Accordingly, although a 15- to 25-foot cannabis patch on a suburban lot surrounded by double fences of 6 and 10 feet in height was assumed to be within the curtilage in California v. Ciraolo (1986), 476 U.S. 207, 90 L.Ed.2d 210, 106 S.Ct. 1809, we cannot accept defendant's apparent argument that any cultivation of cannabis on a suburban lot per se falls within "classic" curtilage and is entitled to the same protection as the home without the application of the rule of Katz to the pertinent facts and circumstances. People v. Pakula (1980), 89 Ill. App.3d 789, 411 N.E.2d 1385. In People v. Pakula police from the adjoining lot observed three large cannabis plants growing among tomato plants in a fenced, suburban backyard.

"Whether the place searched is within the curtilage is to be determined from the facts, including its proximity or annexation to the dwelling, its inclusion within the general enclosure surrounding the dwelling, and its use and enjoyment as an adjunct to the domestic economy of the family." ( People v. Pakula (1980), 89 Ill. App.3d 789, 793, 411 N.E.2d 1385, 1388, quoting Wattenburg v. United States (9th Cir. 1968), 388 F.2d 853, 857.) In other words, the curtilage is defined "by reference to the factors that determine whether an individual reasonably may expect that an area immediately adjacent to the home will remain private."

We agree with the appellate court's application of the Dunn factors to the facts of this case. The facts presented here pertaining to curtilage are clearly distinguishable from those presented in People v. Pakula, 89 Ill. App. 3d 789 (1980), a pre- Dunn decision. There, police officers observed from an adjoining lot marijuana plants growing among tomato plants in a fenced, suburban backyard.

The defendant correctly observes that warrantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable under the fourth amendment unless they fall within a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions. ( Katz v. United States (1967), 389 U.S. 347, 357, 19 L.Ed.2d 576, 585, 88 S.Ct. 507, 514; People v. Pakula (1980), 89 Ill. App.3d 789, 793, 411 N.E.2d 1385; People v. Sanders (1976), 44 Ill. App.3d 510, 514, 358 N.E.2d 375, 378; People v. Creed (1975), 34 Ill. App.3d 282, 284, 339 N.E.2d 305, 307-08.) In this State those few exceptions are search by consent, search incident to arrest, and search predicated upon probable cause where there are exigent circumstances which make it impractical to obtain a warrant.

Its order does not contain findings as to whether the plants were located in the curtilage and, if so, whether under all relevant circumstances the Hoffmans had no reasonable expectations of privacy in their garden. See State v. Rickard, 420 So.2d 303 (Fla. 1982); State v.Rowe, 422 So.2d 75 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1982); State v. Hook, 60 Haw. 197, 587 P.2d 1224 (1978); People v. Pakula, 89 Ill. App.3d 789, 411 N.E.2d 1385 (Ill.App. 1980); State v. Silva, 509 A.2d 659 (Me. 1986); State v. Prier, 725 S.W.2d 667 (Tenn. 1987). But see People v. Schmidt, 168 Ill. App.3d 873, 522 N.E.2d 1317 (1988); State v. Loomis, 436 So.2d 1103 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1983); State v. McConnell, 422 So.2d 74 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1982); Lightfoot v. State, 356 So.2d 331 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.), cert. denied, 361 So.2d 833 (1978).

Id. 409 N.E.2d at 1080, citing Coolidge, supra; People v. Pakula, 89 Ill. App.3d 789, 44 Ill.Dec. 919, 411 N.E.2d 1385 (1980) (marijuana in fenced-in yard was visible from adjacent landowner, not from street; police action was planned warrantless seizure). Cf. proper procedure followed in George v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 509 S.W.2d 347 (1974) (anonymous call alerted police officer to possible contraband.

Exigent circumstances may arise if a defendant becomes aware, or is certain to become aware, of an officer's presence. Compare Benefield v. State, 160 So.2d 706 (Fla. 1964); State v. Nagel, 308 N.W.2d 539 (N.D. 1981), with People v. Wormack, 91 Ill. App.3d 169 (1980); People v. Pakula, 89 Ill. App.3d 789 (1980); State v. Platten, 225 Kan. 764 (1979); State v. Coyle, 95 Wn.2d 1 (1980). See United States v. Rubin, 474 F.2d 262 (3d Cir. 1973); Comment, Warrantless Residential Searches to Prevent the Destruction of Evidence: A Need For Strict Standards, 70 J. Crim. L. Criminology 255, 269 (1979).

See also: Hoffmanv. People, 780 P.2d 471, 475 (Colo. 1989); State v. Rickard, 420 So.2d 303 (Fla. 1982); State v. Hook, 60 Haw. 197, 1227-29, 587 P.2d 1224, 1228-1229 (1978); People v. Pakula, 89 Ill. App.3d 789, 793-96, 44 Ill.Dec. 919, 923-24, 411 N.E.2d 1385, 1389-1390 (1990); Sayre v. State, 471 N.E.2d 708, 713 (Ind.App. 1984), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1027, 106 S.Ct. 1226, 89 L.Ed.2d 336 (1986); Latham v. Sullivan, 295 N.W.2d 472, 476-477 (Iowa App. 1980). This principle is equally applicable whether police make a warrantless entry for the purpose of making an arrest or seizing contraband.

Courts in other jurisdictions have also held that entries into areas of the curtilage not open to the public, such as in the case sub judice, are violations of the Fourth Amendment absent a valid warrant or proper exigent circumstances. People v. Pakula, 89 Ill. App.3d 789, 44 Ill. Dec. 919, 921-923, 411 N.E.2d 1385, 1387-1389 (1980); Morsman v. State, 360 So.2d 137, 138 (Fla.App. 1978) cert. discharged, 394 So.2d 408 (Fla. 1981) cert. denied 452 U.S. 930, 101 S.Ct. 3066, 69 L.Ed.2d 431 and State v. Johnson, 301 N.W.2d 625, 627-628 (N.D. 1981). III. Abandonment

" See also People v. Pakula, 89 Ill.App.3d 789, 44 Ill.Dec. 919, 924, 411 N.E.2d 1385, 1390 (1980), where the court said: "The doctrine of plain view is not an exception itself to the requirement that a search or seizure must be supported by a warrant issued by a judge upon a finding of probable cause.