Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County, Super.Ct.No. INF054976, John J. Ryan, Judge. (Retired judge of the Orange Super. Ct. assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.) Affirmed.
Jeffrey S. Kross, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Rhonda Cartwright-Ladendorf, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Christine Levingston Bergman, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
RICHLI, Acting P.J.
A trial court found defendant and appellant Oscar Palomares guilty of possessing methamphetamine under Health and Safety Code section 11377, subdivision (a). Defendant’s sole contention on appeal is that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence under Penal Code section 1538.5. For the reasons set forth below, we shall affirm the judgment.
I
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Shortly before midnight on June 20, 2006, Indio Police Department Officer Peter Fuentes was on patrol with his partner, Officer Peraza. While the officers were patrolling the area of Hoover Street, in front of Tres Flores Apartments, they observed an older model Chevy S10 truck parked on the street. Defendant was in the driver’s seat of the truck. The officers then saw a woman walk up to the truck and talk to defendant through the passenger’s window of the truck. The officers thought this activity was suspicious for prostitution or other criminal activity because the area was known for vehicle thefts, prostitution, and narcotics sales. Officer Peraza parked his unmarked police car about a car’s length in front of and facing defendant’s truck.
Officer Fuentes approached defendant to see if any type of prostitution was occurring. Defendant, however, would not make eye contact; he seemed nervous and sweaty. Officer Fuentes could not see inside the truck because it was dark; he wanted to make sure defendant did not have any weapons. After defendant stated that he owned the truck, Officer Fuentes asked for consent to search defendant and the truck. Defendant gave his consent to both. Officer Fuentes found a baggie containing methamphetamine in defendant’s pocket.
On June 26, 2006, defendant was charged in a felony complaint with possessing methamphetamine under Health and Safety Code section 11377, subdivision (a). On September 19, 2006, the trial court heard and denied defendant’s motion to suppress evidence under Penal Code section 1538.5. On September 26, 2006, defendant was charged in an information with possessing methamphetamine under Health and Safety Code section 11377, subdivision (a).
After the trial court conducted a bench trial, on June 13, 2007, the court found defendant guilty of possessing methamphetamine. The court then found defendant eligible for a substance abuse program under Proposition 36 and referred defendant to a treatment plan.
On June 27, 2007, the trial court placed defendant on probation for 36 months, ordered him to complete a substance abuse program, and imposed related fines and fees.
Defendant appeals.
II
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence. Specifically, defendant contends that his initial encounter with the police was illegal because it was a detention that was not supported by reasonable suspicion. Therefore, defendant contends that the drugs found as a result of the ensuing search should have been excluded.
A. Procedural Background
On September 19, 2006, the trial court heard defendant’s motion to suppress concurrently with the preliminary hearing. Defendant argued that the contact exceeded a consensual encounter and the officers did not have reasonable suspicion to detain defendant. He also argued that the consent was coerced after Officer Fuentes told defendant he wanted to search defendant for drugs and weapons.
After hearing the testimony of Officer Fuentes, as summarized above, the trial court denied defendant’s suppression motion. The trial court stated that, based on the totality of the circumstances, the officers had reasonable suspicion to contact defendant. The court also found that defendant freely and voluntarily consented to the search. The court stated: “[Officer Fuentes] had good reason to go into the car. He behaved properly. He didn’t [coerce] anything or anybody, and therefore voluntary.”
B. Standard of Review
In reviewing the denial of a suppression motion, we defer to the trial court’s factual findings where supported by substantial evidence, but exercise independent judgment to determine whether, on the facts found, the search was reasonable under Fourth Amendment standards. (People v. Leyba (1981) 29 Cal.3d 591, 596-597, superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in People v. Trujillo (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 1219, 1223; Ornelas v. United States (1996) 517 U.S. 690, 697-699.)
C. Analysis
The Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .” (U.S. Const., 4th Amend.) “Police contacts with individuals may be placed into three broad categories ranging from the least to the most intrusive: consensual encounters that result in no restraint of liberty whatsoever; detentions, which are seizures of an individual that are strictly limited in duration, scope, and purpose; and formal arrests or comparable restraints on an individual’s liberty. [Citations.]” (In re Manuel G. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 805, 821.)
1. Consensual encounter
Our present inquiry concerns the distinction between consensual encounters and detentions. Not every encounter an individual has with law enforcement triggers Fourth Amendment scrutiny. (Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 19, fn. 16.) Consensual encounters do not trigger Fourth Amendment scrutiny. (Florida v. Bostick (1991) 501 U.S. 429, 434 (Bostick).) Unlike detentions, they require no articulable suspicion that the person has committed or is about to commit a crime. (Wilson v. Superior Court (1983) 34 Cal.3d 777, 784.) The United States Supreme Court has made it clear that a detention does not occur simply because a police officer asks an individual a few questions. (Bostick, at p. 434.) As long as a reasonable person would feel free to disregard the police and go about his or her business, the encounter is consensual and no reasonable suspicion is required on the part of the officer. (California v. Hodari D. (1991) 499 U.S. 621, 628.) Only when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, in some manner restrains the individual’s liberty does a seizure occur. (Bostick, at p. 434.) Thus, Fourth Amendment scrutiny will not be triggered unless the encounter loses its consensual nature. (Bostick, at p. 434.)
There is no bright-line rule to determine if an encounter is consensual. (Ohio v. Robinette (1996) 519 U.S. 33, 39.) “[I]n order to determine whether a particular encounter constitutes a seizure, a court must consider all the circumstances surrounding the encounter to determine whether the police conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person that the person was not free to decline the officers’ requests or otherwise terminate the encounter.” (Bostick, supra, 501 U.S. at p. 439.) Whether or not a person would have believed that he or she was free to leave is to be evaluated in light of the totality of the circumstances, rather than emphasizing particular details of that conduct in isolation. (Michigan v. Chesternut (1988) 486 U.S. 567, 573.) Factors that might indicate an unlawful detention has taken place include: (1) the presence of several police officers; (2) an officer’s display of a weapon; (3) some physical touching of the person; or (4) the use of language or a tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer’s request might be compelled. (United States v. Mendenhall (1980) 446 U.S. 544, 554 (Mendenhall); In re Manuel G., supra, 16 Cal.4th 805, 821.) “The officer’s uncommunicated state of mind and the individual citizen’s subjective belief are irrelevant in assessing whether a seizure triggering Fourth Amendment scrutiny has occurred. [Citation.]” (In re Manuel G., at p. 821; see also Mendenhall, at p. 554.)
In Mendenhall, two Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents were stationed at the Detroit Metropolitan Airport for the purpose of detecting narcotics smuggling. The agents observed the defendant walking through the airport and concluded that her conduct was consistent with that of persons who unlawfully smuggle narcotics. The agents approached the defendant and asked to see her driver’s license and airline ticket. After discovering that the ticket and driver’s license contained two entirely different names, the agents asked further questions and identified themselves as DEA agents. (Mendenhall, supra, 446 U.S. at pp. 547-548.)
The United States Supreme Court found that no seizure of the defendant occurred. “The events took place in the public concourse. The agents . . . requested, but did not demand to see the respondent’s identification and ticket. Such conduct[,] without more, did not amount to an intrusion upon any constitutionally protected interest. The respondent was not seized simply by reason of the fact that the agents approached her, asked her if she would show them her ticket and identification, and posed to her a few questions. Nor was it enough to establish a seizure that the person asking the questions was a law enforcement official. . . . In short, nothing in the record suggests that the respondent had any objective reason to believe that she was not free to end the conversation in the concourse and proceed on her way . . . .” (Mendenhall, supra, 446 U.S. at p. 555.)
Applying the foregoing principles, we conclude the trial court properly denied defendant’s suppression motion because the contact between the police and defendant was a consensual encounter. Here, Officers Fuentes and Peraza approached defendant’s vehicle and asked “what he was doing there.” The officers, in plain clothes, did not draw their guns or use force or threats. Defendant was not directed to a different location. The tone of the encounter was conversational, not accusatory. The officers did not exhibit any physical or verbal force, which would cause a reasonable person to feel that he or she was not free to leave.
The fact that Officer Peraza parked the unmarked police car in front of defendant’s truck does not turn the encounter into a detention. (People v. Perez (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1492, 1496 (Perez) [police maneuvered their patrol car in front of a parked car, but there was room for the driver to drive away; there was no detention, even when high beams and a white spotlight were directed into the passenger compartment].) Here, as in Perez, the officers parked the unmarked police car about a car length in front of defendant’s truck, facing the truck with the headlights turned on. The police did not block defendant’s truck; instead, the police left plenty of room for defendant to leave. However, unlike Perez, there was no red light or police light on top of the police car.
Moreover, the encounter was not converted into a detention requiring Fourth Amendment scrutiny merely because Officer Fuentes asked defendant if he owned the truck and whether he had any weapons or drugs. (See Bostick, supra, 501 U.S. at p. 434; Florida v. Royer (1983) 460 U.S. 491, 497-498; People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 328.) Additionally, the fact that Officer Fuentes requested defendant’s identification does not change our conclusion. A peace officer’s request for identification does not convert a consensual encounter into a detention. (People v. Castaneda (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1222, 1227; People v. Gonzales (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 1185, 1188-1189.)
The facts in this case are similar to the facts in People v. Lopez (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 289. In Lopez, the court found no detention when officers, who were concededly on the prowl for narcotics dealers, recognized the defendant from a previous encounter. The officers “stood on either side of him and launched into a short, albeit somewhat accusatory, interrogation.” (Id. at p. 293.) The officers asked the defendant whether the car he was sitting on belonged to him. (Id. at p. 291.) When he said no, the officers asked why he was sitting on that car. The defendant responded that he was waiting for his friends to play pool. When the officers asked where was his pool stick, the defendant did not reply. The officers asked whether the defendant had identification and he reached into his pocket. The defendant handed the officer the wallet and when it was opened, a bindle of cocaine “‘pop[ped] up.’” (Ibid.) Finding the questions were “brief, flip, and, most importantly, did not concern criminal activity,” the reviewing court concluded the questions were not so accusatory as to demonstrate that a reasonable person would believe he was not free to leave. (Id. at p. 293.)
Similarly, in this case, defendant voluntarily responded to the police when he answered questions, presented identification, and consented to the search. Therefore, the nature of the contact between defendant and the officers was consensual and did not constitute a detention requiring reasonable suspicion.
Based on our independent review of the circumstances as a whole, we conclude that defendant’s encounter with the officers was consensual. The trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress the physical evidence obtained as a result of this encounter.
2. Detention
Assuming arguendo that the encounter between defendant and the officers amounted to a detention, the detention was reasonable.
For this analysis, we must first determine whether the officers had a reasonable suspicion that defendant was involved in criminal activity, sufficient to support the detention. (See People v. Harris (1975) 15 Cal.3d 384; People v. Gatch (1976) 56 Cal.App.3d 505, 508-509.) A reasonable suspicion of involvement in criminal activity will justify a temporary stop and detention even though the circumstances are also consistent with lawful activity. Typically, the purpose of the detention is to resolve the ambiguity. (People v. Souza (1994) 9 Cal.4th 224, 233 (Souza); In re Tony C. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 888, 893-894 (Tony C.), superseded by statute on another ground as stated in People v. Lloyd (1992)4 Cal.App.4th 724, 733; United States v. Arvizu (2002) 534 U.S. 266, 274-276 (Arvizu); United States v. Sokolow (1989) 490 U.S. 1, 7-8.) Even if individual factors are susceptible to innocent explanation, and some factors are more probative than others, taken together, they may suffice to form a particularized and objective basis for an investigatory stop. (Souza, at p. 233; Arvizu, at p. 277.)
“It is settled that circumstances short of probable cause to make an arrest may justify a police officer stopping and briefly detaining a person for questioning or other limited investigation.” (Tony C., supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 892, citing Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S. at p. 22.) However, the police are not free to detain citizens at will. “In order to justify an investigative stop or detention, ‘the circumstances known or apparent to the officer must include specific or articulable facts causing him to suspect that (1) some activity relating to crime has taken place or is occurring or about to occur, and (2) the person he intends to stop or detain is involved in that activity. Not only must he subjectively entertain such a suspicion, but it must be objectively reasonable for him to do so: the facts must be such as would cause any reasonable police officer in a like position, drawing when appropriate on his training and experience . . . to suspect the same criminal activity and the same involvement by the person in question. The corollary to this rule, of course, is that an investigative stop or detention predicated on mere curiosity, rumor, or hunch, is unlawful, even though the officer may be acting in complete good faith.’ [Citation.]” (In re James D. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 903, 919-920, quoting In re Tony C., at p. 893; see also People v. Renteria (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 440, 443; Souza, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 231 [“detention is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment when the detaining officer can point to specific articulable facts that, considered in light of the totality of the circumstances, provide some objective manifestation that the person detained may be involved in criminal activity”].)
The reputation of an area for criminal activity is an appropriate consideration in assessing whether an investigative detention is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. (Illinois v. Wardlaw (2000) 528 U.S. 119, 124; Souza, supra, 9 Cal.4th at pp. 240-241; People v. Nonnette (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 659, 668.) Presence in a high crime area combined with unprovoked flight or “nervous, evasive behavior,” may support a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. (Illinois v. Wardlaw, at p. 124.)
Here, the officers’ actions were reasonable and the totality of the circumstances warranted the officers’ detention of defendant. It was late at night, in a poorly lit area known for vehicle thefts, prostitution, and narcotics. The officers saw defendant sitting in his parked truck and then observed a woman walk up to the truck and talk to defendant. The officers felt that this behavior was consistent with prostitution or possibly a vehicle theft. Therefore, the officers approached defendant’s truck to investigate.
All of these observations, when considered together, provided reasonable suspicion for the officers to believe that some criminal activity was about to occur or had already occurred. Therefore, the facts in this case support the trial court’s finding that the officers “had good reason” to approach defendant’s truck.
Defendant’s reliance on People v. Perrusquia (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 228 is misplaced. The officers in Perrusquia were patrolling a “high-crime” area, looking for possible 7-Eleven robbers. All the officers knew was that there had been a string of 7-Eleven robberies in that neighborhood, but had no information about whether the 7-Eleven in question had been or was about to be robbed. The officers found the defendant outside an open 7-Eleven, waiting in his car with his engine idling, but had no information tying the defendant to a particular crime. (Id. at pp. 230-231.) The officers detained the defendant when he tried to walk past them toward the store. (Id. at p. 231.) Without the defendant’s consent, the officers conducted a patdown search and found a gun. (Id. at pp. 231-232.) The Perrusquia court found the detention unlawful because it was based on a mere “hunch.” (Id. at p. 234.)
In comparison, the officers in this case knew that the specific street where defendant was parked was known for vehicle thefts, prostitution, and narcotics activity. The officers observed suspicious activity directly related to defendant—they observed a woman walk up and talk to defendant through the passenger’s window of defendant’s truck. Based on the officers’ training and experience, they believed this activity to be suspicious for prostitution or possible vehicle theft. Accordingly, unlike the officers in Perrusquia, the officers in this case had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that defendant was or was about to be engaged in criminal activity.
Based on the above, we find that the trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress.
III
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
I concur: MILLER, J.
KING, J., Concurring.
I concur with the majority’s result and its discussion in part II dealing with the existence of a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
I do not concur, however, with the majority’s discussion relative to “consensual encounter.” Here, the encounter occurred during the hours of darkness with defendant seated behind the steering wheel of a stopped car. Officer Peraza’s vehicle approached from the opposite direction. The unmarked police car stopped and was parked approximately one car length in front of defendant’s truck, facing defendant’s truck. Officer Fuentes then approached the vehicle on the driver’s side, asking defendant if he owned the truck and whether he had any weapons or drugs. Under the circumstances, I do not believe a reasonable person, in defendant’s position, would feel free to start his vehicle, turn on the headlights, and leave. (See In re Manuel G. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 805, 821-822.)