiscriminately. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (People v. Park (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 61, 64 (Park).) “‘Evidence of a defendant’s state of mind is almost inevitably circumstantial, but circumstantial evidence is as sufficient as direct evidence to support a conviction.
A. Additional Background Defense counsel asked for the standard aggravated mayhem instruction (CALCRIM No. 800) but wanted it supplemented with language taken from People v. Park (2000) 112 Cal.App.4th 61, 64 (Park) so as to "clarify and assist the jury" with the differences between the intent elements of simple and aggravated mayhem. His requested addition read:
An attack that is limited in scope and targets a vulnerable part of the victim's body supports a reasonable inference that the attack was not indiscriminate. (Manibusan, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 88; People v. Park (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 61, 69 (Park).)
[Citation.] As explained earlier, the record contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable jury guided, as here, by proper instructions on the controlling legal principles could have found beyond a reasonable doubt ... [a] specific intent to [cause permanent disability].” ( People v. Park (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 61, 71–72, 4 Cal.Rptr.3d 815, italics omitted.) I. Accomplice Instructions
'[E]ven though the appellate court may itself believe that the circumstantial evidence might be reasonably reconciled with the defendant's innocence, this alone does not warrant interference with the determination of the trier of fact. [Citations.] Whether the evidence presented at trial is direct or circumstantial, . . . the relevant inquiry on appeal remains whether any reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.' [Citation.] As explained earlier, the record contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable jury guided, as here, by proper instructions on the controlling legal principles could have found beyond a reasonable doubt . . . [a] specific intent to [cause permanent disability]." (People v. Park (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 61, 71-72, italics omitted.) I. Accomplice Instructions
(See People v. Assad (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 187, 195 ["[a]ggravated mayhem requires the specific intent to cause the maiming injury"].)" '[S]pecific intent to maim may not be inferred solely from evidence that the injury inflicted actually constitutes mayhem; instead, there must be other facts and circumstances which support an inference of intent to maim rather than to attack indiscriminately.'" (People v. Park (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 61, 64 (Park).)
An attack that is limited in scope and targets a vulnerable part of the victim's body supports a reasonable inference that the attack was not indiscriminate. (Manibusan, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 88; People v. Park (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 61, 69 (Park).) As well, while a jury might have concluded that the slashings were the result of "an explosion of indiscriminate violence" that occurred in the midst of a melee between two couples (Park, supra, 112 Cal.App.4th at p. 70), the evidence did not compel that conclusion.
[Citation.]" (Quintero, supra, 135 Cal.App.4th at p. 1162, quoting People v. Lee (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 320, 325-326 (Lee).) Evidence of specific intent may be sufficient where the "circumstances show defendant's attack was the product of deliberation and planning . . . ." (People v. Park (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 61, 70 (Park).) "However, where the evidence shows no more than an 'indiscriminate' or 'random' attack, or an 'explosion of violence' upon the victim, it is insufficient to prove a specific intent to maim.
However, where the evidence shows no more than an 'indiscriminate' or 'random' attack, or an 'explosion of violence' upon the victim, it is insufficient to prove a specific intent to maim." (People v. Quintero (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1152, 1162 (Quintero), overruled on other grounds in People v. Poisson (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 121, 125; see also People v. Park (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 61, 64 (Park).) Evidence of" 'a defendant's state of mind is almost inevitably circumstantial, but circumstantial evidence is as sufficient as direct evidence to support a conviction. [Citations.]'
(Gonzales, at p. 941; see People v. Campbell (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 1653, 16681669 (Campbell) [the "controlled and directed nature of the attack supports an inference [the defendant] intended to disfigure [the victim's] face, including her right ear"]; cf. Anderson, at pp. 356, 359 [no "specific intent to commit mayhem" where the evidence, which showed "41 wounds ranging over the entire body [of the victim] from the head to the extremities," indicated "no more than an indiscriminate attack"]; Sears, at p. 745 [evidence showed "no more than . . . an indiscriminate attack" and did "not support the premise that [the] defendant specifically intended to maim his victim"]; People v. Park (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 61, 71 ["[b]ecause there was no evidence about how or why the defendant [in Anderson] inflicted the particular wounds, there was no evidence to show anything more than an indiscriminate attack"].)