• 1 More recent law has defined that to vitiate a criminal trial, the variance between allegations of a charge and the proof must be of such character that it misleads a defendant in making his defense or exposes him to double jeopardy. ( People v. Bristow, 8 Ill. App.3d 805, 291 N.E.2d 189 (1st Dist. 1972); People v. Palmer, 4 Ill. App.3d 309, 280 N.E.2d 754 (1st Dist. 1972).) The complaints here allege that the gambling place was at premises under defendant's control at 519 Fulton in Peoria; the proof shows that gambling activities were carried on at a place in Peoria called Palace Recreation Club which was under defendant's control at 529 Fulton Street in Peoria.

Unless prejudice can be shown from a variance between the allegations of the charge and the proofs at trial, demonstrating that the accused was unable to prepare his defense or that he would be subject to a second prosecution for the same offense, the variance will not be considered fatal nor will it mandate a new trial. (See People v. Palmer (1972), 4 Ill. App.3d 309, 311-12, 280 N.E.2d 754; People v. Hurley (1973), 10 Ill. App.3d 74, 76-77, 293 N.E.2d 341.) See also People v. Bristow (1972), 8 Ill. App.3d 805, 808-09, 291 N.E.2d 189, where the criminally damaged premises was alleged in the charge as owned by a housing corporation, whereas the proofs showed that the premises was owned by a university and leased to an association bearing a name similar to that of the housing corporation alleged in the charge, which in turn was in fact nonexistent; this court held that such variance was not fatal since neither the defendants nor the trier of fact were in any manner misled or prejudiced by the variance and also that the record of the proceedings would be a bar to further prosecution for the same offense.

Other appellate opinions have reviewed the matters of record to ascertain whether or not the accused was, in fact, misled in any way in the preparation of his defense. People v. Springs, 2 Ill. App.3d 817, 277 N.E.2d 764; People v. Viar, 131 Ill. App.2d 983, 268 N.E.2d 872; People v. Cicchetti, 2 Ill. App.3d 535, 275 N.E.2d 661; People v. Kaprelian, 6 Ill. App.3d 1066, 286 N.E.2d 613; People v. Palmer, 4 Ill. App.3d 309, 280 N.E.2d 754. In People v. Jones, 53 Ill.2d 460, 292 N.E.2d 361, the indictment named Charles Mundy as the victim of armed robbery.

This holding and many like it, recognize that if evidence proves ownership in someone other than the defendant, a variance in the owner's name is not material unless it appears that a jury was misled or that substantial injury was done to the accused. People v. Callahan, 324 Ill. 101, 154 N.E. 463; compare People v. Palmer, 4 Ill. App.3d 309, 280 N.E.2d 754. • 7 In the case before us, the indictment charged criminal damage to a fraternity house which in fact was the house of the fraternity in question.

We conclude that such variance as does exist is not fatal to the judgment. People v. Palmer (1972), 4 Ill. App.3d 309, 280 N.E.2d 754. • 3 It is next argued that the truck rental contract recovered during the course of a search of defendant's person at the police station should have been suppressed since the arrest pursuant to which the search was made was without probable cause.

Protection against double jeopardy is likewise afforded through the testimony at trial. As noted, the record adequately establishes the premises, and defendants have recourse to the record to establish a defense of prior jeopardy in subsequent prosecution for the same offense. (See People v. Palmer (1972), 4 Ill. App.3d 309, 311-312, 280 N.E.2d 754, 756-757.) We cannot conclude that any substantial injury was worked upon defendants in this regard.