Because there was no evidence to the contrary, we presume that the jury understood and heeded its instructions. See Bohrer v. DeHart, 961 P.2d 472, 478 (Colo. 1998); Bear Valley Church of Christ v. DeBose, 928 P.2d 1315, 1331 (Colo. 1996); People v. Palmer, 189 Colo. 358, 360, 540 P.2d 341, 342 (1975). The subsection (4)(k) "not a continuing threat to society" mitigator, under which the trial court admitted most of the improperly considered aggravating circumstance evidence, provides a helpful example of the potential impact of the jury instruction.

The presumption that the jury follows a court's instructions has been applied in a variety of other contexts. See e.g., People v. Palmer, 189 Colo. 358, 360, 540 P.2d 341, 342 (Colo. 1975) (presuming that the jury followed an instruction to disregard hearsay evidence and noting that "defense counsel was afforded the opportunity, of which he did not take advantage, of submitting additional curative instructions."); People v. Anderson, 183 P.3d 649, 651-52 (Colo.App. 2007) (presuming that jury followed curative instruction to disregard inadmissible testimony, in a sexual assault on a child case, when caseworker improperly testified that she believed victim's allegations were true); Roget v. Grand Pontiac, Inc., 5 P.3d 341, 346 (Colo.App. 1999) (objectionable characterization of evidence during closing argument did not constitute reversible error where jury was given a curative instruction). Here, the trial court provided the jury with a limiting instruction immediately after Blood's closing argument.

We presume that the jury followed the court's instructions, Quintano v. People, 105 P.3d 585, 594 (Colo. 2005); Dunlap, 975 P.2d at 743; People v. Palmer, 189 Colo. 358, 360, 540 P.2d 341, 342 (1975), and therefore held the prosecution to its burden of proof on the second degree murder charge. This is not a case, unlike those relied on by defendant, where the court failed to inform the jury of its option to acquit the defendant.